

# ARMY

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SEA AND AIR



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### The War Program

#### GENERAL MACARTHUR

NOW that time has passed and the MacArthur-Miller political correspondence has fallen into its proper perspective, there are some facts to be told about the military commander in the Southwest Pacific, which throw a light upon his attitude and conduct radically different from that cast by his critics. It is clear from his action in designating in his own handwriting as "personal" one of his letters to Congressman Miller, that he never assumed that that member of the House would be so lacking in good taste and sense of decency as to make them public along with his own, which contained the attacks upon the Administration and the New Deal. It must not be forgotten that remote from Washington, General MacArthur has not been fully informed on developments in the United States. Such communications as he has received from the War Department have been exclusively formal and official, and his personal friends who wrote to him have deemed it wise to be careful in their description of conditions at home because they feared examination of their missives by censors, and transmission of copies to Washington. Aware that Congressmen are in a position to resent the opening of, or failure to deliver, their letters, and therefore can write freely, General MacArthur probably gave more credence to the opinions of Miller than they were worth; and because of the position of his voluntary correspondent, with whom he is not even acquainted, in the House of Representatives, doubtless he felt obligated to reply in the agreeable language he used, never dreaming that his brief notes would be made public, or be interpreted beyond his intent. Moreover, in the midst of carrying out campaigns and planning others ahead against a powerful enemy, he probably hastily dictated the replies without considering how they might be regarded.

To understand General MacArthur, as the Military Service understands him, it should be pointed out that he is held in the highest respect and esteem by all who have served with or under him. As a leader of men, General Pershing looks upon him as specially gifted, and his achievements in the Southwest Pacific, where for a long time he was on the defensive without adequate forces or materiel, confirm this estimate made by the great soldier of World War I under whom MacArthur served. It is recognized that his fine character is accompanied by fine qualities of heart and mind.

It is equally recognized that basing his judgment upon thorough knowledge of the art of war, and practical experience, he does not hesitate forcefully to express his convictions. No one knows this better than President Roosevelt with whom the General when here talked frankly, and, when occasion required, bluntly; and that Mr. Roosevelt listened was shown by his reversal of decisions which had been carried out would have been destructive of the Regular Army. Although firm in his views, General MacArthur is open to reason and does not hesitate to accept sug-

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### Army Leaders Support Unification of Forces; Navy Under Secretary Asks Further Study

A single department of defense, created by consolidation of the present War and Navy Departments under one Cabinet officer, and a single chief of staff for all branches were advocated by eight ranking Army officials in testimony before the House Select Committee on Post War Military Policy this week. There was no agreement however on the part of the Navy, for Under Secretary Forrestal urged that action be delayed until Navy war chiefs could be called to give their views.

Several of the Army witnesses, including Under Secretary of War Patterson and Lt. Gen. Breton B. Somervell, Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, urged a complete consolidation of duplicating functions, indicating the advisability of a single supply agency for items common to all the services, a single medical department, possibly even a single educational system. This viewpoint was endorsed by Representative Maas, of Minn., ranking Republican on the House Naval Committee, an advocate of organization of men in task forces, not as Army, Navy, Marine Corps or Air.

In contrast to the Army's witnesses,

the first Navy witness, Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal expressed his direct opposition to consolidation at the present time, and indicated that the case for consolidation after the war or for a single air force remains to be proved.

"On the question whether or not there should be an attempt now to secure legislation creating a single Department of War, the Navy is definitely in opposition," Mr. Forrestal told the committee yesterday.

"Any attempt to pass legislation at this juncture would inevitably be attended by extensive debate," he continued. "Properly to implement that debate in the Congress would, on the part of the Navy, require the services of many men who are now continuously occupied in prosecuting the war. You would want, I should think, to talk to Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Halsey, Vice Admiral Turner, to Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and many others. These men are all away from Washington fighting the war. I doubt whether you would want to pass legislation without obtaining their views, and it is obvious that to call them back from their duties at this

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### Navy Court Martial Changes

Legislation designed to modernize Navy court martial procedures was asked of Congress by the Navy Department this week.

Under the proposed bill the convening of a general court would be handled the same in peace as in war. Officers empowered by the Secretary of the Navy to convene such a court would be (1) the commanding officer of a division, squadron, flotilla or other naval force afloat; (2) the commandant or commanding officer of any naval district, naval operating base, navy yard, or naval stations; (3) the chief of any air functional command, and (4) the commanding officer of a marine barracks, marine corps station, marine training center, or marine camp, or a wing, brigade or larger force of the Navy or Marine Corps not attached to a navy yard or naval station.

Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal indicated that these changes are necessary to take care of changes in organization and to make the provisions applicable to the present organization of the Navy. Continuing, he said the changes eliminate "the restriction on the discretionary power of the Secretary to authorize certain officers to convene such courts martial only in time of war and the extension of the Secretary to empower commanding officers of the Marine Corps and air organizations to convene general courts martial."

The bill also would make the number of officers composing a general court martial (subject to a minimum of 5) as many as may be directed by the convening authority rather than as many as can be ordered without injury to the service. The maximum of 13 is retained.

The authority of all naval courts mar-

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### Army Reduces Officer Candidate Facilities

With the initial pressing demand for junior officers met and the need for the Officer Candidate School program decreasing rapidly, not more than 11 of the original 26 schools in continental United States will be in operation this fall.

During March, the following Officer Candidate Schools were suspended: Fort Riley, Kans. (Cav.); Fort Monroe, Va. (CA); Camp Hood, Texas (Tank Destroyer).

On March, the Military Police Officer Candidate School at Fort Custer, Mich., accepted its last class and will be suspended after graduation of this class on 27 June, 1944. The Antiaircraft Artillery Officer Candidate School at Camp Davis, N. C., enrolled its last class on 20 February and will close on 15 June, 1944.

The Chemical Warfare Service Officer Candidate School, Edgewood Arsenal, Md., which enrolled a class last 13 March for graduation this 8 July, will be suspended on completion of this class. The Armored Officer Candidate School, at Fort Knox, Ky., will be suspended on 23 Sept., 1944, when its last class, enrolled 29 May, will be graduated.

When the peak of the program was reached in December, 1942, more than 23,000 enrollees were graduated in that month from Officer Candidate Schools. Since then, the number of monthly graduates has steadily dropped until now it is below 2,500. Of the four Officer Candidate Schools overseas, only the one in Australia now is in operation.

Officer Candidate Schools which at present accept candidates are: Fort Belvoir, Va. (Eng.); Fort Sill, Okla. (FA); Durham, N. C. (Fin.); Fort Benning, Ga. (Inf.); Ann Arbor, Mich. (JAG); Camp Barkeley, Tex. (Med. Adm.); Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. (Ord.); Camp Lee, Va. (QMC); Fort Monmouth, N. J. (Sig.); New Orleans, La. (Trans.); San Antonio, Tex. (AAF), which will supplant the Army Air Force Officer Candidate School at Miami, Fla.

Officer Candidate Schools which were suspended prior to those already mentioned include: Ft. Washington, Md. (AGD); Ft. Warren, Wyo. (QM); Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (Med. Adm.); Fargo, N. D. (Army Adm.); Grinnell, Iowa (Army Adm.); Gainesville, Fla. (Army Adm.); Ft. Washington, Md. (Army Adm.).

### Admiral King's Report

The full text of the report of Admiral Ernest J. King, commander in chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, is printed in this issue of the ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL, beginning on page 1034.

### Army Officers' Winter Uniform

The Quartermaster Corps has completed redesigning of the Army officers' winter uniform to increase comfort and improve appearance, while retaining the present basic style. The redesigned uniform will be available to officer personnel next fall when they change from summer to winter uniform.

It was pointed out by the War Department that officers are not required to discard or alter present uniforms, since Army Regulations provide that whenever changes in design or material of uniforms are prescribed, all members of the Army are authorized to wear out existing clothing. Uniforms procured or manufactured after publication of changes will be of the new type.

The "sports" type of back, with pleats from the outer edge of the shoulders to the waistline, will be replaced in the new design by a plain back. The new design eliminates the vertical seams from the collar to the tops of the upper pockets. The matching cloth belt is equipped with a new type tongueless bar buckle with rounded corners, raised polished rims, and horizontally lined background, similar to the background of regulation coat buttons.

Patterns for the uniform are available

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### Close Camp Lee Center

Announcement of the closing of the reception center at Camp Lee, Va., "sometime in May" featured a conference of reception center representatives of the Third Service Command at New Cumberland, Pa., last week. The disclosure was made by Lt. Col. Floyd W. Ferree, chief of the enlisted procurement branch, personnel division, Baltimore.

### Army Nominations

The President yesterday sent to the Senate the following nominations:

To be Lieutenant Generals (temporary): Louis H. Brereton and Barney McK. Giles.

To be major general (temporary): Elwood R. Quesada.

## Admiral King's Report

*Baltimore Sun*—"The realism of Admiral King's comprehensive account heightens his confidence and that of his readers. It presents a record in which the Navy can rightly take tremendous pride and for which the whole country must be deeply grateful."

*Scranton Times*—"Without brag but supported by concrete facts Admiral Ernest J. King, commander in chief of the United States Fleet and chief of naval operations, summarizes the war situation with the declaration that 'we are going far and fast' toward defeating the enemy."

*Newark Star-Ledger*—"The report gains in impressiveness from its candid admission of past mistakes and honest acknowledgement of enemy achievements. Typical of this candor is his reference to the worst defeat we sustained in combat with the Japanese in the South Pacific—between Florida Island and Guadalcanal 24 hours after our landing at Guadalcanal."

*New York Times*—"But perhaps the most salutary lesson lies in Admiral King's report on the situation at the outbreak of the war. Though the menace of Germany and Japan had been rising for years, we maintained a fatal Maginot mentality of our own, thinking merely in terms of defense. We did not begin to build up our Navy until the war had actually started."

*Richmond Times-Dispatch*—"Now that our carrier-based planes can strike westward almost at will, it

can be only a question of time before we shall be landing on the Philippines, and then on the China coast. The latter, as Admiral King has made plain, is the only really effective base from which land power can be crushingly mobilized for the final crushing blows against Japan."

*Newark Evening News*—"Seizure of Hollandia and other important points on the North New Guinea coast comes like a dramatic corroboration of Admiral King's report on the Navy's part in the war. For the seizure represents one of those high points in combined operations which Admiral King describes as the end result of our efforts to date."

*Washington Star*—"Admiral King's report to the Secretary of the Navy tells the story of a United States Fleet which has fought its way back from the edge of disaster to an assured command of the seas in which our vital interests lie. Much of this recital has to do with the physical growth of the fleet."

*New York Herald-Tribune*—"Clearly we have come a long way since the desperate and divided days of 1941 and 1942. Some idea of how we have done so—well as a somewhat grimmer picture than we then knew of just how desperate those days really were—is now conveyed from the naval point of view, in Admiral King's long report."

*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*—"How the Navy managed to do those more essential jobs, while it awaited the reinforcements which would enable it to carry the fight to the enemy, is a thrilling tale well told by

Admiral King. How far and how fast the Navy has come along is shown by the frankness with which he discussed earlier and serious reverses."

*Manchester Union*—"Admiral King's report was intended primarily as a summary of Naval aspects of the war to date. As such it has a mass of detail that is chiefly of historic value. Like General Marshall in his report some weeks ago on the military aspects of the war, Admiral King writes with an easy picturesque style that makes his summary interesting reading."

*Columbus, Ohio State Journal*—"Today when our Navy, according to King, is at least three times greater than the Jap sea forces, we get news that everybody has been curious about and which many had inklings of as a result of veiled hints coming back from the Pacific. It is recognized that the Navy was right in withholding news to total extent of damage done our fleet at the time, but in view of the fact that we have had preponderance of power, numbers and quality of ships in the Pacific for more than a year, it is hard to understand why this news has been withheld until now."

*Trenton Evening Times*—"Admiral King's conclusions are supremely confident even though reserved. While long roads still lie ahead both in Europe and in the Pacific, we are now prepared to 'travel far and fast to victory.' He presents a sound basis for the confidence in victory but offers no justification for the hope that we may coast along easily and comfortably to that alluring objective."

## Navy Court Martial Changes

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tial and courts of inquiry to subpoena witnesses would be extended to apply to any part of the United States, its territories and possessions in the same manner as in United States courts of criminal jurisdiction.

The punishment that may be inflicted by a summary court would be increased by the bill. It would increase the maximum of confinement from 2 to 6 months, and increase the maximum permissible deprivation of pay from 3 months to 6 months. In explanation of the changes Mr. Forrestal said, "The existing limitations are considered unsound as they require trial for many offenses by general court martial to insure adequate punishment. Moreover, the restrictions do not permit of sufficient variation between the sentences of deck courts and summary courts martial. The increase in the power to impose greater deprivations of pay is particularly desirable, as such a form of punishment will accomplish the intended salutary effect without the loss of manpower incident to sentences of confinement."

The requirement that the proceedings of a summary court martial must be reviewed by the convening authority and his immediate superior in command before the sentence can be carried out would be modified to provide for a review by the immediate superior in command only when the convening authority is below the rank of commander in the Navy or lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps. This would do away with the unnecessary review of a number of cases, but would protect the interests of accused persons by providing such a review where the court was ordered by an officer of junior rank.

Deck courts would be permitted to impose a sentence of 30 days' loss of pay instead of the 20 day maximum now provided.

The punishment that may be inflicted on an enlisted man by order of the commanding officer would be increased to permit a sentence of loss of pay for not more than 10 days. The provision for "extra duties" is changed to "extra police duties" to accord with the punishment provided for summary courts martial.

Concluding his letter to the Congress Under Secretary Forrestal indicated that the provisions are desirable to permit the commanding officer in appropriate cases to impose punishment in the nature of fines and thus avoid the necessity of resorting to confinement to punish enlisted men. The loss of manpower incident to confinement in the cases of enlisted men will be greatly reduced.

First aid may be your last—if the seal on your First Aid Packet is broken. The seal keeps germs out of the packet—and you. Don't break it!

## Gift Aids Rehabilitation

A remarkable contribution to the rehabilitation of sick and wounded war veterans was made this week when Mr. Bernard M. Baruch gave \$1,100,000 to advance teaching and research in the field of physical medicine, including the diagnosis and treatment of disease by light, water, heat, electricity, exercise, and massage.

Mr. Baruch said that his contribution would be only an initial one if the program develops as he hopes. "If it works out all right," Mr. Baruch said, "I propose that practically all of my fortune will go into it. But it has got to turn out right. I don't like to waste money."

The gift was made only after he had received a report, made at his request, on the possibilities of the physical medicine field. Vice Adm. Ross T. McIntire, Surgeon General of the Navy, expressed himself "in complete accord with the principle and recommendation" of the report and said the plan for increasing the number of teachers was "highly desirable." Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, Surgeon General of the Army, said his branch of the services was "vitally concerned with any new scientific enlightenment in this field, especially as it pertains to reconditioning of wounded soldiers and sailors."

Other endorsements came from Maj. Gen. David N. W. Grant, Air Surgeon of the Army, and Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines, Administrator of the Veterans Bureau, as well as from many leading scientists from all parts of the country.

## Seeks Former Officer

The ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL is in receipt of an appeal from Mr. H. G. Wall, president of radio station WIBC, Indianapolis Ind., seeking the services of a wounded or discharged officer of either this war or World War I.

"I desire to procure," Mr. Wall writes, "a wounded discharged or retired Army or Navy officer with the rank of captain or better to broadcast three and not to exceed four daily news programs of 15 minutes each. The material covering the news will come exclusively from AP or UP tickers which we have installed in the studios. It will not be necessary, or even desirable, to make any personal comments but to stick closely to the war, political and domestic news as it comes over the tickers. In other words, the officer would not be violating any rules or regulations of any of the services by inserting personal comment with respect to strategy or any other similar matters.

"Even though such officer might be wounded or crippled, there is no reason why he should not be able to fulfill this position as it requires no physical exertion whatever other than the possible strain of reading the news continuously for 15 minute periods."

Those interested should write to Mr. Wall at WIBC, 9th Floor, Indianapolis

Athletic Club, giving details concerning experience and background. It will be necessary that the studio be furnished with a transcription of the voice of the applicant. This can be done by arrangement with local broadcasting stations.

## 1945 Naval Funds

Adopted by the Senate this week by a 61 to 0 vote, the 1945 Navy Department appropriation bill has gone to conference for adjustment of minor amendments.

The Senate cut \$2,404,635 from the \$27,572,202,936 bill approved by the House. One million of this reduction was cut from Bureau of Naval Personnel Instruction; one million, from repairs and improvements to Marine barracks, and \$404,635, from telephone, telegraph and teletype rentals and tolls.

During debate on the bill, Chairman Overton of the Naval Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, declared that by the end of 1945, the combat strength of the Navy will be as great as the combatant strength of the combined navies of all the rest of the world.

Earlier, during hearings on the bill, Vice Adm. F. J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, had told the subcommittee:

"I should say that our Navy at the end of this year, 1944, would be at least three times that of the available Axis ships in the Pacific."

The 1945 bill, Senator Overton told the Senate, provides for the construction of some 20,000 landing craft, doubling the present number of such craft.

Indicative of the growing importance of the air arm of the Navy was the statement of Vice Adm. J. S. McCain to the committee that 52 flag officers are now flying and drawing flight pay. The number of flag admirals who may draw flight pay is limited by law to 60.

## WACS New Overseas Cap

A new summer garrison or overseas cap for wear by members of the Women's Army Corps was announced this week.

The new cap, a feminine version of the regular Army overseas cap, is made of khaki tropical worsted. Smartly tailored along soft lines, it fits the back of the head snugly and comes to a graceful point on the forehead. Caps worn by enlisted women will be bordered in braid of old gold and moss green, the colors of the WAC. Caps of WAC officers will be piped with the same gold and black braid worn on garrison caps of officers of the Army.

## Change EFTC Command

Maj. Gen. William O. Butler last week assumed command of the AAF Eastern Flying Training Command, with headquarters at Maxwell Field, Alabama. He succeeds Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hanley, Jr., whose new assignment has not been announced.

## Army Officers' Uniform

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to manufacturers through the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot. By making approved standard patterns available to manufacturers, rather than permitting each to make up his own, it is expected that a more uniform appearance in officers' clothing will result.

The patterns are made for eight different builds, and will go far in eliminating the need for specially tailored uniforms.

To reduce the necessity for extensive alterations, the waist proportions have been based on a seven-inch drop from the chest to the waist, a proportion which will fit the average figure. The skirt to the coat has been redesigned to prevent undue flaring. The sleeves have been set into raised armholes to make a clean appearance in front and to add more comfort. The coat has a full lining for easier wear over a woolen shirt.

The trousers have been cut with a higher rise at the waistline, additional fullness and wider belt loops for better appearance and more comfort.

## Right to Rental Allowance

The Comptroller General has held (decision B-38567) that an officer with or without dependents is entitled, with certain exceptions, to rental allowance during the interim between detachment from permanent station and reporting to a new permanent station, including periods while on leave of absence and while on sick leave from hospital, regardless of the officer's status for rental allowance purposes while at his former permanent station, that is, no distinction is made between officers furnished quarters in kind and those receiving an allowance in lieu of quarters.

Where, after detachment from his overseas station and return to the United States for hospitalization, an Army officer without dependents was hospitalized and assigned to a replacement pool pending determination of his fitness for further military duties and was granted sick leave away from the hospital prior to completion of his hospitalization, he is entitled, under section 6 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, as amended, to rental allowance for the period while on sick leave away from hospital.

## Regular Army Promotion

Promotions and Vacancies on the Promotion List (Cumulative) since 21 April 1944

Last promotion to the grade of Col.—John F. Davis, Cav., No. 67. Vacancies—Six. Last nomination to the grade of Col.—Henry J. F. Miller, AC, No. 75. Senior Lt. Col.—Alfred S. Balsam, QMC, No. 78.

Last promotion to the grade of Lt. Col.—George H. Bare, Inf., No. 200.

Last promotion to the grade of Maj.—Willard R. Wolfenbarger, AC, No. 227.

Last promotion to the grade of Capt.—Adrian L. Hoebeke, Inf., No. 298.

Last promotion to the grade of 1st Lt.—Francis M. Smith, Inf., No. 721.

## Publishers Hear Service Leaders

Editors and publishers of newspapers from all over the United States, attending the annual meetings of The Associated Press and the American Newspaper Publishers Association in New York City, this week heard on and off the record talks from many of the high ranking officers in all services.

Messages, by transcription, were heard from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied invasion commander, and Lt. Gen. Jacob Devers, deputy supreme commander in the Mediterranean Theater. General Eisenhower said:

"Public opinion wins wars—that is as true now as ever. In order to facilitate the flow of news to the public in the impending operations, we are drawing upon past experiences and hope to profit from them."

"I have always considered as quasi-staff officers those correspondents who are accredited to my headquarters. These correspondents are a part of the great team striving to conclude this war successfully at the earliest moment."

General Devers said:

"The battle in Italy on two fronts is grim beyond description. It cannot be compared to any other campaign. . . . The result to date has been disappointing due in a large part to the terrain and weather conditions."

"However, these problems will be solved and in the meantime we must place in the balance the fact that a number of enemy divisions have been drawn into this theater while vital needed elsewhere; that the airfields of Italy are now playing an important part in the Balkan situation and in the bombing of northern Italy and Germany; that the enemy has stalled after repeated efforts to eliminate, first, the Salerno beachhead and, later, the Anzio beachhead, with a consequent loss of morale. Heavy casualties have been inflicted upon him and great quantities of his supplies have been destroyed."

Excerpts from the addresses of officers appearing before the meetings follow:

### Secretary of War

The Secretary of War addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D. C., said:

"Possibly I have exaggerated it but it seems to me that today the press reflects a growing disposition on the part of our people to set apart the Army and the Navy from those in civilian life; in other words, to separate a part of our population as a disconnected task force which has been selected to do a difficult, unpleasant, and dangerous job. And while they engage in this desperate assignment, a large part of the remainder of the country feels free to climb up into the grandstand, prepared to watch the show. You should know whether this impression of mine is correct."

"The efficient setting up and training of powerful armies on land and sea and in the air and their transport to theatres of offensive action thousands of miles away has given an almost irresistible impression of ultimate and even prompt victory. What better opportunity could there be than this for reverting to undiluted, self-interested human nature—for discarding from our minds the necessary sacrifices which should be in the thoughts of a Nation at war for its very existence."

"Division of our war effort, either by division among our Armed Forces themselves; or between the Armed Forces and the civilian population (which was the major cause of the collapse of Germany in 1918); or division between ourselves and our Allies—there lies the possibility of defeat."

### Admiral Radford

Rear Adm. Arthur W. Radford, USN, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) also addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors, declared:

"We are hearing much these days about thousand-plane raids on Europe, and of course this news is justified in every respect. The public does not yet seem generally aware, however, that thousand-plane raids in the Pacific, conducted by planes flown from carriers, have become the rule rather than the exception. This applies of course to our major carrier offensives, such as the first big raid on Truk."

"It is no exaggeration to say that today the Navy is capable of striking with a thousand-plane raids—and more than a thousand planes if necessary—at almost any spot in the Pacific Ocean."

"As our task forces grow bigger and bigger, it is reasonable to assume that, eventually, even the shores of Japan itself will not be safe from our sudden strikes and de-

structive raids. It is possible, also, that this day may be somewhat nearer than the Japanese think."

"Unfortunately, I can tell you nothing at all about the new carrier tactics which have been developed by the Japanese, if any. The reason for this is the fact that we haven't been able to find a Japanese carrier since November of 1942. We know that the Japanese still have carriers, and we expect that we will someday have the pleasure of making their acquaintance. We look forward to this meeting with much hope. At the same time, however, we are aware that there is still a lot of hard and bitter fighting ahead, and we still have a long way to go."

### General Kuter

Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, USA, Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, Army Air Forces, at the American Society of Newspaper Editors, said:

"We never have contemplated any year-after-year-after-year struggle. We doubt whether the Japs do today except for home consumption. They can recognize the tactical pattern of what lies ahead for them. They also are reviewing the past year's operations in the Pacific."

"During the past year, we have maintained our qualitative superiority and increased our quantitative strength. We have driven back the enemy's air battle line, and the land and sea battle lines now follow rapidly."

### Admiral Low

Rear Adm. Francis S. Low, USN, Chief of Staff Tenth Fleet, before the Newspaper Editors, said:

"The German U-boat today is sinking considerably less than one-half of one percent of the ships being convoyed across the Atlantic by the Navies of the United Nations."

"We felt that we had achieved some measure of success when we raised our score to the point where we were sinking one U-boat for each Allied merchant ship we lost. In our parlance, this is called 'the exchange rate.' Today our exchange rate and our score is even better. According to the latest figures, the Germans are now losing a ratio of more than one U-boat for each Allied merchant vessel they sink. How long Hitler can keep up this suicidal type of warfare—only Hitler seems to know. At least he knows his U-boat losses, although he cannot be certain of our merchant losses; and it should be obvious by this time that the flow of men, weapons and supplies across the Atlantic has not been stopped."

"The average combat life of a German submarine today is far less than it was a year ago. In fact we believe that it takes the Germans two or three times as long to build a submarine as that vessel may expect to endure on combat patrol. Such a rate of attrition, if hardly need be added, is not conducive to winning wars and influencing neutrals. And I take pleasure in emphasizing that this comparison bears no relation to our own submarine losses."

### General Wilbur

Brig. Gen. William H. Wilbur, USA, Assistant Division Commander, 36th Infantry Division, told the Newspaper Editors that:

"We had hoped that airplanes, tanks, artillery, and machines could carry the major part of the load of battle. We had hoped that in this war infantry could be charged with a minor role. It does not appear to be so. The Infantry soldier still carries almost the entire load. On those fronts such as in Italy, where all elements of our fighting forces are in daily action against the enemy, this is most apparent. There, for each individual private soldier of the Artillery, Air Corps, Engineers or other arms that is killed, there are thirty, fifty, even 100 privates of Infantry who make the supreme sacrifice for their country."

### General Vandegrift

Lt. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, at the Associated Press Luncheon, said:

"Current in the pages of your newspapers are the stories of the atoll battles, the shattering bombardments, followed by the amphibious assaults. Kwajalein and Eniwetok were the results—in light casualties—of the hard lessons we learned at Tarawa. But the remaining islands on the Tokyo road are not all atolls. The Marianas and the Carolines and the Bonins are not coral atolls. They are volcanic islands, choked with jungle growth and honey-combed with caves. There will be many places where Naval gunfire will not be possible and where bombs will not penetrate. As we go closer to Japan I have no doubt that the enemy will redouble his fury in defense and counterattack."

"In two years we have learned much of this close, individual war and our technical equipment has improved by bounds. This learning and development does not stop with the technique of battle on a grand scale or new landing craft. It goes into the very heart of our organizations. Since 7 December 1941, in a thousand jungle skirmishes, we have built up a tremendous volume of experience."

"A minor but representatively far-reaching example of the fruits of this experience is our new rifle squad, which I mention here because it affects every Marine in every rifle regiment. Where formerly our squads were ten or twelve men under a leader and his assistant, now each squad is an integrated unit of three separate 'fire teams' each with its own automatic weapon, anti-tank grenade, and riflemen; and each man is a fighting unit. It is a good organization for American Marines."

Governors aren't installed on equipment to slow down your war effort. They're put there to protect the equipment. Don't permit tampering with governors!

## Secretary Knox Dead

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox died suddenly yesterday afternoon.

While in Manchester, N. H., early in the week, attending the funeral of Mr. J. A. Muehling, his partner of 40 years' standing, Mr. Knox suffered an attack of what was diagnosed as "gastrointestinal upset complicated with dizziness." Upon his return to Washington and upon the advice of his physician he cancelled all his appointments and stayed home. His condition took a turn for the worse yesterday and death followed shortly after noon.

Mr. Knox had been Secretary of the Navy since early in the emergency and under his guidance the Navy had grown from its small pre-war size to its present position as the largest fleet in the world. When it suffered the greatest blow in history at Pearl Harbor, it was Mr. Knox who, while not minimizing the severity of the losses, strove to keep the remainder on the aggressive and to rebuild the fleet far beyond its former power.

Leaving his position as publisher of the *Chicago Daily News* to become Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox had behind him a distinguished career in the newspaper business and in the Army. Before taking over the *Chicago Daily News* he had been publisher of the *Boston American* and *Boston Daily Advertiser* as well as having been connected with a number of other newspapers. During the Spanish American War he served with Troop D of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders). Later he was a major on the staff of the Governor of New Hampshire. During the World War he was commissioned a captain of the Field Artillery, and assigned to the staff of the 78th Division. Later he was promoted to major and served with the 153rd Field Artillery Brigade in France.

His loss will be felt keenly throughout the Armed Services, where his force of character and keen judgment has served as a stimulus since the war began.

## Calendar of Legislation

### ACTION ON LEGISLATION

H. R. 4624. To consolidate and revise laws relating to the Public Health Service. Reported by House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Service.

\* S. 608. To grant service connection for disabilities incurred after acceptance, selection, or order to duty and prior to rejection or induction into the armed services. Reported by House Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation.

H. R. 3176. Provides for the furnishing of artificial limbs or other appliances for retired officers and enlisted men and certain civilian employees of the military and naval forces, same to be furnished whenever reasonably necessary instead of once every three years. Reported by Senate Committee on Finance.

H. R. 4559. Navy Appropriations bill. Passed, amended, by Senate.

S. 1508. Provides that the effective date of awards of death pension or compensation in cases of persons missing or missing in action shall be the date of death reported or found by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, instead of by the Veterans' Administration. Reported by Senate Committee on Finance.

S. 1838. To reimburse Navy and former Navy personnel for personal property lost by fire in quarters occupied by the 12th Naval Construction Battalion, 26 Dec. 1942, and the 42nd Naval Construction Battalion on 29 March, 1943. Reported by Senate Naval Committee.

S. 1839. To reimburse Navy personnel for personal property lost by fire at naval advance base depot, Port Hueneme, Calif., 6 Feb. 1944. Reported by Senate Naval Committee.

S. 1840. To reimburse Navy and former Navy personnel for personal property lost by fire in the bachelor officers' quarters, Argentina, Newfoundland, 12 Jan. 1943. Reported by Senate Naval Committee.

S. 1841. To reimburse Navy and former Navy personnel for personal property lost by fire at the Naval Station, Tutuila, Samoa, 20 Oct. 1943. Reported by Senate Naval Committee.

S. 1842. To reimburse Marine Corps personnel for personal property lost by fire at the Marine barracks, naval supply depot, Bayonne, N. J., 25 April, 1943. Reported by Senate Naval Committee.

S. 1856. Sen. Lucas, Ill. To increase the maximum amount of national service life insurance which may be carried by any person in the armed forces by an amount equal to \$5,000 for each child of such person.

S. 1861. Sen. Andrews, Fla. To establish a Dental Department in the Navy.

S. 1866. Sen. Walsh, Mass. To provide monetary benefits for certain enlisted men of the Regular Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard discharged for service-connected disabilities.

H. R. 4662. Rep. Brooks, La. Would amend WAC law to provide that the commanding officer of that corps shall have the rank of major general and such officers of lower rank as the Secretary of War may prescribe.

## Army and Navy Journal

April 29, 1944

1015

### Army Promotions

The following temporary promotions in the Army of the United States have been announced by the War Department:

**Lt. Col. to Colonel**  
A. O. Acer, AGD  
W. M. Goldston, TC  
J. W. Sobey, Cav.  
C. E. Martin, TC

**Major to Lt. Col.**  
J. Y. Ledbetter, AC  
G. S. Stone, Jr., MC  
C. H. Henry, AUS  
C. E. Smithson, Sig C  
J. T. Moorhead, QMC  
J. F. Schlitz, AC  
A. E. Montgomery, MC  
F. Caldwell, AC  
R. B. Bowie, JAGD  
A. M. Stephens, TC  
C. B. Gould, AC  
W. H. Mitchell, AC  
S. Green, JAGD  
A. N. Bontempo, AUS  
M. H. White, AUS  
Andre Lord, AUS  
T. F. Bonsall, Sig C  
W. J. Lynn, OD  
B. H. McLeMORE, FA  
B. Q. Van Cott, AC  
S. N. Lapsley, AUS  
J. E. Chamberlin, AUS  
R. Gleason, AUS  
F. L. McDonald, OD  
E. H. Bowman, AC  
J. R. Lane, Inf.  
A. Pohan, AC  
S. McWilliam, MC  
G. Scholl, Sig C  
J. M. Shank, AC  
F. G. Hoffman, AC  
J. M. Hildahl, CE  
R. H. Morris, MC  
T. F. Moran, MC  
J. D. Mage, CE  
F. S. Brackett, Sig C  
E. B. Condon, AUS  
J. H. Owen, AUS  
W. S. Wheeler, AUS  
H. S. Kessell, Inf.  
H. Silverberg, Sig C

**Captain to Major**  
W. T. Kemp, Jr., AUS  
P. W. Hansen, AC  
G. R. Thomas, Jr., AC  
V. C. Thompson, Inf.  
F. L. Ferguson, AC  
G. H. Walker, Jr., AUS  
J. Hubbard, GSC  
P. R. Baker, AUS  
R. F. Bender, AC  
P. Sheridan, FD  
A. M. Meis, FD  
H. H. Young, FD  
G. H. Cook, AUS  
L. Lally, AUS  
E. M. Hoskinson, AC  
H. F. Read, CAC  
W. G. Sent, AUS  
R. H. Fuchs, FD  
L. P. Geary, AC  
K. S. Reames, FD  
M. H. Strickler, AC  
J. Palser, FD  
R. R. Laacke, AUS  
S. F. Flynn, CAC  
D. B. Otis, FD  
W. H. Binder, QMC  
S. P. Brown, AC  
T. F. Lynch, AC  
J. Kass, AUS  
R. S. Ecke, MC  
D. Granger, Jr., AUS  
D. E. Riley, AC  
M. W. Greenhal, AUS  
W. H. Rollins, AUS  
H. L. Pitser, FD  
L. W. Guernsey, Jr., AUS  
D. M. Starrett, AUS  
W. J. Long, AC  
M. P. Penn, CE  
T. R. Scheffer, FD  
J. C. Winget, AUS  
D. L. Hancock, AUS  
J. H. Zabriskie, AUS  
M. E. Wilkins, Jr., AUS  
K. R. Wadleigh, Inf.  
D. F. Davison, AUS  
S. C. Grashoff, AC  
R. A. Larsen, AUS  
C. D. Frierson, Jr., Inf.  
M. B. Adams, CE  
R. A. Ragan, CAC  
A. F. Rice, CE  
R. E. Wolcott, AC  
A. L. Chladek, CE  
P. B. Martin, AUS

**Captain to Major**  
W. G. Cowles, Inf.  
J. B. Donnelly, AC  
Nelson Miles, FA  
L. P. Payne, CE  
W. J. Donnelly, Jr., QMC  
D. R. Smith, AUS  
W. T. Prietley, AC  
H. P. Evans, Jr., CE  
M. J. Harding, QMC  
M. B. Johns, Jr., AGD  
W. G. Flagg, CE  
J. H. Catlin, CMC  
J. A. Maurice, CE  
R. P. Balkman, FD  
S. E. Goodwin, CE  
L. Orlov, AC  
A. M. Cadwell, QMC  
S. L. Bousquin, AGD  
I. R. Kolman, CE  
J. J. Gibbons, AUS  
O. R. Salmela, AC  
J. M. Berutich, Inf.  
F. L. Stayner, CE  
M. R. Wiseman, Inf.  
T. E. Peterson, QMC  
J. McC. Malone, Inf.  
A. F. Collar, CWS  
J. M. Flennedy, TC  
H. R. Williams, OD  
L. W. Weller, MC  
M. L. Hall, AUS  
H. T. Dykman, AUS  
C. L. Anderson, MC  
R. E. Falconer, AUS  
J. W. Delafield, FA  
E. W. Stearns, WAC  
W. W. Seymour, Inf.  
R. N. Davies, Inf.  
S. E. Wildman, AUS  
R. H. Budd, Inf.  
L. R. Ware, FA  
F. Lindeman, Jr., CE  
G. L. Noblett, CE  
L. Sherman, AC  
D. E. Neldig, Jr., CWS  
R. H. Miller, Inf.  
J. L. Crawford, AUS  
W. J. Reed, AUS  
L. C. Hutton, Cav.  
N. C. MacKay, AC  
F. Earhart, Inf.  
H. F. Coganougher, AC  
D. H. Byram, MC  
C. W. Dinsmore, AUS

(Please turn to Page 1050)

## The Journal Salutes

Capt. M. L. Britt, Inf., and 2nd Lt. Ernest Childers, Inf., awarded Medal of Honor for exploits in Italy.

Reed B. Hogan, CphM; Charles E. Hart, PhM; Wesley S. Proctor, PhM, and Harry E. Reite, PhM, first Navy personnel to receive new Coast Guard Star Medal.

Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA, appointed Deputy Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force.



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Ander-

M. Ken-

Simon-

Garney

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E. Arm-

J. Bader

Carlson

Fleisher

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R. Marts

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R. Schult

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J. Abrams

D. Amann

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


# A REPORT TO THE NATION

## *on General Motors 1943 War Activities*

- ★ Physical volume of war materials produced was more than double that of 1942.
- ★ Total value of 1943 war production more than 3 billion, 500 million dollars.
- ★ Average total employment 448,848, an all-time high.
- ★ Total payrolls more than 1 billion, 300 million dollars—up 54%.
- ★ Net income after taxes from manufacturing operations— $3\frac{3}{10}$  cents per dollar of sales.
- ★ Materials and services purchased from others approximately 1 billion, 900 million dollars—up 88%.

### PRODUCTION



GENERAL MOTORS 1943 deliveries of war material rose to a total value of more than  $3\frac{1}{2}$  billion dollars, or about 87% more than in 1942. The increase in physical volume was even greater, since unit prices were reduced during the year. Deliveries of service parts and other authorized civilian material amounted to \$250,000,000, a decrease of about 30% from 1942.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, G.M. deliveries of war products were at a rate of two million dollars' worth a day. By the end of 1943 the daily rate was above twelve million dollars. The 2,300 separate items placed in production ranged from small and delicate parts to airplane engines, complete airplanes, tanks, and powerful Diesel engines for submarines and landing craft.

### EMPLOYMENT




AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT in General Motors in 1943 was 448,848, an all-time high. The figure stood at 503,749 in December. In 1942, the yearly average was 314,144, and the December figure was 391,975. Thus the increase in yearly average was 43%. All the same time, payrolls rose 54%, and reached a total of about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  billion dollars.

More than 200,000 new G.M. employees were trained for war work in 1943. Enrollment in courses for supervisors and executives totaled 21,500.

The percentage of working time lost because of accidents was less in 1943 than ever before.

### PRICES AND PROFITS



TOTAL NET INCOME after taxes in 1943 from war output and other sources was \$149,780,088, compared to \$163,651,588 in 1942 and \$201,652,508 in 1941. Net income after taxes from manufacturing in 1943 was only  $3\frac{3}{10}$  cents per dollar of total net sales.

93% of all war material delivered to the end of 1943 was manufactured under fixed-price contracts. General Motors early adopted the policy of reducing prices to the government as lower costs were achieved through greater experience. The government benefited many millions of dollars by these reductions in 1943. Taxes in 1943 totaled \$308,068,000, of which federal taxes were \$254,783,000; social security and unemployment insurance taxes, \$39,263,000, and state and local taxes, \$14,022,000. Common stock dividends were \$2 per share in 1943. They were also \$2 in 1942, \$3.75 in 1941 and 1940, \$3.50 in 1939.

The year 1943 was one of great effort and sound achievement in General Motors. The job is not yet done. All are determined to contribute to the utmost toward final

victory. When this is accomplished, there will be the task of preparing for the requirements of peace. But until that time "Victory is Our Business!"

LET'S ALL BACK THE ATTACK — BUY MORE WAR BONDS

## GENERAL MOTORS

*General Motors units engaged in the war effort*

CHEVROLET • PONTIAC • OLDSMOBILE • BUICK • CADILLAC • FISHER BODY • FRIGIDAIRE • GMC TRUCK & COACH  
AC Spark Plug • Aeroproducts • Allison • Cleveland Diesel • Delco Appliance • Delco Products • Delco-Remy • Detroit Diesel  
Eastern Aircraft • Electro-Motive • Guide Lamp • Hyatt • New Departure • Brown-Lipe-Chapin • Delco Radio • Detroit Transmission  
• Diesel Equipment • Harrison Radiator • Inland • Moraine Products • Packard Electric • Proving Ground • Research Laboratories • Rochester Products • Saginaw Malleable Iron • Saginaw Steering Gear • Ternstedt • United Motors Service  
G.M. Overseas Operations • General Motors Parts • General Motors Institute • General Motors of Canada, Ltd. • McKinnon Industries, Ltd.

*"Victory is Our Business!"*

### Navy Dental Department

"To provide more efficient dental care for the personnel of the United States Navy," Senator Andrews, Fla., has introduced a bill, S. 1861, calling for the establishing of a Dental Department to function under the Surgeon General, with a Director of Dentistry at its head. In addition to officers there would be chief warrant and warrant officers not to exceed five per cent of the number of officers in the Dental Corps, and enlisted personnel not to exceed 106 per cent of the total number of dental officers. The Director of Dentistry would be appointed by the President, and would have the rank of rear admiral.

### Aid Navy Study

The Secretary of the Navy announced 25 April that he had requested the help of officials of the General Motors Corporation and United States Steel Corporation to assist the Navy in the making of a study designed to enable the Navy to continue to improve its methods of handling the vast quantities of material and supplies required for the prosecution of the war by the largest Naval force in the world and thereby increase efficiency in operation.

Secretary Knox stated that General Motors Corporation and United States Steel Corporation had each consented to act in such an advisory capacity without compensation.

**VITAL INFORMATION** is in every issue of the Army and Navy Journal. Prompt renewal of your subscription will insure you against missing copies.

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HEADQUARTERS FOR  
NAVY  
OFFICERS' CAPS



The "Hat Corner of the World," long the center of the finest in civilian headwear, is today headquarters for Navy Officers' caps of the high quality and character represented for more than a century by the Crest of Knox.

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## U. S. NAVY & MARINE CORPS

### Promote Navy Lieutenants

Printed below are the names of nearly 5,500 lieutenants of the Regular Navy and Naval Reserve selected for temporary promotion to grade of lieutenant commander.

Those selected were on duty in rank of lieutenants on or before 15 June 1942. A selection board will meet shortly to recommend for promotion lieutenants who had a later date of rank.

As stated by the ARMY & NAVY JOURNAL last week, approximately 3,700 of those promoted at this time are line officers, including aviators, of the Regular Navy and Naval Reserve. Of the remainder, about 800 are from the Medical Corps, 357 from the Supply Corps, 330 from the Dental Corps, 155 from the Civil Engineer Corps, 65 from the Hospital Corps and 65 from the Chaplains Corps. The names of those promoted follow:

#### REGULAR NAVY

Line  
J. E. Dacey  
P. G. Schultz, Jr.  
F. C. Jones  
W. W. McCrory  
John K. Leydon  
J. E. Hausman  
R. A. Schelling  
John M. Waters  
Vernon R. Hayes  
R. K. R. Worthington  
L. E. De Camp  
Nels R. Nelson  
Richard D. Mugg  
Jack E. Mansfield  
Kenneth S. Brown  
Arnold E. Jakel  
P. E. Greenwood  
Nathan Sonenschein  
F. G. Dierman  
Otis A. Wesche  
Daniel A. Ball  
V. E. Schumacher  
Irwin F. Fike  
Robert L. Jackson  
Robert A. O'Neill  
Jamie Adair  
Philip A. Beshany  
M. H. Bindskopf  
R. H. Hedgecock  
Ben B. Pickett  
Robert W. McNitt  
Dennett K. Elia  
L. J. Franck  
Joseph R. Tucker  
W. H. Dinnick  
James J. Stilwell  
Clarence A. Melvin  
Elton L. Knapp  
Richard H. Bowers  
John B. Shirley  
H. M. Robinson  
James A. Marks  
W. A. Hasler, Jr.  
C. R. Norris, Jr.  
Herman E. Miller  
Willie R. Denekas  
H. O. Hauck  
John A. Bartol  
Edward B. Jarman  
A. R. McFarland  
C. F. McGivern  
James S. Cooley  
Donald B. Ramage  
Harry B. Bass  
George A. Whiteside  
Robert K. Irvine  
Carl R. Dwyer  
P. B. Halmes, Jr.  
H. C. Lauerman  
C. S. Arthur, Jr.  
J. F. Ellis, Jr.  
Richard E. Johnson  
F. H. Carde, Jr.  
Douglas H. Pugh  
Leon S. Embanks  
R. W. Alexander  
Francis H. Huron  
Herman K. Rock  
William M. Klee  
Cecil R. Welte  
Conde L. Ragnet  
F. B. Garrett, Jr.  
J. P. Fitz-Patrick  
Richard M. Marsh  
Robert J. Morgan  
Charles D. Brown  
Joe C. Elliot  
H. J. Wetter, Jr.  
G. F. Richardson  
R. F. DuBois  
Gideon M. Boyd  
Robert R. Managhan  
Arthur F. Johnson  
Edward H. Conrad  
Ralph Weymouth  
Walter A. Hering  
Victor A. Dybdal  
L. J. O'Brien, Jr.  
F. C. Lynch, Jr.  
Charles R. Johnson  
R. M. Kercheval  
John R. Brown  
Jackson H. Raymer  
Cecil A. Bolam  
John A. Leonard  
Leonard E. Harmon  
Lauren E. Johnson  
Keene G. Hammond  
A. T. Church, Jr.  
W. R. Glennon  
Victor B. Graff  
James G. Andrews  
R. E. Seibels, Jr.  
John D. Mason  
James R. Payne  
Monroe Kelly, Jr.

Raymond Shille  
B. Magoffin, 3rd  
Henry S. Jackson  
W. T. Ingram, 2nd  
W. M. Laughlin, Jr.  
Morton Harvey  
John M. Bowers  
Robert G. Bidwell  
Heydon F. Wells  
Charles H. Hoit  
Robert M. Allison  
William N. Leonard  
E. L. Anderson  
John W. Reed  
J. E. Brenner, Jr.  
C. M. MacDonald  
William K. Rogers  
Gordon F. Smale  
F. E. McEntire, Jr.  
Walter S. Small, Jr.  
Verner J. Sobale  
S. H. Stearns  
E. M. Westbrook, Jr.  
Daniel E. Henry  
Robert E. Cutts  
E. F. Woodhead  
Grant S. Heston  
Everett A. Trickey  
E. F. Baldridge  
Rhonda J. Hoyle  
Elvin C. Ogle  
George R. Muse  
A. R. Josephson  
Charles V. Gordon  
F. A. Zimanski  
H. T. Haselton  
John N. Myers  
Marion H. Buas  
R. C. Crommelin  
John J. Hilton, Jr.  
John A. Bogley  
Paul C. Lovelace  
Richard H. Woodfin  
Leo R. Jensen  
J. T. Bland, 3d  
George F. Dalton  
J. A. Boorman, Jr.  
L. B. McDonald  
William L. Kitch  
Edward M. Luhy  
Frank D. Whalen  
C. R. Giffen, Jr.  
G. R. Reinhardt  
Herbert R. Kabat  
Herbert S. Graves  
B. McD. Ganyard  
J. A. Masterason  
A. Minville  
Thomas R. Ingham  
Norman J. Kleiss  
John L. Erickson  
Louis K. Bissell  
James A. Boyd  
W. J. Collum, Jr.  
R. Berthrong  
Edwin L. Pierce  
Harry B. Stott  
R. D. Sampson  
James M. Palmer  
John L. Haines  
W. W. Suydam  
K. G. Robinson  
C. H. Morrison, Jr.  
O. W. Bagby, Jr.  
G. F. Gagliotta  
Albert R. Olsen  
A. F. Hollingsworth  
John E. Wicks, Jr.  
R. Kline  
W. F. Riesenberg  
Robert W. Rvnd  
Robert C. Millard  
H. E. Gillmor  
J. J. Superfine  
C. B. A. Holmstrom  
Charles E. Pond  
Miles P. Rebo, 3rd  
Walter A. Sharper  
Gene Collison  
Emery H. Huff  
Frank B. Quady  
John R. Sweeney  
Andrew L. Burgess  
Robert J. Antrom  
C. O'N. Akers  
F. J. Schroeder  
Wilmer E. Rawle  
Cecil V. Johnson  
Charles A. Marlinke  
C. S. Hartigan, Jr.  
W. J. Tate, Jr.  
Frank L. Bogart  
Oscar B. Parker  
Michael T. Tyng  
A. D. Jackson, Jr.  
Homer E. Conrad  
James F. Rigg  
John B. Honan  
Monroe Kelly, Jr.

### Marine Corps Nominations

The nominations of the following officers of the Marine Corps to temporary promotion were confirmed by the Senate on 21 April:

To Major general—Brig. Gens. James L. Underhill and Thomas E. Watson.  
To brigadier general—Colonels Samuel C. Cumming and Oliver P. Smith.

The nominations of the following for appointment as second lieutenants in the Marine Corps were submitted to the Senate on 21 April:

D. B. Hubbard J. C. Pritchett  
W. W. Stopinski, Jr. W. B. Baugh, Jr.  
M. K. Minnick R. W. Allen  
E. R. Shockley F. R. Korf  
E. R. Messer S. Sgt. R. C. Andrews  
R. F. Henn, Jr.

Donald E. Smith C. A. Van Dusen, Jr.  
M. T. B. Sullivan Thomas Robinson  
T. Washington, Jr. Clarence E. Olson  
Gordon B. Williams John J. Wörner  
Ira G. Stubbart William S. Finn  
William K. Ratliff Robert H. Wood  
Rubin H. Kong James D. Nelson  
Richard S. Harlan Delbert M. Minner  
T. H. Suddath C. L. Lambing  
Eli Vinock John F. Bundy  
Charles S. Moffett F. C. Bamman, Jr.  
R. Semmes, Jr. Gordon R. Egbert  
N. E. Fryer, Jr. Gordon P. Chase  
W. G. Brown H. H. Holton  
H. H. Holton D. A. Campbell  
D. L. Harris John R. Mackroth  
H. E. Woodworth G. D. M. Cunha  
Ralph H. Lockwood Robert C. Lefever  
David N. Inabush Winford O'N. Moore  
T. V. Collins, Jr. Frank D. Heyer  
\*AM2c M. O. Mog W. B. Brown, Jr.  
Cpl. J. R. Cooney William H. Munson  
\*Pfc. William Balog D. A. Campbell  
Cpl. R. H. Patchen John R. Mackroth  
Pfc. Garth W. King C. E. Ingalls  
U. S. Marine Corps Reserve  
S. Sgt. W. J. Dawley \*Pfc. Steve Suto, Jr.  
\*Pfc. P. F. McClellan Pfc. W. K. Massey  
\*Cpl. Fred Meyer, Jr. \*Pfc. Ira Stoen  
Sgt. S. G. Allen, Jr. \*Pfc. Leroy B. Klug  
Pfc. Abe F. Shutta \*Pfc. James W. Raus  
\*Pfc. C. W. Garrison \*Pfc. L. T. Smith  
WOUNDED  
U. S. Marine Corps Reserve  
1st Lt. G. E. Prouty, Capt. C. M. Cappell  
Jr. Capt. R. A. Brown Capt. H. D. Hedrick  
MISSING  
U. S. Naval Reserve  
Ens J. O. Hamilton Lt. (jg) R. J. Schuets  
Lt. Harold Barton Ens P. W. Bash  
Lt. (jg) W. R. Ens C. J. Parker  
Crutcher U. S. Marine Corps  
2nd Lt. T. C. Czarnecki U. S. Marine Corps Reserve  
1st Lt. J. D. Daly 1st Lt. L. T. Wardle  
1st Lt. D. K. Skillicorn  
\*Previously reported missing.

### Sea Service Casualties

Casualties in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard announced from 28 April to 29 April 1944, include the following.

#### DEAD OFFICER PERSONNEL U. S. Navy

\*Lt. Warner Clark, Jr.  
U. S. Naval Reserve  
Lt. J. A. Rose Ens. Andrew Szalay  
Ens. Jackson Villet Ens. W. H. Burns, Jr.  
Lt. (jg) D. L. Schlater Ens. R. M. Janson  
Lt. R. E. Holland, Jr. Ens. C. Rolka  
\*Ens. M. F. Lambert

#### U. S. Marine Corps Reserve

1st Lt. J. Johnson, Jr. 1st Lt. M. M. Pierce  
1st Lt. D. R. Meulpol 1st Lt. H. M. Shafer  
1st Lt. W. E. Birdsall Jr.

#### ENLISTED PERSONNEL

U. S. Navy  
ACMM W. R. Potts \*AM2c C. A. Morken  
AP1c R. H. Garver S3c K. N. Morell

#### U. S. Naval Reserve

CBM E. F. Freshwater \*EM2c F. P. Andiff  
AMM2c V. L. Smith EM2c G. F. Hecken  
AM2c T. V. Collins, Jr. AMM3c L. J. Nichols  
\*AO2c M. O. Mog PM2c W. G. Lewis

#### U. S. Marine Corps

Cpl. J. R. Cooney Pfc. E. J. McBride  
\*Pfc. William Balog Cpl. Petie H. Barber  
Cpl. R. H. Patchen \*Pfc. Lloyd G. Lane

#### Corps Reserve

S. Sgt. W. J. Dawley \*Pfc. Steve Suto, Jr.  
\*Pfc. P. F. McClellan Pfc. W. K. Massey  
\*Cpl. Fred Meyer, Jr. \*Pfc. Ira Stoen  
Sgt. S. G. Allen, Jr. \*Pfc. Leroy B. Klug  
Pfc. Abe F. Shutta \*Pfc. James W. Raus  
\*Pfc. C. W. Garrison \*Pfc. L. T. Smith

#### WOUNDED

U. S. Marine Corps Reserve  
1st Lt. G. E. Prouty, Capt. C. M. Cappell  
Jr. Capt. R. A. Brown Capt. H. D. Hedrick

#### MISSING

U. S. Naval Reserve  
Ens J. O. Hamilton Lt. (jg) R. J. Schuets  
Lt. Harold Barton Ens P. W. Bash  
Lt. (jg) W. R. Ens C. J. Parker

#### Crutcher U. S. Marine Corps

2nd Lt. T. C. Czarnecki U. S. Marine Corps Reserve  
1st Lt. J. D. Daly 1st Lt. L. T. Wardle  
1st Lt. D. K. Skillicorn

### Origin of Navy "E"

The following letter from Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to Capt. H. A. Baldridge, USN, curator of the U. S. Naval Academy Museum, reveals officially the origin of the use of the "E" award:

"The Department greatly appreciates the response by your letter of 2 December 1942, to its request for information as to the origin of the Navy 'E'. Your very complete account, together with the corroborative data kindly gathered and recently forwarded by you from several other officers, seems to establish conclusively that the first suggestion for the use of this valuable factor in morale building was made by you in 1906.

"Since its early adoption, the use of the Navy 'E' has been unquestionably proved to be stimulating to the morale of personnel in the service. Doubtless you are aware of the success that has attended the adaptation of the 'E' in Industrial Incentive Plan inaugurated by the Bureau of Ordnance in July 1941, which Plan was adopted by the Navy later in the year and by the War Department in 1942.

"The Department congratulates you upon the ingenuity of your original suggestion. "I take pleasure in forwarding a copy of this letter to the Bureau of Naval Personnel to be filed with your official record."

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(Please turn to Page 1021)

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# ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL

JOHN CALLAN O'LAUGHLIN,  
President and Publisher

LEROY WHITMAN,  
Editor

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"Established in obedience to an insistent demand for an official organ for members of the American Defense and those concerned with it, The Army and Navy Journal will be published in the interest of no party; it will be controlled by no clique. Its independence will be absolute. Its interest will be directed solely to the inculcation of sound military ideas and to the elevation of the public service in all its departments."—From Vol. 1, No. 1, of the Army and Navy Journal, published August 29, 1863.

SATURDAY, APRIL 29, 1944

"Your Navy gives you facts. It works on the sound democratic thesis that the public deserves the truth, good or bad."

—CAPT. L. P. LOVETTE, Director of Office of Public Relations.

## OUR PRIORITY LIST

1. Victory.
2. Assurance now that personnel and equipment for our land, sea, and air forces will be maintained after the present war at such strength as the responsible heads of those Services determine necessary to assure this nation against future aggressors.
3. Protection of Service personnel, active and retired, against undue reductions in their pay through imposition of the Victory tax and income taxes.
4. Institution of studies looking toward the protection and development of just post-war systems of promotion for personnel of the permanent establishments.
5. Strengthening of the post war status of the National Guard and Reserves to assure their efficiency and permanency with continuance of full training facilities after the war.
6. Upward revision of pension scales to assure Service widows a living income.
7. Compensation for service personnel who use privately owned automobiles on government business.

ONE cannot read the inspiring report of Admiral King, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, without a thrill of American pride in the response of the Sea Establishment and each and every one of its components, to the test of war. Upon the solid foundation laid in time of peace, the Service, Phoenix-like, rose from the ashes of Pearl Harbor, and the machine erected with phenomenal speed, is functioning and operating in accordance with sound strategical and tactical conceptions. From Industry rapidly came the ships and weapons and planes, from our manpower pool was drawn the fine young officers and men to man them, and the system of training fashioned them into effective fighting units, and those units into hard hitting task forces and fleets. Because the Regular Navy never has been a static force, it indoctrinated its hugely expanded personnel with the principle of individual initiative combined with strict discipline, and it instilled into officers a mode of thought which would assure coordination with their fellows however startling the emergency encountered. There was applied also the policy of what Admiral King calls "calculated risk," which was expressed at Guadalcanal and at other points in the Pacific. Nor has the Navy failed to employ the lessons which only warfare produces. When we strike now, we strike with preponderant force—a thousand planes is no rarity in operations against the Japanese any more than this number is against Germany; and we dare to say there will not be another Tarawa with its heavy losses. We have realized more than ever the vital importance of unity, unity in the ship and of the components of a fleet and of fleets, unity with the Army, and unity with our Allies. We have solved the problems of logistics, colossal because we have ships and troops in all sections of the world, and they must be supplied. We have recognized the value of each arm, the air, which Admiral King points out has been predominate in many engagements, the surface craft, carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, PT boats, landing boats, and merchantmen, all of which have shown their battle worthiness, and the submarine, with its magnificent record of sinkings. As we gathered strength, we passed from the defensive through stages to the offensive in distantly separated areas, we reduced the enemy submarine from a menace to a problem, and by attrition, we seriously have weakened Japanese air and sea strength. We are now, as the Admiral points out, the only nation in the world with a full supply of munitions and manpower, and tomorrow when we reach the strength toward which we are moving, we will be so formidable that we will be able to reach our enemies in their home waters and crush them, or compel them to realize the hopelessness of their situation. Admiral King has drawn a picture of growing irresistible might, based upon achievement and fact. It is one which reflects high credit upon the Regular Establishment, and all of its components, and upon the men and women who, drawn by patriotism, are gallantly serving in the ships that have gone down to the sea.

THERE is an important field for constructive work open to the Interdepartmental Committee now studying simplification and revision of the pay schedules for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. To the personnel of the flying services and those of the submarines, there should be added other categories of fighting personnel entitled to additional pay, above their base pay, as recognition of the extra hazard and the arduousness of their duties. First consideration for this additional pay should be given to the ground forces in actual, front line contact with the enemy, and the men who man the landing craft and destroyers which come inshore in amphibious operations against defended areas. The additional pay for overseas service falls upon all alike, but to those men at Cassino and Anzio and at Hollandia and Aitape, as in past operations on atolls and beaches all over the world, something extra should be added in recognition of the terrific strain under which they are put in their day by day living and fighting in mud and jungle against strongly entrenched enemies. The losses in such operations attest to the hazardousness of the work. Even in the matter of flight pay there is, as we have pointed out, need for extension to cover all those who go aloft in fighting craft, for under present conditions the non-piloting navigators and bombardiers in the Naval air service do not draw flight pay as do other commissioned members and all enlisted members of the air crew. Other matters for consideration should include the crediting of U. S. Military and Naval Academy time in the computation of longevity, the same as Reserve and National Guard officers are entitled to count their inactive service. All officers, including those commissioned from the ranks, should be entitled to retirement with the rank and pay of their highest war-time grade, provided, of course, their service has been creditable. All retired pay should be exempt from the levy of income taxes. The Joint Committee can do much for the morale of the Services, and hence for the promotion of the war effort, by correcting these matters and others which are sources of injustice and irritation to those adversely affected. We believe Congress would look with favor upon a bill drawn by such a representative group and the citizenry would give its approval as a matter of justice.

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## Service Humor

### Definition

A War Department circular is something that rescinds everything that has gone before but starts nothing that cannot be rescinded by the next circular.

—Scott Field Broadcaster.

### But He Was Friend

Provost Marshal: You say your wife eloped with your best friend? Who is he?

Old Soldier: Don't know, sir. Never met the fellow.

—Sacramento Command Post.

### It's All In Pun

"Did you hear about Jake dropping the casket at Ed's funeral?"

"Yeah; he never could hold his bier."

—Skyscrapers.

Army shoes are supposed to fit like a glove. We know a guy who's looking for a pair that fit like shoes.

### And With Pleasure, Sir

C. O.—"Sassing the first sergeant, eh? I'll let you have your choice of punishment, scrubbing pots with the KP's, picking butts with the policing detail, or cleaning my quarters with the orderly. Which do you prefer?"

Yardbird—"Mopping the floor with the first sergeant, Sir."

—Rangefinder.

### Read Out of Party

The Southern father was introducing his family of boys to a visiting governor. "Seventeen boys," exclaimed the father, "And all Democrats but John, the little rascal. He got to readin."

—Pointer.

### Jumping To Conclusions

Pvt. Yfniff: "When you jump from the plane and your parachute don't open, what do you do?"

Instructor: "Well, Yfniff, that's what's known as jumping to a conclusion."

—Exchange.

### Public Relations, Probably

Sgt. "Some of the best cooks in the world are in the Army."

Staff Sgt. "What are they doing?"

—Broadcaster.

### Old Account

It was in the late Fall last year. A Kentucky youth who had been working in the city returned to the hills. He had been drafted.

"Maw, I'm going off to war, but I'm going to take kere of you just the same."

"I knew you would, Zeke. You is a good boy."

"I'm a-going to send you half my pay."

"I knew you would, Zeke."

"And I'm a-going to get a new thing they call insurance, in case I gets killt. I'm going to give you that, too."

"I knew you would, Zeke."

"Well, good-bye, Maw."

"Good-bye, Zeke—and listen, Zeke. I wanna warn you, don't come back until you've whupped them damn Yankees this time."

—Rangefinder.

### So Red the Nose

"I can't quite diagnose your case. I think it must be drink."

"All right, doctor, I'll come back when you're sober."

—Rangefinder.

## ASK THE JOURNAL

Please send return postage for direct reply.

D. R. McC.—The pamphlet "Going Back to Civilian Life" is being distributed by the War Department to all points from which personnel will be discharged. You undoubtedly can obtain a copy by applying to the 4th Service Command if copies are not yet at your headquarters.

A. H.—An enlisted man who completes 30 years' service in the Army may retire. He would, of course, be subject to recall at the option of the Army, but few such personnel have been recalled to active duty.

B. W. B.—An enlisted man who had a full 30 years' service and served in any commissioned rank, including Lieutenant or major, in World War I would retire with three-quarters of the pay of a warrant officer, Junior grade, with 30 years' service; that is, three-fourths of \$2,700. Chief warrant officers of the Army (except masters of mine planters) receive base pay of \$2,100 a year.

R. W. A.—Enlisted men cannot count inactive commissioned services for pay purposes, although officers can. The Merritt Bill, H.R. 1506, passed by the House and now before the Senate Military Committee, is designed to correct this.

T. W. R.—No action has been taken by the House Merchant Marine Committee on H.R. 3818 which affects former members of the Lighthouse Service.

U. U. W.—Headquarters of the Reserve Officers' Association of the United States is located at 2449 39th Place Northwest, Washington 7, D. C.

H. R. H.—A retired soldier does not draw the \$15.75 allowance. That allowance was abolished by the pay act of 16 June 1942.

W. L. L. and C. B. S.—The auditors and accountants being sought by the Army must be civilians. Military personnel are not eligible for the posts.

K. L. P.—No bill has been passed which would permit enlisted men to count prior National Guard service for retirement purposes. It is impossible to predict whether any such legislation will be adopted.

## In The Journal

### One Year Ago

Strong formations of Flying Fortresses of the Strategic Air Force made heavy attacks on the marshalling yards and airfield at Palermo. Many bursts were seen in the marshalling yards, and at the airfield numerous hits were scored on hangars and other buildings.

### 10 Years Ago

Col. and Mrs. Wallace DeWitt from the U. S. Military Academy spent Friday and Saturday at Carlisle Barracks as the guests of Brig. Gen. and Mrs. M. A. DeLaney. A regimental parade was held in Colonel DeWitt's honor.

### 25 Years Ago

Lt. Alexander S. Wotherspoon, USN, attached to the USS New York, has been spending a leave at the home of Mrs. Wotherspoon's parents, Mr. and Mrs. John Larner, on Nineteenth Street, Washington.

### 50 Years Ago

Lt. George B. Duncan, 4th US Infantry, lately at Sackett's Harbor, N. Y., was due this week at Fort Sherman, Idaho, for duty with his regiment.

### 80 Years Ago

An officer of the 120th New York, has been dismissed for being in Washington without authority.

Promoted to Lt. Comdr.

(Continued from Page 1018)

A. H. Higgs  
Edward Ackerman  
Edward Utzoff  
G. M. K. Baker, Jr.  
E. C. Blount, Jr.  
John B. Kitch, Jr.  
Jack C. Young  
H. H. Sampson  
John F. Quinn, Jr.  
Paul W. Gill  
Thomas R. Eddy  
A. S. Wadsworth, 2d  
H. L. Hart, Jr.  
William Denton, Jr.  
James L. Abbott, Jr.  
K. K. Weitzfeld  
A. B. Ostroski  
William D. Adams  
C. M. Cassel, Jr.  
E. M. Swenson  
W. J. Valentine  
W. L. Savidge  
Thomas C. Hart  
Robert C. Truxx  
Arthur G. Harrison  
K. C. Childers, Jr.  
S. J. Caldwell, Jr.  
Hill T. Steen  
Frederick C. Fallon  
J. F. B. Johnston  
C. A. Dancy, Jr.  
David S. Hill, Jr.  
Richard M. Tunell  
Winfred E. Tunnell  
T. J. Walker, 3d  
F. P. Anderson  
Andrew B. Hamlin  
H. S. Moredock, Jr.  
L. L. Schwab, Jr.  
C. H. Parmenter  
G. A. Norwood  
John B. Anderson  
Peter Shumway  
W. M. Shifflett  
Wendell W. Bemis  
Chester W. Smith  
J. B. Guerry, Jr.  
James R. Banks  
Alton L. C. Waldron  
H. G. Reaven, Jr.  
Gustave A. Wolf  
William J. Kehm  
Robert E. Lawrence  
W. Harkness, 2d  
Engene C. Fairfax  
William W. Breton  
Floyd E. Moan  
E. C. Benitez  
Robert L. Gurnee  
H. W. McElwain  
Nathan F. Asher  
O. F. Savin  
R. J. Trauner  
Richard E. Robb  
Lee D. Goolsby  
Charles F. Leigh  
Charles R. Clark, Jr.  
J. W. Ustick  
John B. Dudley  
John W. McConaughay  
J. D. Harper, Jr.  
James P. Colenian  
Tom J. Gary  
F. M. Cuipenner  
Richard T. Fahy  
Robert L. Martin  
Willard V. Howell  
Chester H. Flink  
N. C. Harris, Jr.  
B. K. Jarvis  
Robert H. Dasteel  
Will P. Starres  
F. J. Fitzpatrick  
E. B. Bonner  
J. L. Arrington, 2d  
F. R. Clarke  
Paul R. Schatz  
W. A. McGuinness  
W. R. DeLoach, Jr.  
C. F. Pinkerton  
James G. Glaner  
George C. Duncan  
Earl F. Craig  
John E. Parks  
Lawrence R. Gels  
Joseph M. West  
Carl F. Pfeiffer  
Norton E. Croft  
F. L. Taensch  
Joseph W. Hughes  
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E. E. Carlsten  
John J. Munson  
D. S. Baughman, Jr.  
Clarence W. Bucker  
Edward J. Foote  
R. N. Perley, Jr.  
K. B. Stuart, Jr.  
Daniel J. Wallace, Jr.  
Harold C. Lank  
S. W. Kerker  
B. J. Germershausen  
Albert B. Strow  
Pan G. Adams, Jr.  
T. C. Slegmund  
Thomas M. Bennett  
M. G. McCormick  
Paul C. Boone  
Clarence E. Bell, Jr.  
Robert F. Delbel, Jr.  
Robert W. Clark  
William B. Fargo  
Roy E. Green, Jr.  
George F. Sharp  
Allen B. Register  
W. W. Hoffman  
John V. Cameron  
W. S. Will, Jr.  
Edwin G. Reed, Jr.  
John E. Hindman  
Charles W. Jenkins  
Frank C. Perry  
L. S. Wall, Jr.  
Neal Almugren  
E. T. Grace  
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K. B. Wysong  
W. G. Wright, 3d  
J. E. Shepherd, 3d  
R. P. Kline  
A. R. Barbee, Jr.  
John A. Sharpe, Jr.  
R. C. Dilley  
Harold T. Murphy  
Thomas D. Keegan  
Hubert T. Murphy  
W. R. Laird, Jr.  
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## Army and Navy Journal

April 29, 1944

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H. P. Hill	George Eubanks
S. L. Mathews	Richard Simons
J. T. Gramentina	S. P. Daily
W. H. Nettle	G. A. Patterson
C. G. Ferguson	E. M. Hays
J. M. Wirth	C. L. Clabaugh
R. H. Osborne	A. B. Sherman
R. J. White	W. J. McDonough
J. S. Ferabee	F. G. Lueders
L. G. Kaye	R. A. Boose
W. H. Williamson, Jr.	P. J. Klimek
R. B. Couley	F. W. Wiggin
Elmer Westerlund	A. G. Thrus
D. D. Mackey	T. P. Mulvihill
G. S. Link, Jr.	G. H. Cannon
R. F. Davis	H. A. Ottewill
E. Y. Cargill	O. M. Mac Robert
H. C. Fisher	B. D. Sheedy
A. Libby, Jr.	Edward Collony
R. E. Elerding	J. L. Russ
W. F. Schans	E. H. Boyce
J. W. Farly	C. A. Blake
J. C. L. Michaelis, Jr.	D. E. Richardson
R. J. Geler	J. P. Van Bruggen
H. W. Turner	J. R. Blanchard
A. W. Schneider	G. R. Math
W. W. McClure	Alvin Crocker, III
L. C. Lee, Jr.	M. J. Chumbley
W. G. Poyner	H. E. Austin
R. L. White	Wyman Ellis, Jr.
L. L. Pierce	H. M. Walker
B. G. Friedman	J. D. Gillian
R. F. Tammet	J. E. Rutherford
C. B. Moore	W. P. Flanagan
E. J. Blair	G. R. Tina
N. A. Miles	J. G. Coate
J. B. Galvin	C. E. Munger
L. L. Reid	D. H. McGoun
H. N. Beers	J. A. Klickman
W. A. Harwick	N. V. Scurria
H. A. Nutter	J. N. Davis
W. B. F. Hall	B. Lassiter, Jr.
E. M. Dinnin	L. C. Berry
James Hickerson, Jr.	H. M. McGaughey
	S. S. Truestell

**Classification DH-M**

C. R. Bower	F. Gibbs
<b>Classification D-M</b>	
Y. A. Biggs	C. D. Allen
W. J. Steffens	F. F. Ardagh
F. J. Llano	C. H. Tubbs
M. J. Boncick	H. I. Calren
A. J. Gerber	T. U. Jorgenson
B. C. Miller	F. H. Bauer
W. E. Brown	J. Dineen
P. R. Warfield	A. J. Oxley
P. H. V. Bamberg	A. G. Munro
C. B. Ojedsted	W. H. Roberts
L. A. Woodland	E. J. Hackett
A. A. Fischer	R. C. Weymouth
G. J. De Simone	T. D. Arthur
H. N. Brikken	J. R. Schwartz
P. W. Mailard	B. M. Perkins
B. A. Masmussen	J. E. Johansen
J. Smith, jr.	C. B. Christensen
A. M. Alcott	C. W. Fisher
J. H. Burger	P. F. Lindner
N. A. Nielsen	F. W. Wight
L. O. Hess	C. R. Gibson
E. E. Latton	J. P. Pleegraph, jr.
J. Jensen	J. J. Hughes
K. T. Larsen	H. P. Lair
B. C. Modin	E. L. Jungherhold
A. B. Giles	J. F. Wickham
C. T. Fitzgerald	E. B. De Mille
F. A. Litchfield	A. P. Chester
R. H. Donnell	J. L. Reid
W. B. Bretzen	A. Mascarenhas
J. S. Hulings, jr.	E. M. Norvik
F. P. Davis	A. B. Taylor
J. T. Hodgson	H. C. Plummer
A. Parker	E. A. Battay
L. Sauerbier	W. G. Dutton
D. Shimpoo	N. H. Olsen
G. Kelly	A. S. Haines, jr.
H. Gaorian	G. F. Beal
H. Nelson	C. G. Strom
W. Home	F. W. Schultz
E. N. Nichols, jr.	C. W. Brockway
H. Howe	H. T. Conion
H. Pearce	J. E. Kendall
D. H. McClintock, Jr.	H. P. Tengue
A. A. Reidinger	J. H. Gallagher
B. K. Parry	R. D. Lamson
F. Meyer	H. G. Schuara, jr.
D. G. Blair	C. M. Parker
W. Bincles	W. D. Baker
R. Andersen	L. W. Borst
C. Hesse	F. A. Bane
A. Bjork	L. L. Kenny
H. Hartley	M. C. Walley
F. Henrikson	W. J. Benson
G. Kriner	R. W. Lees
Seudder	J. H. Ducat
R. Knight	M. K. Reece
R. Lange	A. M. Drake
J. Connors	J. H. Stewart

J. M. Maley J. C. Hutcheson  
J. W. Hirth Classification E-M

Classification E-M

W. H. Williams	J. M. Mackenzie
P. N. Harding	E. A. Winslow
P. Hogstrom	C. E. H. Davis
R. C. Wilson	J. C. Sancho
C. L. Hunter	W. E. Clarke
A. E. Zwier	W. H. Miller
F. E. C. Sundquist	H. C. Brown
T. Malley	A. Quellmalz
W. J. Armstrong	E. Zieselman
E. G. McDonald	E. C. Stoner
C. Anderson	D. L. Thompson
A. H. Scurfield	J. F. Thornberry
A. D. Miller	S. C. Evans
E. M. Pittman	I. L. Strahan
A. C. Keyl	L. C. Broms
M. F. Parsons	V. U. Buenzle
A. J. Nepper	T. C. Allen
W. S. Bolton	E. F. Nessmith
J. J. Gunnip	E. Stone
A. W. Koehler	F. B. Smith
J. J. Perry	F. M. Kelley
K. L. Boone	E. W. Holmes
H. F. Herbermann	M. W. Calcott
O. M. Lambline	K. Solberg
J. J. Bruno	J. D. Johnson
W. J. Kanapaux	D. R. Farnham
I. R. Bennett	S. A. Clecon
C. F. Kerley	A. C. Johnson
E. O. Koelling	W. T. Mozingo
H. W. Dailey	W. G. Shattuck
B. T. Snagg	G. N. Musser
L. M. Sullivan	S. K. Mills
V. C. Branen	S. Black
J. E. Myers	J. L. Eubanks
H. C. Manley	A. A. Desrosier
B. Leddy, Jr.	C. M. Braden
A. C. Modell	J. A. McInluoch
F. J. Carden	J. V. Borkowski
C. G. Rohrbaugh	J. H. Plumb
S. J. Mirtich	J. M. Steele
C. A. Ellingwood	J. C. Bullock
J. D. MacGregor	L. W. Bafundo
F. Flanner	R. H. Jacobs
D. Madrid	C. V. McIntosh
R. J. Soleas	C. H. Kline
W. P. Alberigi	R. C. Burdette, Jr.
G. E. Redman	A. A. Seaberg
H. S. Mount	J. E. Young
J. L. Mowrey	G. R. Milner
M. Jacobsen	J. W. Allen
A. C. Hillner	D. G. Phillips
C. Hallquist	R. E. Groas
J. A. McLoughlin	F. E. Gray
Classification DE-V(8)	
F. S. Walker	J. T. Bingham
A. B. Cech	J. A. Larson
I. W. Sayers, Jr.	W. V. Stevenson
A. L. Milburn	H. K. White
W. T. Romizer	V. T. Boatwright
A. E. Bernet	T. J. Banvard
G. A. Cox	S. L. M. Cole
M. M. Champlin	R. M. Rowe
N. W. McCollum	
Classification D-V(8)	
J. J. Reynolds	O. K. Baker
H. W. Whillock	J. H. Evans
J. M. Schiff	J. H. Mersereau
L. J. Gans	C. R. Osborne
R. S. Myers	C. M. Newhall
F. C. Dugan	H. P. Anewalt
E. F. Jenkins	F. S. Moseley
H. B. MacWherter	G. A. Hebert
F. A. Petrie	D. C. Paul
W. E. Parker	H. K. Latta
L. J. Ford	R. T. Smith
W. W. Baumeister	E. A. Buttle
A. H. Acron, Jr.	D. P. Whelchel
G. Dwight	B. Henderson
V. G. Byers	J. E. Ward
A. J. Black	H. M. C. Hewson
W. M. Huck	A. L. Olsen
I. C. McMillaine	B. G. Manley
D. R. Neal	H. A. Berry
A. Dodds	R. M. Newman
C. C. Houghton	G. S. Cochrane
F. W. Tenney	R. H. Hudkins
W. A. P. Pullman	L. A. Wheeler
M. W. Copper, Jr.	F. E. Alexander
M. R. Meyer	C. F. Currier
J. F. Harritt	C. J. Mabry
A. L. Lanier, Jr.	C. F. Gouraud
P. A. Harwood	W. G. Reed
H. Nash	H. L. Holcomb
L. Carver	G. V. Hurley
C. K. Kennedy	J. A. Reynolds
R. A. Patton	R. K. Walker
W. John	R. D. Lawrence
Strong	J. F. Bichler
N. Carter	M. L. Dawson
E. K. Kincannon, Jr.	E. E. Dohert
E. Steele	W. S. White
E. Walker, Jr.	H. B. Price
S. Jones	T. F. Lane
E. Townsend	G. L. Parker
V. Baldwin	H. E. Ruisseau
H. Jefferles, Jr.	H. L. Hartley
H. G. Bailliere	F. V. Browster
H. Luke	A. N. Chapman
A. Maren	F. W. Noel
P. Ferry	W. L. Hawes
W. Kaufman	L. B. Shackelford
Barrie, Jr.	S. J. Ball
Foster, Jr.	W. O. Robertson
Kelly, Jr.	A. R. Byron
M. Hodson, 2nd.	J. W. Bertolez
C. Relf	C. D. Pennebaker
W. Gosselin	W. C. Baker
E. Ellcott	H. A. Ritcheson
P. Hamill	W. C. Bord
F. Spencer	F. P. Kane
W. Brennan	L. A. Cridop
L. Sherman	B. R. Childs
S. Barthelmes	F. R. Shapardson
E. Reynolds, Jr.	C. R. Cronch
R. Boas	W. A. Brooks, Jr.
V. Emery	M. C. Brittain
Williamson	L. K. Gongh
L. Benson	J. N. Knowles
M. Whitechurch	N. Marr
P. Watkins, Jr.	R. F. Logan
R. Valentine	A. F. Lynch
Hatemier	D. P. Brown
P. Furber	C. P. Keen
Wisner	M. L. Brown
J. Manley	J. A. Turner, Jr.
C. Rider	W. F. Foster
H. Reside	W. G. Killinger
R. Stewart	E. J. Wilson
S. Deane, Jr.	L. M. Brumhelow
A. Carlson	E. C. Burdo
K. Murray	W. Xenfeld
Hiller	G. H. Ridings
L. McCordell, Jr.	C. M. Steddel

C. C. Sportsman  
 E. N. George, Jr.  
 M. J. Gilman  
 E. McCloud  
 E. W. Nelson  
 L. A. Mullins  
 M. J. Gary  
 R. G. Newsome  
 N. J. Gaynor  
 H. B. Long  
 K. F. Geiser  
 F. W. Sheehan  
 L. G. Adams  
 B. G. Carey  
 T. B. Semans, Jr.  
 D. C. Ward  
 D. J. Lloyd  
 W. S. Rauscher  
 R. B. Smith  
 E. Schechter  
 C. R. Lee  
 E. O'Dunne, Jr.  
 B. V. Harrison  
 J. Wardrop  
 B. H. Taussig  
 B. Cone  
 L. J. Rodgers  
 A. M. Allyn, Jr.  
 K. B. Harding  
 H. S. Ortiges  
 W. K. Carter  
 O. H. Pitman  
 E. L. Casey  
 D. Davis, III  
 M. V. Olson  
 E. Snyder  
 K. D. MacColl  
 J. K. Davis  
 A. Legendre  
 D. I. Knowles  
 J. Skele  
 H. M. Kempton  
 H. G. Saylor  
 D. G. Beste  
 C. L. Felske  
 P. D. Hinckle  
 P. J. Flaherty  
 H. T. Saylor  
 T. B. Dupree  
 O. T. Goddin  
 C. W. Lombard  
 F. Pardee, Jr.  
 D. M. Taylor  
 J. R. McCalmont  
 H. T. Woodland  
 R. W. Safford  
 W. G. Wylie, Jr.  
 W. H. Keplinger  
 C. M. Dillon  
 E. H. Jewett, Jr.  
 C. E. Bliske  
 P. W. Howard  
 K. T. Ripley  
 D. T. Bryan  
 H. H. Dawson  
 G. R. Hunter  
 D. S. Gifford  
 H. F. Hennessey  
 J. E. Cole  
 H. A. Engler  
 J. K. Lord  
 M. J. Lane  
 A. W. Lunt  
 R. S. Williams, Jr.  
 W. B. Stone  
 E. F. Baldwin  
 F. W. Chaffee  
 C. W. Williams, Jr.  
 R. L. Smith, Jr.  
 C. E. Eastman  
 S. M. Martin  
 N. G. Holman  
 G. R. Marrs  
 N. R. Meglethery  
 E. R. Wernts  
 C. H. Meyers  
 E. J. Aylstock  
 A. Balsch  
 Brereton, Jr.  
 H. W. McKee  
 D. C. Zimmerman  
 L. E. Watkin  
 C. D. Condy  
 P. Bowes  
 R. H. Matson  
 F. A. Concea  
 P. K. Romeo  
 K. S. Safe  
 J. E. Traquair  
 D. H. Annan  
 W. W. Crandall  
 J. M. Kahn  
 M. M. Gatch  
 D. Jangels  
 W. C. Wright  
 C. T. Portman  
 H. Koch, Jr.  
 F. C. Williams  
 C. H. Hunpuch  
 N. V. Williams  
 J. W. Collins  
 M. A. Burgess  
 G. T. Wakeman  
 K. H. Hemmerly  
 D. K. A. Detering  
 H. C. Will  
 C. D. Klaft  
 J. Cunningham  
 J. G. Mitchell  
 W. M. White  
 W. H. Hoffman  
 C. E. Phelps  
 A. V. Di Nucl  
 W. H. Smith  
 J. F. Brainard  
 R. A. Haynie  
 C. S. Bowen  
 A. H. Kellor  
 L. H. Goddard  
 O. W. Snarkman  
 C. R. Atherton  
 C. R. Worth  
 H. D. Davis  
 T. A. Waage  
 M. A. G. G. Schich  
 P. P. Pfeifferbarger  
 C. R. Tallbert  
 T. D. Wallace  
 W. O. Buskin, Jr.  
 F. F. Twogood  
 E. E. Shepard  
 C. Bartelma  
 C. A. Muhl  
 F. P. Dester  
 S. T. Selby  
 E. H. Smith

R. D. Simmons  
A. M. McCoy  
R. B. Wolf  
G. W. Harmeson  
G. W. Woerlein, Jr.  
H. D. Price  
E. M. Waller, sr.  
E. C. Waters  
C. Sholts  
N. D. Riker  
W. S. Newhall  
C. O. Fulgham  
V. R. Taylor  
W. B. Shaw  
J. E. Whitford  
J. G. W. Jackson  
J. F. Reilly  
H. M. Graham  
C. Hobbs  
R. F. Stalnback  
W. F. Lovelace, Jr.  
H. H. Baulch  
B. A. Grant  
W. S. Powers  
E. C. Jones  
J. L. Badger  
G. D. Stont  
G. H. Leileitner, Jr.  
R. B. S. Bryan  
S. G. Chambers  
L. N. Case  
E. P. Doyle  
H. Gardner  
A. B. Neumann  
L. L. Stanton  
F. L. Edmondson  
H. Mayer  
C. W. Schelling  
M. C. Shawkey  
W. C. Dwyer  
H. E. Carson  
C. P. Brady  
E. E. Burwell, Jr.  
J. D. Delaney  
J. E. Saunders  
E. A. Connell  
G. J. Andrews  
C. H. Trigg  
A. G. Bolton  
R. M. Hull  
I. H. Kempner, Jr.  
J. T. Armstrong  
P. J. Primm  
T. P. Hogan  
E. T. King  
F. B. Hewee, Jr.  
H. W. Julian, Jr.  
J. L. Jones, Jr.  
R. G. Owsley  
E. L. Rumbough  
R. F. Babcock  
N. A. Moore  
G. J. Tyson  
F. J. Carey  
L. L. Hill  
E. M. Savage  
H. P. Bonnell  
M. K. Chappies  
W. H. Wintrop  
H. D. Dolan  
C. Carlson  
S. Ponfield  
V. M. Redfield  
E. Parsons  
F. Haynes  
E. Ford  
Turnure  
G. Reid  
L. McConnell  
L. Hasbrouck  
C. Kennan  
K. Grant  
W. Worth  
Temple  
V. Walfron  
F. Lent  
M. Pratt  
A. Tannlund  
M. J. Taylor  
S. Taller  
V. C. Kleine  
A. Christian  
T. Hall  
A. Rohle  
E. Chabot  
J. McElroy  
C. Johnson, Jr.  
L. Gregg  
W. Mearns  
R. Hodge  
H. Connery  
C. Russ  
R. Hazzard  
T. Ellision  
O. O. Goosch  
F. Beyerle  
F. L. Parker  
B. Kreder  
H. Koenig  
O. Stimpson  
J. Steen  
R. Boccroft  
M. Shultz  
W. Stokes  
H. Bruce  
H. Falk  
E. Williams  
L. Hulset  
R. Walter  
T. Swenson  
Miller  
R. Smith  
Saxon  
W. Dillon  
C. Urban  
E. Boatwick  
Boyd  
S. Wilton, Jr.  
A. Watters  
D. Wittenow  
A. Peterson  
J. Fourier  
H. Gregg  
J. McAllister  
P. Mooney  
R. Boyle  
A. Ruddy, Jr.  
H. Berry  
W. M. McAlla  
P. Quinn  
N. Case  
V. Dixon  
O. McDermott  
F. Williams  
B. Schenckhardt  
D. Dowling

W. H. Post	E. H. Miahler
J. D. Decker	T. Herbert
H. J. Harris	A. E. Ariling
F. Kunzel	E. H. English
R. A. Durham	G. D. Miller, Jr.
P. T. Stafford	J. H. Munster, Jr.
A. L. Elscherberger	F. G. Winsler
H. O. Polk	G. E. Mann
H. T. Cavanaugh	P. Rocca
S. G. Egel	H. M. Geddes
J. S. Coleman, Jr.	H. F. Godfrey
P. A. Skipman	G. A. Prouse
O. A. Goldaraconsa	H. G. Powell
L. B. Hogan	W. V. Gearhart
R. J. Wissinger	H. L. B. Spector
W. H. Ryan	J. D. W. Riggan
F. S. Dale	P. J. Hoyt
W. A. C. Roethke	R. T. Murphy
F. J. Hoffmann	T. T. Brown
J. D. Cassidy	S. A. Eacho
W. M. Huntley	W. J. Parks
H. E. Bawden	A. T. Dittmann
M. A. Thayer	W. J. Pitt
C. M. Ashton, Jr.	J. M. Le Roy
G. A. Atwater	L. B. Merriman, Jr.
H. L. Eves	R. J. Schaffer
J. H. Sanders	W. S. Davis
J. G. Barnett	D. S. Harris
H. C. Baskerville	S. Putnam
F. T. Starr	J. L. Callionet
A. J. Haviland	A. A. Zuntag
E. R. Kimball	R. B. Kleinhanhs
W. Bronson	J. H. Willett
R. S. Watts	J. A. Stirtton
J. F. Carr	J. T. Casey
T. A. Twomey	G. P. Hamlin
C. S. Barnard	F. R. Meredith
A. E. Mathis	E. L. Fielding, Jr.
J. L. Abbott	M. S. Mallory
O. M. Landreth	W. J. Ray
W. P. McGuirk	B. W. Arvin
A. R. Middleton	L. F. Hills
A. F. Wesson	A. H. Lederer
L. J. Casanova	F. Y. Mercer
A. H. Ewing, Jr.	H. O. Durham, Jr.
P. P. Miller	J. D. Odell
D. W. Smythe	B. W. Johnson
H. E. Lowe	A. M. Johnson
H. W. Craig, Jr.	J. A. Young, Jr.
C. P. Erickson	M. V. Carson, Jr.
N. P. Strader	L. G. Findley
R. B. Clogston	A. W. Laidlaw
J. C. Curtice	J. U. Munro
T. A. Rogers	E. Lyons
D. E. Liebendorfer	A. Ponvert
R. J. Crane	J. F. Q. Butler
O. H. Vogel	S. H. Sinton, Jr.
H. W. Ritters	A. W. Jones
F. F. Enno	H. J. Field
N. K. Banks	S. D. L. Paine
C. C. Finucane	G. G. Perry, Jr.
C. C. Lewis	E. Dillon
C. W. Hook	J. M. Kiloulien, Jr.
F. E. Lusk	C. H. Kirshner
T. S. Waldal	J. A. Shaw
J. H. Wholley	C. R. Hoopes
J. Green, Jr.	R. H. Tweedie
G. W. Sherrill	J. E. Hitchcock
R. B. Belth	W. F. Lurkin
R. E. McLaughlin	N. Stanard
C. P. Smith	W. H. Fraze
G. E. Brown	H. A. Reese
L. W. Dennis, Jr.	D. C. Davis
R. P. Hosford	J. E. MacDonald
J. B. Morse	C. E. Mynard, Jr.
D. D. Hall	J. V. McNamara
W. C. Rebenack	E. H. Hayward, Jr.
C. D. Schenck	J. B. Wyand
H. H. Haywood	R. G. Congdon
H. M. Watts, Jr.	F. S. Bayley, Jr.
P. H. Ducharmre	R. R. Winn
D. A. Stretch	R. G. Mitchell
S. R. Milbank	W. C. Taylor
F. Morris	W. J. Holt, Jr.
A. M. Fowler	E. W. Hammond, Jr.
R. W. Newhouse	C. G. Ellis
R. W. Caldwell	H. C. Shackelford
J. A. Muller	R. H. Anshberg
D. R. Drubben	H. L. Morrison
N. R. Patterson	R. G. Breedon
W. Guenther	P. F. Lackey
S. N. Howe	T. H. Adams
P. L. Jacobson	D. D. Snyder
P. A. Bissinger	J. S. Bonde
O. E. Fang	A. C. Wolf
T. B. Crane	O. Root, Jr.
C. F. Hovey	J. B. Reid
C. V. Morton	J. M. Irvine
W. F. Brooks	A. A. Peterson
A. H. Hudson	W. B. Didsbury
C. A. Forbes	H. M. Davila
M. Shannon	R. W. Bowles
K. M. Pier	J. T. Lane
E. S. Trosdal, Jr.	C. L. Burwell
J. W. Jones	A. L. Stewart
R. M. Van Horn	
Classification A-V(8)	
J. E. Arrowsmith	G. S. Stephenson
W. E. Fuller	R. L. Stevens
J. H. K. Levick	H. Parish, II
S. W. Woodson	J. Mauze
E. H. Rust	J. A. Tilt, Jr.
J. M. Morrison	G. W. Sloan
F. Hansen, Jr.	F. A. Ballard
L. Foote	J. B. Coleman, Jr.
T. Barber	H. A. Holland
C. Ballard	F. D. Mead
W. Greene	M. W. Hall
S. Clinchy	E. O. Robinson
D. Rodgers	C. F. Frothingham, Jr.
F. Butler	J. M. Bleakie
C. Clark	M. E. Stone
Watson	F. T. Greene
Hilbs	F. P. Phipps
S. French	S. M. Hamill
Baldwin	M. J. Grove
D. Duholis	L. Pirie
M. Perry	L. Collidge
Watts	G. M. Collins
J. Hunneman	T. L. Stirling
Batcheller, Jr.	A. Belmont
P. Greene, Jr.	E. I. Van Nise
W. Wood	W. MacFadden
R. Sturges	B. E. Rourke
L. Evans	J. W. Valentine
E. Hutton	W. F. Murphy
L. Winston	S. H. Koss
Righter	T. P. Heffelfinger
K. Ewing, III	F. R. Schanck, Jr.
H. Barnes, Jr.	R. Clayton
C. Brady	J. C. Knott
R. Rodgen	W. V. Ross, Jr.
R. Harrison	R. S. Friend
W. Walker	C. E. Henninger
	P. D. Trafford, Jr.
(Continued on Next Page)	

*(Continued on Next Page)*

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T. L. Little  
C. A. Kerr  
A. J. Jennett  
W. L. Fogarty  
H. Fleishhacker, Jr.  
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S. L. Rawlins, Jr.  
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R. E. Blythe  
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R. W. Lent L. M. Duke  
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W. B. Wallace H. F. Dostal

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E. C. Lee  
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A. D. Thomas  
E. S. Ferguson, III  
F. R. Startzell  
W. C. J. Lanz  
R. L. Kettner  
W. C. Hildegard  
K. S. Ritzk  
E. D. Martin  
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M. V. V. Hayes  
W. M. Murray  
J. S. Prichard  
C. A. S. McWilliams  
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W. M. Clark  
H. R. Aaron  
J. O. Bishop  
I. J. Sandorf  
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L. J. Allemen, Jr.  
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C. H. Reiter, Jr.  
R. H. Kirchmyer  
M. J. Plonaker  
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C. W. Hubbard  
C. W. Bathelt  
R. C. Conrad  
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G. C. Humphreys  
H. D. H. Glass  
C. L. R. Cronkhite  
H. W. Ligon  
H. F. Cunningham  
A. R. Winner  
J. L. Landenberger  
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E. C. Ramage, Jr.  
W. D. Macy, III  
W. P. Murdock  
R. J. Siebenmorgen  
E. C. Kemp

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E. K. Sloane  
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W. Byrd, Jr.  
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W. H. Bowen  
G. W. Blieck  
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A. F. Ryan, sr.  
J. H. Burton  
J. H. Metzgar  
F. E. Vanhoesen  
F. E. Walcott  
E. E. Ewbank  
H. K. Snickling  
G. K. Groot  
J. D. Hanselt  
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J. H. Groenendale  
J. I. Mather  
J. J. Barry  
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J. Corro  
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J. W. Blackburn  
J. Stern  
K. R. Welsh  
J. H. Kirsch  
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W. V. B. Warren  
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T. R. Arkinstall  
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R. S. Stevenson  
A. H. Davis  
R. A. O'Bannon  
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W. L. Williams  
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T. E. Erdmann  
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W. F. Bausman  
C. J. Swain, Jr.

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J. L. Vols  
B. H. Bush  
C. F. Garland  
B. P. Carpenter  
W. B. Tucker  
W. R. Lockhart  
L. H. Mult  
L. E. Kinsler  
R. Tate  
F. A. Spencer  
G. F. Platts  
H. Forgerzen  
M. Kevole  
E. Urschitz  
J. A. Ball  
H. F. Gallado  
J. R. Maxwell  
W. J. Dann  
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E. M. Blue  
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J. P. Murphy  
W. H. Kordt  
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C. L. Turnage

W. Hardman

W. O. Beach

E. L. Battey

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J. H. Macumber

S. T. Gibson

V. T. Young

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D. Singer

J. Z. Bowers

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J. H. Hammond

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D. J. McCarthy

J. E. Compson

C. M. Cutshaw

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F. X. Sommer, Jr.

J. R. Bell

E. C. Atwell

O. Greene

C. A. Smith

R. L. Dennis

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R. D. Brookes

H. M. McCroskey

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T. C. Butt

M. S. Rapp

E. B. Johnson

J. W. Bell

G. R. Miller

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R. O. Dawson

H. R. Barr

W. H. Curley

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J. E. Renner

T. C. Craig

H. W. Coleman

W. A. Console

T. G. Powell

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R. L. Godfrey

J. H. Klinger

S. J. Boguski

D. J. James

J. E. Adams

R. E. Sheets

E. M. Childress

C. M. Hanisch

D. G. Clark

H. H. Gooldiad

J. E. Callahan

T. E. Cone, Jr.

J. S. Skinner

P. A. Cluts

H. S. Miropol

H. M. Landberg

E. C. Wilson, Jr.

W. J. Moore

J. E. Cholaser

T. A. Fox

A. A. Buscemi

R. F. Chin

H. R. Bierman

E. T. Callahan

T. E. Goldstein

F. A. C. H. Cone, Jr.

J. S. Skinner

P. A. Cluts

H. S. Miropol

H. M. Landberg

E. C. Wilson, Jr.

W. J. Moore

R. Z. Zupanec

H. B. Orenstein

F. P. Baurichter

R. Bookman

W. D. Deuell

E. I. Cornbrook, Jr.

D. D. Harris

H. T. Graham

G. Callies

**Classification C-V(X)**

G. F. Cramer

F. T. Bowers

E. M. L. Burchard

A. A. Hill

C. D. Chretien

B. B. Hackman

D. M. Stanier

G. Callies

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A. L. Braun

V. U. Buck

J. C. Hargreaves

L. I. Nadeau

R. E. Calhoun

**Classification L-V(S)**

C. L. McKenna

G. A. Sullivan

J. E. Fant

J. M. Platis

J. J. Peacock

B. Muir

L. P. Okes

F. M. Seaman

P. V. Dabber

**Classification O-V(S)**

H. C. Yeager



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G. M. K. Rice	P. P. Halpern
J. M. Laurent	G. W. Edgar
J. M. Minter, Jr.	W. H. Johnson
J. W. Seager	R. U. Smith
Donald Armstrong	C. M. Grassino
J. D. Cooper	L. T. Mainman
E. E. Brighton	H. E. Toombs
V. N. Hansen	E. G. Hutchinson
R. L. Pope	G. S. Lofink
<b>Classification SC-V(S)</b>	
D. P. Miller	E. N. Lamson
J. A. Clague	J. B. Andrade
D. M. Cameron	D. S. Lennox
E. W. Vossler	C. W. Churchill, Jr.
W. H. Shannon	E. M. Williams
L. M. Francis	A. H. Pittack
A. G. Zanoff	H. C. Brock
P. L. Lancaster	J. H. Baker, Jr.
A. B. Poole	Irving Winer
J. V. Lenihan	J. W. Newbegin
W. M. Huggins	J. H. Gipson
H. W. Wheatley, Jr.	J. R. Aron
C. B. Hampton	E. H. Roeder
Raymond Craer	Arthur Hargrave, Jr.
H. S. Horner	C. H. Parks
L. A. Sykes	Kermit Neuman
T. A. McInerney	W. H. Sharon
J. B. Tallent	J. K. Webster
W. C. McPherson	C. E. Kuhlman
M. D. Cleland	D. T. Aaron
H. B. Brown	E. W. Meyer
C. A. Ritter	T. D. Maybank
J. F. Corlett	Jack Levering
Emerson Leclercq	A. W. Lee
J. H. Tolson	W. J. Kuehn
T. C. Peterson	W. H. Howland
R. C. Walter	F. H. Fay
W. C. Woodard	R. J. Mehane, Jr.
C. P. Bracey	C. R. Heard
J. D. Esary, Jr.	J. P. Sullivan
E. G. R. Lloyd	D. A. Robertson
T. S. Washburn	C. F. Leatherbee, Jr.
E. R. Faft	J. E. Madden
E. P. Noell	R. B. Williamson
A. T. Samuelson	G. A. Taylor
F. G. Blee	R. D. Hutchins
B. R. Gardner	P. J. McNeill
F. J. Moore	S. L. Harleston
W. C. Wiley	B. A. Vann, Jr.
C. E. Thorsenquist	R. D. Kingsbury
W. B. Willard	M. M. Exton
H. H. Ball	J. R. McKowne
W. B. Kimball, Jr.	F. W. Sellman
C. H. Lockton	F. B. Stewart
R. D. Seagraves	M. T. Figg
B. G. Lewis	H. W. Brandow
T. B. Howard	A. C. Stifel, Jr.
G. L. Walsh	H. W. Warjone
Richard Wurdean	B. W. Bellamy
K. R. White	P. McC. Parrott
V. E. Troutfetter	R. M. Stocking
E. F. Nimmo	N. D. Morgan
C. E. Raeder	M. J. Beverley
T. C. Roberts, Jr.	J. M. Gilley
Samuel Greenspan	G. MacE. Malcolm
R. J. Dickson	C. D. Damon
C. F. Smith	R. S. Ferguson
E. K. Auerbach	A. D. McCreary
H. K. Snyder	R. A. Harrison
A. L. Norton	C. B. Heck
W. M. Gause	J. F. Skipper
V. A. Sheehey, Jr.	J. J. Wilkinson, Jr.
<b>Classification CEC-V(S)</b>	
T. L. Jackson	W. R. Bonford
P. A. Harper	R. P. Strickland
H. H. Darby	E. K. Bryant
R. J. Johnson	J. H. Hulse
T. C. Donahue	W. H. Young
R. C. Sheldon	A. E. Ramburst
R. E. Harrison	L. L. Willard
W. B. Hayes, Jr.	D. M. Lancaster
F. L. Biggs	H. E. Smith
F. G. St. Clair	J. P. Draney, Jr.
C. J. Snook, Jr.	J. M. Kelly, Jr.
H. Mc. C. Mima	L. L. Furnell
E. A. Greely	Max Leider
W. R. Milner	F. W. Klee
J. T. Pendergrass	W. M. Gustafson
C. E. Peterson	W. K. Trimble
L. F. Southerland, Jr.	Thomas Jefferson
A. M. McKinnon	Solomon Kaplan
C. L. Blacker	W. A. Bowles
W. H. Walker	X. F. Censullo
J. S. Hamel	F. F. Kravath
G. L. Walling	T. J. Dumont
A. G. James	W. H. Nelson
S. H. Martin	C. E. Grohs
W. F. Bowerman	A. P. Pasquarello
David Lindsay	George Ohl, Jr.
J. B. Lawson	H. F. Hormann
C. J. Donahue	W. E. Bobbit
E. E. Kirwan, Jr.	R. E. Flint
L. H. Schliem	N. W. Herzberg
G. W. Flynn	J. A. Riviere
G. A. Barrett	J. W. Wilson
H. H. Holmberg	J. K. Flynn
J. C. Stilley	T. F. Donlon
A. M. Garr	E. H. Sutter
A. C. Kettler, Jr.	G. A. Daniels
C. B. Cochran	H. T. Snedkamp
W. W. Moore, Jr.	F. M. Mosley
J. H. Thatcher	J. H. Eitter, Jr.
E. W. Smith	J. K. Skippey, Jr.
B. P. Ferguson	H. V. Roulett
W. R. Cuff	J. R. Burke
A. S. Klay	W. B. Wingo
P. H. Peterman	H. H. Wolfe
A. M. Turner	T. C. Evans
J. W. Head, Jr.	J. L. Aull
W. K. Adams	E. R. Peters
H. A. Lee	P. J. Simons
W. B. Garbino	H. E. Reardon
L. W. Corder	A. C. Morris
M. R. Norton	D. G. Knox
G. L. W. Meng	J. H. McGrann
R. S. Harmen	W. R. Boyer
E. M. Howard	J. F. Fitzpatrick
Philip Gross	E. E. Jackson
T. A. Bradford	J. B. Knoebel
J. B. Balnes	W. M. McLean
H. H. Schoen	A. C. Church
R. B. Jennings	W. J. Byrnes
P. L. McLaughlin	R. L. Roberts
G. W. Morrison	G. F. Pappin

G. T. Korink	Ernest Couloheras
<b>Classification CHC-V(G)</b>	
K. D. Perkins	C. Larkin
R. A. Curtis	E. F. Smart, Jr.
P. R. McPhee, Jr.	E. R. Barnes
E. J. Finnin	J. W. Fulton, Jr.
J. F. Woloch	J. T. McLaughlin
J. P. Farrell	
<b>Classification CHC-V(S)</b>	
J. E. Fraze	B. T. Beckham
D. J. Burke	F. J. Keenan
H. H. McClellan	S. V. Hannon
P. J. Redmond	T. H. Reilly
D. F. Meehan	F. R. Jacobson
A. J. McElwain	J. P. Lynch
F. M. J. McKeon	L. A. McMahon
W. F. X. Wheeler	J. J. Gaffney
R. A. O'Connor	E. V. Best
F. D. Bennett	R. C. Shindler
R. L. Bonner	W. W. Lumpkin
J. W. Weise	C. D. Christman
J. McD. Flowers	M. P. Gans
R. W. Hodge	J. N. Moody
P. C. Edgar	M. B. Faust
J. O'Neill	L. W. Meacham
F. J. Loungway	J. E. O'Brien
F. A. Gallagher	W. H. Hoffman
F. P. Gehring	F. L. McGann
V. H. Morgan	J. W. Boud
J. R. Aron	S. W. Russell
R. L. Smith	J. H. Shilling
C. J. Foley	J. P. Gill
L. A. Fey	

<b>Spot Promotion</b>	
Lieutenants whose previous appointments to the rank of Lieutenant Commander which continue only while serving in specified duties are terminated and who are reappointed to the rank of Lieutenant Commander for temporary service in the Naval Reserve of the United States Navy without restriction as to duty station:	
<b>Classification DE-V(G)</b>	
C. G. Long	C. L. Cover, Jr.
W. S. Ginn	E. E. Swiderski
G. S. Fitzgerald	R. H. Stevens
L. S. Summers	W. H. Phillipson, Jr.
<b>Classification D-V(G)</b>	
J. R. Kivlen	Francis Kernal, Jr.
Gordon Raymond	A. L. McPherrin
D. A. Smith	B. M. Abel
F. W. Maenle	C. M. Fellows
<b>Classification C-V(G)</b>	
H. W. Schlueter	T. H. Morrin
<b>Classification A-V(G)</b>	
W. F. McDonald	S. W. Hopkins
R. M. Van Tuyl	
<b>Classification A-V(T)</b>	
E. J. Detmer	W. E. Conney
W. E. Deming	E. A. Teague
<b>Classification D-M</b>	
C. W. Finstrom	A. J. Church
J. P. Gately	R. J. Casilli
D. S. Poller	D. B. Geddes
N. E. Wilcox	U. V. Martin
A. C. Hoffman	F. W. C. Zwicker
G. R. Jacobs, Jr.	H. E. Randell
H. M. Godsey	H. T. Cameron
H. R. McPhee	G. A. Ritchey
D. J. Hackett	J. D. Burns
W. F. Smith	F. O. Bryce
W. W. Mackenzie	F. T. Callahan
<b>Classification E-M</b>	
J. J. Cantline	J. A. Mackey
A. H. Russell	W. A. Keefe
A. E. Champeau	
<b>Classification DE-V(S)</b>	
Tom Gore	E. N. Leonard
Norman Loader	Spaulding Trafton, Jr.
J. P. Raugh	C. J. Forsberg
<b>Classification D-V(S)</b>	
G. B. Bingham	H. S. Center
H. C. Walters	E. B. Morris
P. M. Clark	C. L. Kessler
D. D. Dunn	E. W. Sweetland
R. B. George	L. A. Hager, Jr.
B. M. McMullin	G. B. Berger, Jr.
C. W. Myers	W. M. McCarthy
H. W. Carroll, Jr.	Frederick Fish
R. S. Aldrich	G. O. Hackett
J. N. Wheelock	L. R. Sauer
C. S. Olson	J. J. M. La Follette
L. E. Oehring	H. J. Wright
F. E. Adam	H. L. Hamilton
R. W. Schlecht	J. F. Gallagher
D. E. Keith	J. F. Gilday
T. H. McBaine	W. P. Burleigh
C. B. Neely	D. E. Hart, Jr.
E. B. Keckler	J. S. Frazer
Truman Jones	Warwick Potter
J. E. Beebe	R. S. Hotz, Jr.
C. K. Saltzman	F. J. Cavanagh
B. H. Donbey	C. W. Wine
L. D. Blanchard	D. F. Folds
W. A. Bowles	T. M. Prentice
X. F. Censullo	Preston Moore
F. F. Kravath	T. D. Price
T. J. Dumont	H. E. Neal
W. H. Nelson	E. C. Lawson
C. E. Grohs	G. C. Ellick
A. P. Pasquarello	T. R. Stansbury
George Ohl, Jr.	R. W. Greene, Jr.
H. F. Hormann	B. E. Flettner
W. E. Bobbit	K. C. Elliott
R. E. Flint	C. S. Stufts
N. W. Herzberg	D. M. Miller
J. A. Riviere	F. D. Denfeld
J. W. Wilson	S. E. Fox
J. K. Flynn	F. S. Sims
T. F. Donlon	R. W. Greene, Jr.
E. H. Sutter	B. E. Hatchett
G. A. Daniels	B. E. Flettner
H. T. Snedkamp	J. L. Burch
F. M. Mosley	H. T. Grace
J. H. Eitter, Jr.	L. J. H. Heiss
J. K. Skippey, Jr.	Alfred Hano
H. V. Roulett	J. E. Neal
J. R. Burke	E. C. Lawson
W. B. Wingo	W. G. Morrison
H. H. Wolfe	Frederick Denfeld
T. C. Evans	G. C. Ellick
J. L. Aull	E. A. Lowell
E. R. Peters	E. A. Matthiessen
P. J. Simons	H. R. Stone
H. E. Reardon	Willard Deason
A. C. Morris	H. Milliken
D. G. Knox	P. J. Lee
J. H. McGrann	A. C. Cassatt
W. R. Boyer	M. C. Rhodes, Jr.
J. F. Fitzpatrick	T. T. King
E. E. Jackson	J. L. Aull
J. B. Knoebel	E. R. Peters
W. M. McLean	P. J. Simons
A. C. Church	H. E. Reardon
W. J. Byrnes	A. C. Morris
R. L. Roberts	D. G. Knox
G. F. Pappin	J. H. McGrann

<b>Classification CHC-V(S)</b>	
K. D. Perkins	J. C. Larkin
R. A. Curtis	E. F. Smart, Jr.
P. R. McPhee, Jr.	E. R. Barnes
E. J. Finnin	J. W. Fulton, Jr.
J. F. Woloch	J. T. McLaughlin
J. P. Farrell	
<b>Classification CHC-V(S)</b>	
J. E. Fraze	B. T. Beckham
D. J. Burke	F. J. Keenan
H. H. McClellan	S. V. Hannon
P. J. Redmond	T. H. Reilly
D. F. Meehan	F. R. Jacobson
A. J. McElwain	J. P. Lynch
F. M. J. McKeon	L. A. McMahon
W. F. X. Wheeler	J. J. Gaffney
R. A. O'Connor	E. V. Best
F. D. Bennett	R. C. Shindler
R. L. Bonner	W. W. Lumpkin
J. W. Weise	C. D. Christman
J. McD. Flowers	M. P. Gans
R. W. Hodge	J. N. Moody
P. C. Edgar	M. B. Faust
J. O'Neill	L. W. Meacham
F. J. Loungway	J. E. O'Brien
F. A. Gallagher	W. H. Hoffman
F. P. Gehring	F. L. McGann
V. H. Morgan	J. W. Boud
J. R. Aron	S. W. Russell
R. L. Smith	J. H. Shilling
C. J. Foley	J. P. Gill
L. A. Fey	
<b>Classification C-V(S)</b>	
J. E. Fraze	B. T. Beckham
D. J. Burke	F. J. Keenan
H. H. McClellan	S. V. Hannon
P. J. Redmond	T. H. Reilly
D. F. Meehan	F. R. Jacobson
A. J. McElwain	J. P. Lynch
F. M. J. McKeon	L. A. McMahon
W. F. X. Wheeler	J. J. Gaffney
R. A. O'Connor	E. V. Best
F. D. Bennett	R. C. Shindler
R. L. Bonner	W. W. Lumpkin
J. W. Weise	C. D. Christman
J. McD. Flowers	M. P. Gans
R. W. Hodge	J. N. Moody
P. C. Edgar	M. B. Faust
J. O'Neill	L. W. Meacham
F. J. Loungway	J. E. O'Brien
F. A. Gallagher	W. H. Hoffman
F. P. Gehring	F. L. McGann
V. H. Morgan	J. W. Boud
J. R. Aron	S. W. Russell
R. L. Smith	J. H. Shilling
C. J. Foley	J. P. Gill
L. A. Fey	
<b>Classification CC-V(S)</b>	
C. W. Leveau	
<b>Classification L-V(S)</b>	
C. D. Robinson	S. H. Edmunds
<b>Classification O-V(S)</b>	
W. E. Browning	A. B. Layton
D. F. McRae	R. W. Ince
Hudson Moore, Jr.	W. F. Wetzel
M. K. Coleman	
<b>Classification MC-V(G)</b>	
G. G. Schlesinger	
<b>Classification MC-V(S)</b>	
H. M. Wevraugh, Jr.	G. A. Stanbury
R. T. Burke	H. B. Yeatts
S. M. Dillenberg	N. F. Fein
F. L. Horsfall, Jr.	F. K. Bradford
George Ferre	A. W. Squires
W. E. Dawson	W. B. McAllister, Jr.
<b>Classification DC-V(G)</b>	
W. H. Hartnett	
<b>Classification SC-V(G)</b>	
M. M. Rosser	
<b>Classification SC-V(S)</b>	
George Friedman	C. W. Folds
G. W. Noite	F. L. Ehrman
<b>Classification SC-M</b>	
H. M. S. Gandelman	J. F. Walker
<b>Classification CEC-V(S)</b>	
R. D. Scheirer	A. C. Josephs
L. R. Quayle	Bernard Marcus
R. L. Cooper	W. H. Day
M. E. Healey	V. K. Cates
J. R. Ritter	P. E. Blume
J. T. Lewis	Benjamin Evans
D. H. Gottwals	W. C. Binkley
R. J. Valentine	S. F. Schleppi
E. S. Winham	H. J. Bendle
A. G. Van Schaick	W. A. Weeks
C. E. McKay	P. E. Seuffer
<	

A. Ever-  
Gowen  
Humph-  
A. Lau-  
Leslie  
Lidgard  
Linsey  
Soren-  
Strick-  
Topin  
Tonkin  
Ceder-  
Hannon  
E. Hub-  
Sirlia  
Camp-  
Carr  
Fleker  
Finkel-  
Hamil-  
Mahaf-  
V. Scriv-  
Athearn  
G. Herr  
E. Rich-  
Waska  
Buel  
Chap-  
Gogus-  
Bran-  
Carlow  
Graham  
D. Krapf  
Mears  
Aronov  
F. Bales-  
Hilum  
Bohnet  
Sandlot  
Carley  
Castel-  
Cawley  
Chalot  
J. Dalton  
Cooke  
Janowitz  
Demar-  
Denmaye  
R. Dero-  
H. Don-  
R. Drag  
Goetz  
J. Grant  
B. Har-  
Harvey  
J. Holme  
J. Howell  
J. Illies  
J. Kane  
Kurtis-  
Lough-  
McDon-  
Arch  
J. Martin  
Tenkay  
J. Meyer  
J. O'Leary  
J. Petron-  
ph. Pirog  
Rabay  
Shahan  
Snyder  
V. Stern  
Sweeny  
Wasser-  
V. Lentz  
J. Sugg  
Adams  
J. Brand-  
R. Brin-  
J. Butter-  
A. Coven-  
Hansford  
J. Hanford  
Herman  
G. Lynch  
E. Ma-  
A. Mardis  
J. McCor-  
A. Parker  
V. Pullem  
J. Steiner  
A. Terry  
J. Barnett  
M. Berger  
Cleveland  
J. Elling-  
J. Mitchell  
Stephen  
H. Ham-  
A. Hes-  
P. Ame-

## Army Casualties

(Continued from Preceding Page)

2nd Lt. A. J. Bridging 2nd Lt. C. E. Brooks  
1st Lt. A. R. Carbone 2nd Lt. W. P. Calmes  
1st Lt. W. A. Carpenter 2nd Lt. J. W. Rosher  
1st Lt. W. E. Carroll 2nd Lt. J. H. Harper  
Capt. R. T. Edwards 1st Lt. R. R. Lucas  
2nd Lt. R. H. Gourley 1st Lt. E. Martinez  
1st Lt. Alwin B. Jr. 1st Lt. F. G. McDonald  
Kocher 1st Lt. G. B. Melton  
2nd Lt. J. P. Lechow- 2nd Lt. E. B. Noxon  
ski 2nd Lt. N. A. J. Peters  
2nd Lt. D. H. Mac- 1st Lt. R. A. Szarek  
Mullen 2nd Lt. A. Slovacek  
1st Lt. G. S. Mc- Peake, Jr.  
2nd Lt. J. A. Morris 2nd Lt. H. W. Over-  
dorf  
2nd Lt. R. E. Paines 2nd Lt. O. Stanphill  
1st Lt. P. E. Pem- petti  
1st Lt. L. A. Sefranek 2nd Lt. H. J. Elliott  
2nd Lt. H. D. Storey 1st Lt. J. C. Moore-  
head, Jr.  
2nd Lt. W. R. Thorpe 2nd Lt. W. D. Clark  
2nd Lt. J. S. Colvin, Jr. 2nd Lt. T. E. Griner  
1st Lt. H. R. Nichols 2nd Lt. N. G. Pan-  
tages  
2nd Lt. B. G. Blake 2nd Lt. R. C. Smith  
1st Lt. R. C. Smith 2nd Lt. F. H. Hoosier  
1st Lt. John Lauten- schager 2nd Lt. J. N. Hughe-  
s  
2nd Lt. J. T. More- 2nd Lt. R. Matynasz  
2nd Lt. R. E. Spencer 2nd Lt. H. E. Olson  
2nd Lt. R. D. Allison 2nd Lt. W. J. Schmitz  
2nd Lt. R. C. Alphintz 1st Lt. M. E. Ward  
2nd Lt. M. P. Bach- 1st Lt. W. C. Hück-  
leben  
2nd Lt. D. L. Den- benek  
MISSING IN MEDITERRANEAN AREA

2nd Lt. J. J. Hannan 2nd Lt. G. M. Davis  
1st Lt. J. A. Mac- 2nd Lt. G. P. Elder  
2nd Lt. D. A. Mc- 2nd Lt. G. T. Mc-  
Namara 2nd Lt. R. G. Parker  
2nd Lt. W. G. Par- sons  
1st Lt. N. S. Rahal 2nd Lt. J. G. Fowler  
2nd Lt. R. W. Bartel 2nd Lt. H. R. Bro-  
lenthin  
2nd Lt. H. J. Daniels 2nd Lt. P. W. Trainor  
2nd Lt. C. J. Kasper 2nd Lt. B. F. Brown  
2nd Lt. V. M. Cox 2nd Lt. W. J. John-  
son  
2nd Lt. F. J. Sims 1st Lt. D. P. Roberts  
2nd Lt. Lester Jaffe 2nd Lt. G. LeGarde S.  
Doughty, Jr.  
2nd Lt. E. N. Slater 2nd Lt. P. F. Ortman  
2nd Lt. G. C. Strong 2nd Lt. W. F. Peters, Jr.  
2nd Lt. R. M. Whitmey 2nd Lt. W. J. Staunay  
2nd Lt. J. L. Byrne 2nd Lt. F. W. Penn  
2nd Lt. M. J. Solow 1st Lt. S. Rosoff  
2nd Lt. E. H. Belyea 2nd Lt. J. W. Moher  
1st Lt. W. J. Roberts 2nd Lt. J. F. Senta  
Capt. C. M. Shun- 2nd Lt. C. B. Patter-  
son  
2nd Lt. D. P. Thorne 2nd Lt. E. J. Betts  
2nd Lt. D. J. Ander- 2nd Lt. F. J. Buch-  
holz  
1st Lt. W. S. Brown 2nd Lt. H. P. Jostyn  
2nd Lt. J. P. Cook- 2nd Lt. S. Marcisak  
2nd Lt. M. W. Marko- 1st Lt. R. H. Taylor  
2nd Lt. B. F. Reed 2nd Lt. G. L. Weil  
2nd Lt. P. H. Scanlon 1st Lt. W. J. Leach  
Maj. W. A. Miller 1st Lt. W. W. Under-  
coff  
2nd Lt. A. A. Conley 2nd Lt. F. A. Kreml  
2nd Lt. J. T. East- land Jr.  
2nd Lt. John G. Datz 2nd Lt. F. J. Kirk-  
land  
2nd Lt. C. P. Olsen 2nd Lt. J. H. Davis  
2nd Lt. E. W. Nunn- 1st Lt. E. C. Mermad  
ney  
2nd Lt. F. A. Sherrill 1st Lt. R. J. Pike  
2nd Lt. W. T. Barn- 2nd Lt. R. E. Niffen-  
berger  
2nd Lt. L. M. Gerow

## MISSING IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

1st Lt. R. A. Gay 2nd Lt. C. E. Brooks  
1st Lt. L. M. Jennings 2nd Lt. J. P. Arm-  
strong  
1st Lt. R. J. Tilden 1st Lt. J. D. Ennis  
2nd Lt. J. S. Hair 2nd Lt. J. D. Hogan  
2nd Lt. E. E. Everett 2nd Lt. B. J. Ken-  
nedy  
1st Lt. G. B. Hill 2nd Lt. T. M. Hart-  
nett  
2nd Lt. E. R. Hedges 2nd Lt. E. G. Davis  
2nd Lt. R. J. Drewe- low  
1st Lt. F. G. McDonald 2nd Lt. R. F. Michael  
Kocher 2nd Lt. K. R. King  
2nd Lt. J. R. Crad- dock  
1st Lt. W. F. Hallie 2nd Lt. G. R. Ellison  
2nd Lt. A. W. Garlick Capt. G. O. Richard-  
son  
INTERED BY GERMANY

2nd Lt. F. H. Mc- Bride  
1st Lt. V. A. Arneson  
2nd Lt. P. M. Bevier  
2nd Lt. B. T. Moyna- han  
1st Lt. R. N. Brady  
2nd Lt. C. L. Demott  
2nd Lt. R. R. Nixon  
2nd Lt. T. W. Brooks  
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Capt. B. E. Miller 2nd Lt. R. E. Bangs  
1st Lt. L. M. Jennings 2nd Lt. A. Montello  
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2nd Lt. L. M. Gerow

## Army and Navy Journal

April 29, 1944

1029

### PLAY A BETTER GAME WITH "WILSON"

**S**PORTS are more and more a part of the war's training program. Physical fitness for the tough tasks ahead is the greatest thing the war leaders can give you.

And physical fitness, through regular participation in sports, is the best thing you can give yourself for success and happiness after the war.

The greatest benefits . . . and the best fun . . . in sports, come with the finest equipment. In the Army or Navy you get a free test of sports equipment. Watch for the name "Wilson" and compare.


For yourself or your outfit, ask at Post-Exchange or ship Service Store for Wilson Equipment now, and when the war is over you'll go straight to your Wilson dealer to make sure of the same fine quality in anything you require for golf, tennis, football, baseball, basketball, soccer, badminton or any other sport you choose as your peacetime favorite. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., Chicago, New York and other leading cities.

## Wilson

### SPORTS EQUIPMENT



Wilson Athletic Goods  
Mfg. Co. Inc.  
Chicago Plant



**TOUGH-WHISKERED YANKS IN HEAVY TANKS HAVE JAWS AS SMOOTH AS GUYS IN BANKS**

**Burma-Shave**

©

NO BRUSH LATHER

Army Casualties

(Continued from Preceding Page)

1st Lt. F. C. Miller	2nd Lt. Howard D. Venise
2nd Lt. W. J. Cooney	2nd Lt. George A. Browning
2nd Lt. H. J. Eich	2nd Lt. Kenneth Davis
2nd Lt. Frank Far- gasco	2nd Lt. W. T. Cheairs jr.
1st Lt. William Fedge	2nd Lt. M. W. De- merit
1st Lt. Donald Mac- Donald	1st Lt. G. W. Selbert
Lt. Col. Burton E. Mc- Kenzie	2nd Lt. C. H. Taylor
1st Lt. A. J. Mandi- berg	FO Russell D. Austin
2nd Lt. Paul Marks	1st Lt. H. N. Ballew
2nd Lt. P. L. Perkins	2nd Lt. Wm. Borrego
1st Lt. Edmund L. Rinehart	2nd Lt. H. A. Brewer
2nd Lt. T. J. Scanlan	1st Lt. F. C. Butler
2nd Lt. W. P. Shapiro	2nd Lt. W. B. Camp- bell
2nd Lt. W. G. Stein	1st Lt. A. L. Emerson
2nd Lt. Milton Turner	2nd Lt. E. A. P. Jeter
2nd Lt. R. E. Wendell	1st Lt. O. L. Koontz
1st Lt. W. S. Wiggins	1st Lt. Robert L. Mc- Adams
2nd Lt. H. F. Writz	2nd Lt. T. P. McGuinn
2nd Lt. L. W. Clem- ents	1st Lt. J. D. Mullens
1st Lt. Kelley Ritter	1st Lt. R. E. Sanders
2nd Lt. C. R. Carey	1st Lt. R. B. Spencer
2nd Lt. Wayne W. Dougherty	2nd Lt. G. S. Taylor, jr.
2nd Lt. G. S. Hunt	1st Lt. Neal P. Ward
2nd Lt. J. A. Kappelle	1st Lt. H. A. Wheeler
2nd Lt. James P. Lutz	2nd Lt. R. E. Burgess
2nd Lt. L. W. Mc- Daniel	2nd Lt. F. R. Erick- son
2nd Lt. A. L. Malkin	1st Lt. W. N. Ras- mussen
2nd Lt. John E. Orr	2nd Lt. E. F. Ander- son
2nd Lt. E. S. Santos	2nd Lt. T. L. Burr
2nd Lt. Max W. Swayer	2nd Lt. Wallace Legg
2nd Lt. H. H. Ullom	2nd Lt. R. E. Palme
2nd Lt. J. C. Dirick- son	2nd Lt. J. J. Rogers
2nd Lt. J. R. Foster	2nd Lt. O. L. Amund- son
2nd Lt. Don D. Fow- ler	1st Lt. H. C. Cannon
2nd Lt. J. E. Geary	2nd Lt. D. W. Carr
2nd Lt. J. C. Hayes	Capt. J. H. Foster
2nd Lt. W. W. Monk- ers	2nd Lt. J. J. Kelly
2nd Lt. Ted Strain	Lt. Col. Loren G. Mc- Collom
2nd Lt. D. L. Tracy	2nd Lt. Alvin L. Owen jr.
2nd Lt. Norman F. Deffrees	Capt. G. F. Richard
2nd Lt. Clyde P. Mc- Callum	2nd Lt. Paul O. Crab- tree
2nd Lt. Edward F. Bracken	
2nd Lt. A. L. Claple	2nd Lt. E. A. Flint
2nd Lt. H. F. Hart- man	2nd Lt. M. R. Sands
1st Lt. A. J. Repas	2nd Lt. G. E. Steuck
2nd Lt. C. H. Robin- son	2nd Lt. R. L. Sullivan
	2nd Lt. Billy R. Col- lins

U. S. War Communiques  
GENERAL MacARTHUR'S HQ.  
SW PACIFIC AREA

20 April

Northwestern Sector: Netherland, New Guinea.

Babo: Our heavy units at midday bombed the airdrome and installations, causing fires and explosions.

Geelvink Bay: Our heavy units in adverse weather attacked Manokwari, Waren and Muhi airdromes. To the northeast near Bink Island, one of our air patrols damaged a small enemy cargo vessel and strafed shore anti-aircraft positions.

Babar Islands: Our fighters strafed enemy barracks areas and installations and sank a lugger off the coast.

Northeastern Sector: New Britain: Rabaul: Solomons-based medium and light bombers before dawn dropped ninety-four tons of bombs on airdrome defenses and supply installations. Keravat, Rapopo and Lukunai runways were hit and two gun positions probably destroyed. Fuel and ammunition dumps at Matupi were set afire and a causeway damaged. Night harassing attacks and daylight fighter sweeps were conducted over the area. We lost two planes.

New Guinea: Our air patrols attacked Tumleo Island, Bogia defense positions and other coastal targets from Altape and Madang. A bridge over the Gabel River destroyed. Adverse weather hampered air operations in this sector.

Bougainville: Our torpedo and dive bombers struck shore batteries at Mossiga and Buka, scoring direct hits on two guns and damaging others. Other planes attacked enemy gun positions beyond the Torokina perimeter, the Kara runway and Cupp Island in Choiseul Bay, causing a large explosion.

Caroline Islands: Nomoi: Our Solomons-based heavy units at Midday dropped twenty-seven tons of bombs on Satawan airdrome, scoring hits on the runway and bivouac area. There was no opposition.

Woleai: Our air patrols bombed the runway and supply dump, causing explosions and fires.

21 April

Northwestern Sector: Netherland, New Guinea: Our heavy units dropped twenty-three tons of bombs on Utarom and Manokwari airdromes. Three enemy planes intercepted without effect.

Timor: Our escorted medium units before dawn bombed Su Village, causing fires and explosions with smoke visible for fifty miles.

Northeastern Sector: New Ireland: Our air patrols at night bombed Kaveng. An enemy night fighter ineffectively intercepted.

New Britain: Rabaul: Our medium and light bombers from the Solomons expended over 100 tons of bombs in daylight attacks on enemy airdromes and installations. Tobera and Keravat runways were damaged and large fires and explosions were seen at Vunapepe. At Kilon and Bulung plantations, near Kambina Bay, several buildings were demolished. Farther south, our air patrols at-

tacked coastal targets between Waterfall and Wake Bays. Three planes were lost.

New Guinea: Wake Island: Our air patrols set out to shoot enemy freighter and damaged another.

Vanimo: Our medium destroyed a small tanker and bombed Negira village, starting fires and silencing eight gun positions.

Hausa-Madang coast: Our escorted attack planes struck enemy installations at Palas Point, causing heavy damage. Fighter bombers attacked Bagauog Island, Negiar and Sarong harbor, starting fires. Our air patrols silenced two gun positions at Batai Bay, destroyed five laden barges at Hatzendeit harbor and damaged three others along the coast.

Bougainville: Our heavy units bombed Kara runway. Fighters bombed Kahili and villages along the southwest coast and also destroyed gun positions at Buka. Our light surface units strafed shore guns near the Jaba River.

Caroline Islands: Nomoi: Our heavy units from Solomons bases at midday dropped thirty-four tons of bombs on Satawan airdrome and dispersal areas, scoring hits on the runway and starting a large fire.

Woleai: Our heavy units bombed Woleai airdrome on two successive days, destroyed one fighter taking off, two bombers on the ground and one float plane in the harbor, probably destroyed three other float planes and caused large fires and explosions in supply dumps. Two of eleven interceptors were shot down. All our aircraft returned. Our night patrols strafed Ifalik Island.

22 April

Northwestern Sector: Dutch New Guinea: Geelvink Bay: Our heavy units bombed Namber and Kamiri airdromes on Numfoor Island at midday with twenty-four tons of explosives. Dispersal areas were effectively covered and runways cratered. A single enemy plane attempted interception.

Northeastern Sector: New Ireland: Our Solomons air patrols bombed Kaveng at night.

New Britain: Rabaul: Our Solomons light bombers hit Lukunai airdrome and Matupi Island supply areas with forty-five tons of explosives, covering the runway well and starting numerous fires. Fighter patrols raided Rapao airdrome. One plane was lost.

Open Bay: Our light naval units at night shelled buildings at Ualamona.

New Guinea: Vanimo: Our medium bombers dropped forty-five tons of bombs and strafed enemy shore installations from low level, destroying many buildings and starting fires. Our air patrols sank a 1,000-ton enemy cargo vessel west of Hollandia.

Hausa-Madang Coast: Our attack planes from low altitudes struck enemy supply and bivouac areas at Bunabon Harbor, causing fires. Fighters dive-bombed enemy positions along the Walog River, starting fires. Air patrols swept the coast, wrecking two barges and damaging buildings at Bogia and Kromprin Harbor.

Bougainville: Our air patrols strafed personnel at Buka, bombed Altara and Mosiga and harassed targets at Aolei by night. Our torpedo and dive-bombers bombed Nasa-numa plantation and started fires beyond Torokina plantation.

Caroline Islands: Nomoi: Heavy units from the Solomons dropped forty-nine tons of bombs on Satawan airdrome at midday, damaging the runway and starting fires.

Woleai: Our heavy units struck the airdrome runway, dispersal and supply areas, destroying two parked enemy planes and causing explosions and several large fires. In attacks on the previous day two planes were destroyed on the ground.

Our air patrols shot down an enemy bomber to the southeast.

23 April

Northwestern Sector: Mapia Islands: Our air patrols attacked four small enemy freighters, sinking one, damaging another and forcing the other two aground. Supply dumps on shore were set afire.

Northeastern Sector: New Ireland: Solomons air patrols destroyed buildings in the Tabar Islands. Our light naval units at night shelled the barracks area near Namatanai.

New Britain: Rabaul: Our Solomons-based medium and light bombers in morning attacks dropped over 100 tons of explosives on Lukunai, Vunakanau and Keravat airdromes and on supply areas and defense positions at Matupi and Toboi. Fighter patrols over the area set fire to twelve trucks and two small craft.

New Guinea: Altape area: Our heavy, medium and attack units bombed and strafed enemy installations, coastal villages and offshore islands, dropping over 200 tons of explosives. Fuel dumps were ignited, many buildings destroyed and fires started.

Wewak: Continuing the neutralization of this air base, our heavies in a morning attack on But, Dagua and Wewak airfields dropped 200 tons of bombs. A large fuel fire was started at Hana Bay. Our heavy, medium and attack planes struck bivouac and supply areas after dawn with 135 tons of bombs, starting fires.

Madang Coast: Our ground forces advancing north of Erima have captured enemy equipment and supplies. Our air patrols executed numerous attacks on coastal targets, destroying many buildings, supply dumps, a bridge and two motor vehicles.

New Ireland: Kaveng: Solomons-based torpedo and dive-bombers after dawn expended twenty-nine tons on runways and gun positions with good effect. Air patrols attacked Borop and Dauyl Island, damaging a barge.

New Britain: Rabaul: Our Solomons medium and light bombers in morning attacks struck the airdrome and supply areas with ninety-two tons of explosives. Lukunai, Rapopo and Keravat runways were well covered. Large fuel fires were started and several buildings destroyed at Bataval and Vunapone. Air patrols damaged a barge in Kambina Bay and damaged houses at Cape Li-

guan. Bougainville: Our torpedo and dive-bombers heavily damaged Ibn Village west of Numa Numa. Fighters dive-bombed installations in the Bini-Faisi area, causing large explosions. Air patrols swept over Matchin Bay and Buka Bay areas, damaging two piers and sinking a barge.

Caroline Islands: Nomoi: Our Solomons-

neutralization attacks by our air forces and planes from carriers of the Pacific Fleet.

The complete surprise and effective support both on the surface and in the air secured our initial landings with slight losses. We are pushing forward to secure local airfields. We made feints over the past week toward Madang and Wewak and apparently deceived the enemy into concentrating the mass of his forces forward into those areas, thus leaving the vital sector of Hollandia vulnerable and making possible the surprise movement at his rear.

The operation throws a loop of envelopment around the enemy's Eighteenth Army dispersed along the coast of New Guinea in the Madang area from both directions. A single enemy plane raided our beachhead during the night, causing moderate damage and light casualties.

Manokwari: Our heavy reconnaissance units destroyed two small merchant vessels and a barge. To the north an enemy flying boat was shot down by our air patrols.

British New Guinea: Altape: Our forces cleared the area, dispersing the enemy into jungle hills. Our air force is now operating from the airfields.

Wewak area: Our heavy bombers dropped

184 tons of 2,000-pounders on four airfields, insuring their continued unserviceability. Attack planes destroyed five barges off Musa Island.

Marlensburg: On the Sepik River air patrols started a fire by strafing.

Hans Bay: Further heavy air attacks were made on enemy supplies and personnel concentrated in the area. During the morning our heavy and medium bombers hit supply dumps, causing fires, while low-flying attack planes dropped parachute fragmentation bombs in personnel areas. In all, 122 tons were dropped. Anti-aircraft fire was reduced to a few machine guns and all our planes returned.

Madang Coast: Our medium units in a constant sweep shelled and destroyed a gun position on Uligan. Fighter patrols attacked bridges, huts and trucks along the coast and bombed installations on Karkar Island. Light naval units at night machine-gunned positions at Malala.

New Ireland: Our Solomons air patrol at night bombed the airdrome and supply dump at Kaveng and set fire to buildings at Nama Nama. One of our planes failed to return.

New Britain: Rabaul: Our medium and light planes from the Solomons dropped over forty tons of explosives in morning attacks on airfields and supply dumps. The Tohera runway was hit and large fires, visible forty-five miles, were started at Matupi and Tailli Bay. At Open Bay naval patrols destroyed an enemy barge at Tulin River.

Bougainville: Air patrols sank a large troon-laden barge near Numa Numa. Naval units at dusk shelled enemy shore guns on Shortland Island and positions at the Purata Matui and Jaha Rivers.

Caroline Islands: Truk: Our Solomons-based heavy units before dawn struck the townships and seaplane base and fuel storage areas on Eten and Amboi Islands at Parau, causing large fires and explosions. Though enemy planes were seen in the area, only one attempted interception, without effect.

Woleai: Further reports of air combat on April 23 indicate that there were thirty enemy fighters, of which a total of seventeen were destroyed and four probably destroyed. We lost one bomber.

U. S. AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

19 April

Photographs made during Tuesday's Eighth Air Force attacks on Germany show bomb hits on enemy aircraft plants at Oranienburg and Rathenow in the Berlin area, on a rayon plant at Wittenberge, seventy-five miles northwest of Berlin; airfields at Lueneburg, twenty-five miles southeast of Hamburg, and Perleburg (near Wittenberge) and dockside warehouse at Cuxhaven on the North Sea at the mouth of the River Elbe.

Two patterns of bombs fell across a Heinkel 177 components plant at Oranienburg, hitting four major buildings and numerous smaller ones. On an adjacent airfield a subassembly or repair building and a gun-testing range were hit and left burning. Of thirty-nine aircraft on the field at the time at least eight HE 177 long-range bombers were destroyed or damaged.

At Rathenow, forty miles west of Berlin, an aircraft component plant was hit by a heavy concentration of explosives and incendiaries. Two of three major buildings received direct hits, fires were started in the barracks area, and the plant area was obscured by smoke rising several thousand feet at the end of the attack.

Large fires also were started in the Wittenberge rayon plant area and in an adjacent dockside.

At Cuxhaven, a pattern of bombs was strong across warehouses and along docks, and a number of bombs fell in near-by marshaling yards.

Good concentrations hit hangar areas on the Lueneburg and Perleburg airfields, and at Lueneburg three aircraft were destroyed or damaged on the ground.

Of a very strong fighter escort from the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces only five planes were lost, one less than previously announced.

Late this afternoon B-24 Liberators with P-47 Thunderbolt escorts from the Eighth Air Force bombed military objectives in the Pas-de-Calais area in France, while other P-47s conducted offensive patrols over the Netherlands.

No enemy fighters were seen, but flak was intense. One bomber was lost, but all fighters returned safely.

The air invasion of Germany by B-17 Flying Fortresses and B-24 Liberators of the Eighth United States Air Force in very great strength continued today for the second consecutive day and once again met only slight opposition from German fighters in spite of the fact that the weather was excellent. Anti-aircraft fire was also on a reduced scale.

Fighter aircraft factories in the vicinity of Kassel and aircraft parks at Eschwege, Paderborn, Guetersloh, Lippstadt and Werl all

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## U. S. War Communiques (Continued from Preceding Page)

of them in the vicinity of Kassel and Hamm, were hit and in many instances hangars and barracks were covered with bombs.

Results showing on photographs taken during the bombing were generally satisfactory.

Very strong forces of P-38 Lightnings, P-51 Mustangs and P-47 Thunderbolts of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces once again escorted the bomber divisions. Pilots reported they shot down sixteen enemy fighters. Bombers' gunners reported shooting down five enemy fighters.

From this large-scale operation five of our bombers and two of our fighters failed to return.

20 April

Heavy damage was done to the Focke-Wulf plant and other factories in the Kassel area and to various aircraft parks near Kassel and Hamm in the large-scale attack by B-17 Flying Fortresses and B-24 Liberators of the Eighth Air Force yesterday. This was shown by the study of photographs taken during the bombing.

At the Kassel-Bettenhausen Focke-Wulf works a very compact concentration of bombs fell in the target area. Direct hits were scored on all buildings except one component shop. Three important machine shops were all heavily damaged.

The adjacent Spinnfaser textile works was also heavily hit throughout the entire plant area. At the end of the attack large fires had been started in both the Focke-Wulf plants and the Spinnfaser works.

At the Kassel-Waldu Focke-Wulf plant all of the six small and two large workshops received severe damage, and of three assembly buildings two were directly hit. Other smaller plant installations were severely damaged and fires were started.

The Henschel Flugmotorenbau factory for Daimler-Benz aircraft engines received a compact bomb concentration, although smoke from fires and bursting bombs makes impossible a complete assessment. However, it can be seen that four of seven large workshops received direct hits and that fires were started in two of them.

Three of the four large hangars of the Paderborn Airdrome were directly hit. Several smaller hangars, workshops, barracks and other buildings were under two concentrations falling on the target.

At the Lippstadt airdrome two of six major hangars were hit and one was set afire. Workshops and barracks were well hit and fires were started. Another hangar containing a twin-engine plane was set afire and later an explosion occurred in the hangar area.

The full weight of the attack fell on airdrome installations at Werl. Of eight hangars at least six received severe damage. There were also hits on refueling points, on barracks, and on other airdrome buildings.

One hangar of eight was directly hit at the Gutersloh Airdrome and incendiaries fell in hangar and barracks areas.

The Coblenz rallyingards were attacked by B-24 Liberators which scored hits on an engine roundhouse, a repair shop, and on rolling stock. B-24's also scored good results on the target in the Pas-de-Calais area of France.

22 April

This afternoon Ninth Air Force B-26 Marauders and A-20 light bombers in strength attacked military objectives in northern France. They were covered by RAF, Dominion and Allied Spitfires.

Liberators and Flying Fortresses of the Eighth Air Force in very great strength continued the aerial invasion of Germany today with a heavy assault on important railways and marshalling yards at Hamm. The bombers were escorted by very strong forces of Mustangs, Thunderbolts and Lightnings of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces.

An attack on at least seven widely separated German air bases in France and Belgium was made by medium-sized forces of fighter-bombers and fighters of the Eighth Air Force this afternoon.

P-38 Lightnings, P-47 Thunderbolts and P-51 Mustangs dropped bombs on airfields, repair shops, buildings and parked aircraft. Other P-38's, P-47's and P-51's acted as escort and strafed airdromes. Some enemy air craft were damaged on the ground.

From these operations seven of our fighters are missing.

23 April

Operating in very great strength for the fourth time in five days heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force late yesterday afternoon concentrated a heavy attack upon the railway yards at Hamm, one of Germany's most important rail traffic centers.

Satisfactory results against this junction between the Ruhr and central Germany were reported by returning crews of the heavy bombers which were escorted by P-51 Mustangs, P-47 Thunderbolts and P-38 Lightnings of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces.

25 April

B-17 Flying Fortresses and B-24 Liberators of the Eighth Air Force in very great strength yesterday (Monday) continued the air war against Germany, attacking in clear weather factories at Friedrichshafen and a number of airfields in the Munich region.

A fighter escort of very great strength, comprised of P-51 Mustangs, P-38 Lightnings and P-47 Thunderbolts of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces and RAF Mustangs of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces provided escort and support for the bombers.

Bombing results were generally very satisfactory and visibility over the target was good.

Two of our bomber divisions reported light opposition from enemy aircraft, but one division of our attacking force told of determined and continuous attacks by numbers of German fighters. Heavy air battles were fought by our fighter escort and our bombers with the German fighters.

In addition to their escort and support mission, many of our fighters strafed enemy airfields, destroying a large number of enemy aircraft on the ground.

Sixty-six enemy aircraft were reported shot down by our fighters and thirty-seven enemy

aircraft were reported destroyed in aerial combat by our bombers. Thirty-eight of our bombers and seventeen fighters are missing.

26 April

Photographs taken during and after Monday's bombing showed serious damage to the home factories of the Dornier Company and a large tank and gear factory of Friederichshafen, the Messerschmitt glider factory at Leipheim, the Messerschmitt 410 assembly plant at Oberpfaffenhofen and aircraft parks at Gablingen, Landsberg and Erding, all in the Munich area.

At the Dornier plant two concentrations dropped by Eighth Air Force bombers severely damaged three hangars and a large workshop. At the gear plant eight out of twelve main buildings were damaged.

At the Leipheim glider factory all the main buildings of the assembly plant were hit. At Oberpfaffenhofen seven hangars and barracks and the barracks area were hit and many aircraft on the ground left burning.

At the Gablingen airdrome storage and repair shops, three large hangars and some barracks were hit.

At the Landsberg airdrome a large repair hangar was partially destroyed and five other hangars seriously damaged and the barracks set afire.

At the Erding airdrome three hangars were seriously damaged and there were numerous hits on stores and barracks. Photographs show several dozen parked aircraft were partially destroyed or put out of commission by the bombing and strafing of air fields.

B-17 Flying Fortresses and B-24 Liberators of the Eighth Air Force in medium strength today attacked German fighter bases at Nancy, Metz and Dijon in France and industrial targets in southwest Germany.

Strong forces of P-38 Lightnings, P-51 Mustangs and P-47 Thunderbolts of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces and RAF Mustangs and Spitfires of the Second Tactical Air Force provided escort and support.

Enemy air opposition was slight. Our fighters destroyed a number of enemy aircraft on the ground.

In addition to this operation B-24 Liberators of the Eighth Air Force, escorted by P-51 Mustangs, in the afternoon attacked military installations in the Pas-de-Calais area of France.

During the morning P-38 Lightnings fighter-bombers, with other P-38s acting as escort, attacked an airfield in northern France.

In these operations our fighters destroyed ten enemy aircraft in aerial combat in addition to a number on the ground.

Seven bombers and two fighters are missing.

CINPAC

No. 45, 23 April

Strong carrier task groups of the Pacific Fleet commenced attacks on the Japanese airdromes and troop concentrations in the Hollandia-Humboldt Bay region on the north coast of New Guinea on 20 April (West Longitude Date) for the purpose of covering and supporting the forces of the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area. These attacks are continuing.

FOURTEENTH USAF HQ, CHUNGKING

21 April

Mitchells of the Fourteenth Air Force on 19 April bombed and damaged a two-span bridge at Than Mol, Indo-China. Buildings and railroad tracks south of the bridge also were hit.

Fighters strafed and sank a fifty-foot ferry at Takaw, Burma. They also strafed and set afire two Japanese installations in the village.

All our aircraft are accounted for.

23 April

Aiding Chinese-American ground operations in the Mogau Valley, fighters of the Fourteenth Air Force on 21 April attacked Japanese supply lines in northern Burma. Eight trucks were destroyed and one damaged. Much construction equipment, including five steam rollers, was destroyed near Bhamo, and the headquarters building and Japanese troops strafed at Hsien-wu. Near Lashio, a fuel dump was set on fire.

Other fighters on offensive reconnaissance east and west of Takaw attacked ferry buildings and a bridge used by the Japanese supply columns. All our aircraft returned safely.

24 April

Fourteenth Air Force Liberators, striking deep into the southern tip of Indo-China, on 22 April bombed Japanese merchant ships anchored off Cape Saint Jacques, near Saigon, definitely sinking six vessels, including three 300-foot tankers, one 300-foot freighter and one 350-foot freighter, as well as one small naval vessel, totaling approximately 20,000 tons.

This is the first time that Japanese vessels have been attacked in the Saigon area by Army aircraft. The Japanese were completely surprised by the long-range machines. Direct hits were scored on every vessel. The tankers, apparently loaded with fuel, exploded and burned fiercely. One freighter was blown completely apart.

Other Liberators destroyed a three-span railroad bridge south of Vinh, Indo-China.

P-40's of the Fourteenth Air Force carried out an offensive reconnaissance on 22 April along roads of northeastern Burma. Ten box cars parked on a siding northeast of Lashio were strafed and one truck was destroyed.

From all these missions all aircraft returned safely.

Lightning and Warhawk fighters of the Fourteenth Air Force on 23 April carried out three strafing missions against Japanese installations in western Yunan Province, Burma and northern Thailand.

P-40's strafed Japanese barracks and personnel south of Tengchung, in western Yunan. Other P-40's bombed and strafed a motor pool north of Lashio, Burma. Direct hits were scored on the buildings area, causing a fire. Strafing attacks started a gasoline fire. Barracks and sheds were left burning.

P-38's strafed and damaged the barracks area at Chiangmai, northern Thailand.

One plane failed to return from these missions.

## General MacArthur

(Continued from First Page)

gestions which his judgment pronounces to be sound. When he was Chief of Staff he showed by his orders that his one thought was for the enlisted man or lieutenant distant from Washington, rather than those of high rank, and the manner in which he has conducted the campaigns of the current war, prove anew that their safety and their comfort, with due regard to the attainment of the objective set for them, are his single thought. In short, unnecessary risks for his men he will not permit, and he is equally determined that every possible care shall be given to the sick and wounded. By performance he has demonstrated administrative capacity. In the field he is the soldier's soldier. He carefully estimates his lieutenants, often selecting men he personally dislikes for a task to be done because he has decided that they have the qualities to perform it. That is to say, he does not allow his personal feelings to sway his judgment. He is a meticulous planner, and a leader who watches for and snatches opportunity, as shown by his occupation of Las Negros of the Admiralty group when he discovered by personal reconnaissance that it was weakly defended. A smear rumor circulated about him is that he remained within the walls of Corregidor, and never visited the troops fighting on Bataan, and it is further claimed that it was his duty to pass into captivity with his troops. To quote General Pershing again, the bravery of General MacArthur is inherent and beyond question. It was displayed upon the battlefields of France during World War I when his fearless conduct in the front lines earned him the profound admiration of his men and his superior officers. It was his business in the Luzon fighting to be at his headquarters where he could control all operations; and news reports now tell of him ashore with the troops, calmly directing operations under fire. In ordering him to leave the Philippines and assume command of the Southwestern Pacific, the President was motivated by recognition of the need of a leader of MacArthur's ability for this vital task, and by his knowledge that were this officer allowed to become a prisoner the morale of the country might be shaken. Yet MacArthur's friends know that had he believed he could have best served his country by becoming a Japanese captive, he would have disobeyed the order of the Commander-in-Chief and surrendered with his comrades. But because he estimates himself as cold-bloodedly as he does his subordinates, he concluded that in the command offered to him he could conduct operations which would arrest the southward drive of the Japanese, eventually expel them from the Philippines, and place their homeland under American guns. Never for a moment has he relaxed his determination to regain the territory which we lost as a result of the lack of defense power supplied to him. His first care after leaving Manila was Australia, and with meager resources, and aided by the Navy for whose understanding and support he is grateful, and with which he has fully cooperated, the security of that British Dominion has been established. His next move was to wrest from the Japanese control of New Guinea and the archipelagoes to the west and north, and coordinating with Admiral Halsey, this, too, has been done, with heavy losses to the enemy in killed and wounded, with thousands of them surrounded and deprived of supplies, and with minimum cost to our own troops, planes and ships. Today, he is mopping up Hollandia on the northwestern tip of

## Army and Navy Journal

April 29, 1944

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New Guinea, which is the first Dutch territory regained, and when that is securely in his hands, his next advance, already planned, will be made. That advance will be in accordance with arrangements for cooperation which have been perfected with Admiral Nimitz. Thus he is on his way to achieve his primary ambition, which is the recapture of Corregidor, Bataan and Manila.

So far as the Republican nomination is concerned, the efforts to induce General MacArthur to say he is a candidate or would accept it, have been many. Prominent citizens, who know his capacity, have flown to Australia to plead with him to run. Their trips were futile. General MacArthur has not turned, and would not turn, his hand over for the nomination. Obviously, he cannot refuse something which has never been offered to him. Whatever statement denying political ambition which he might make, could and would be interpreted as proof that he is thinking of the Presidency. Moreover, for a soldier to enter upon a political campaign would be repugnant to all his instincts. He believes that as our Republican system provides, the people as represented in the political parties, should make their choice, and again in the elections make their choice as between the candidates. In other words, he holds it to be his duty to devote himself to the job given him. With that position there certainly can be no quarrel. Moreover, he has repudiated entirely the "sinister interpretation" placed upon his letters, "that he intended criticism of any political philosophy or of any personage in high office." Those who know MacArthur accept that statement as the honest expression of his views.

To sum up, General MacArthur, as the country realizes, has demonstrated his capacity as a great field commander, as a thinking and planning machine, marching relentlessly on to his supreme objective, and only anxious that he shall be provided with sufficient strength to achieve it. Such a man facing powerful enemy forces, cannot be giving much thought to American politics, and when this fact is realized, his replies to Congressman Miller will take the minor place in the public mind which they deserve and which undoubtedly he desires.

## Jefferson Bks. to ASF

Transfer of Jefferson Barracks, Mo., from the Army Air Forces to the Army Service Forces became known this week when it was announced that Col. Frederick F. Christine, AAF, has been assigned to command the post until it is turned over to the ASF. Colonel Christine has been chief of staff at the St. Louis headquarters of the Central Technical Training Command.

He succeeds Col. Converse R. Lewis, who has been assigned to command Basic Training Center No. 10 of the Training Command at Greensboro, N. C.

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## SERVICE NEWS AND GOSSIP

**Foreign Affairs**—Nothing has more strikingly demonstrated the coordination of diplomacy with planned military operations than the activities of Secretary Hull in connection with the neutrals of Europe. By the representations he has made to those nations he has convinced them of our belief in our preponderant strength. In conjunction with Britain and Russia, he has moved to minimize their worth as espionage centers and as exporters of raw materials essential for German munitions manufacture. He has endeavored to ameliorate disputes between the Allies and also with and within the Governments-in-Exile, to the end of unity in the impending invasion of western Europe. Cooperating with the military in prosecuting the war of nerves on Germany, he has given publicity to various maneuvers which ordinarily would have been kept secret. The crescendo of his efforts in this connection has not yet been reached, but when it is attained he and his associates believe the United Nations will coordinate their attacks, and that the Hitlerian enemy will be weakened morally and militarily, and less resistant to the power General Eisenhower will apply.

As the picture has unfolded, it becomes clear that over the months Mr. Hull has been pursuing a well calculated plan designed to further the operations which were determined upon finally at Teheran when the date for their start was fixed. Interrupted as are the peace negotiations between Russia and Finland, with the consequence, perhaps, of a break in our relations with the latter if she continues adamant, yet the doubt of Helsinki's decision gravely concerned the German General Staff, and caused it to make military dispositions which advantaged the Red Armies; and the participation of Sweden in the mediation effort did not improve the relations between the Berlin and Stockholm Governments. It was, perhaps, for the purpose of appeasing German anger that the latter to our disappointment and regret,—Secretary Hull used the stronger word "dissatisfaction"—refused to stop the shipment of ball bearings and other materials to the Reich. Because of the value of these articles in connection with the manufacture of machines which our troops at a heavy cost in blood, must destroy, Mr. Hull intends to continue his representations in order to bring about an end to their export. It is true the Swedish government under an agreement made last summer cut the ball bearing export in half, but Mr. Hull holds that by furnishing any supply at all it is aiding our enemy, causing American losses, and prolonging the war. Aside from the damage which will be done to German munitions manufacture in the future as a result of Turkey's compliance with our request that she cease furnishing chrome to our enemy, there is the political and moral effect of the decision. Hitler and his Balkan Satellites now know that the Ankara Government has moved another step toward activating the alliance between it and Britain. Probably Berlin is apprehending that when the Western Front is established, Turkey will implement the reported Cairo agreement by a warlike demonstration if not by actual attack, in which case we will resume lend-lease aid. The measures taken by ourselves and England have reduced to a trickle the stream of information which was flowing out of Elre to Germany and Japan, but President de Valera, nevertheless, is refusing to dismiss the Axis Embassies, and is continuing his efforts to embarrass the Roosevelt Administration with our citizens by persisting in his pleas for Rome to be spared from military attack, although he knows that that city is a center for German activities and for rail connections with German troops in southern Italy. Spain is proving more conciliatory, but despite representations by the American and British Ambassadors, has failed so far to halt the export of tungsten to Germany. Mr. Hull is hopeful that before long the Franco government will see the light and stop this important traffic. The purpose of the reorganization of the Badoglio Government is to promote such Italian unity in the war effort as possible, and, likewise, the continuous negotiations with the de Gaulle Committee, have as their objective whole-hearted participation by the French in the invasion of southern France. Unfortunately, de Gaulle's arrogant determination to dominate all French interests and his dismissal of General Giraud, is making difficult the unity we desire. With Tito's forces of Yugoslavia, British and American naval units are cooperating, and such cooperation arouses another fear in Berlin, that the United Nations are preparing to land an expeditionary force in that region. The statements addressed by Mr. Hull to the people of Hungary and Roumania, coupled with the bombing of Bucharest, Budapest and Sofia, have increased Balkan agitation for peace, and added to the difficulties and complications of German occupation.

Thus at all points where our diplomacy can be employed to aid our military, it is being employed, and the German General Staff is in the position of stretching its cloth, represented by its troops, to cover all areas of possible attack, and to concentrate reserves to reinforce wherever we strike. It is comparatively easy now to shift those reserves—and there has been some shifting as information reaches Berlin and reacts upon its fears—but when battle is joined our air squadrons will strike more determinedly at communications and thereby slow the delivery of reinforcements. This will prove to be a great gain from the psychological warfare which Mr. Hull and our Army and Navy and other Agencies and Allies have been conducting.

Meanwhile, we have been moving to dispel or adjust differences with our Allies. The Stettinius Mission in London is nearing the completion of the survey of Anglo-American policies, which it has been making with British Foreign Minister Eden; there has been some clarification of the questions relating to post-war aviation, and a program of principles on post-war stabilization has been formulated by United Nations experts for consideration by an international conference. Unhappily as these several negotiations were moving smoothly, a subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee made a report advocating our permanent acquisition of the bases we leased from England in exchange for fifty destroyers. Immediately at the instance of the State Department, Representative Bloom, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, repudiated the proposal. However, a question concerning it was addressed by a member of Parliament to Prime Minister Churchill, and the latter replied that there was not the slightest possibility of any cession of British territory. As interpreted here, and doubtless it will be so interpreted in Chung King, this means that not only will the bases we have leased not be ceded to us, but that Hong Kong and the Kowloon Peninsula will not be turned back to China. As the latter is one of the aspirations of Chiang-Kai-Shek, Mr. Churchill's blunt statement may develop into an embarrassment in Anglo-Chinese relations, and complicate the situation of the Generalissimo with his people. There would be no surprise here if the matter of the future of Hong Kong and its hinterland should be raised by Chiang-Kai-Shek during his approaching conference with Vice President Wallace, as it was spoken of at the Cairo conference. Other recent statements made by the Prime Minister have not appealed to different circles in Washington. His references to the partial blame resting upon the United States for the failure of the League of Nations and the rearmament of Germany, was followed by sharp criticism from members of Congress, and his statement that a reservation he made in connection with the Atlantic Charter left the way open for British Empire preferential trade agreement, caused Secretary Hull to suggest that the Prime Minister did not intend to display abandonment of the view that the United Kingdom and all the United Nations, each in accordance with its constitutional processes, were both disposed and able to press forward strongly in cooperation for economic aid and advancement with measures which will expand international trade rather than restrict it. In making this comment on Mr. Churchill's declaration, the Secretary spoke in accordance with the policy he has consistently pursued, that of the removal of barriers which impede

trade in order to bring about the production, employment and the exchange and consumption of goods, which, as he said, are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples. It is presumed that Mr. Churchill's announcement of his adherence to imperial preferential trade was due to a desire to remove from the forthcoming Empire Conference any commercial question affecting the relations of the Mother Country and the Dominions. It is also assumed that in replying Mr. Hull was anxious that the door should be left open by that Conference for the widest possible freedom in markets so that the trade expansion he seeks will come to pass. Present at that Conference will be the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, all of whom know our attitude with respect to trade and other matters. Mr. Curtin, Australia's leader, lunched with the President this week at the place where the latter is convalescing, and it is assumed he explained the purpose of the recent Anzac pact relative to the control of the Southwest Pacific, and that further he gave assurances that all of Australia's resources would be employed in the prosecution of the war until victory is achieved. Following the luncheon, Mr. Curtin declared his views on Pacific strategy and post war questions were in entire accord with those of the President. Doubtless in the Empire Conference, due consideration will be given to the attitude of the President and Mr. Hull on the numerous problems which the world must solve, and to be practical about it, in the background will be thought of Lend-Lease, extension of which the House overwhelmingly approved and the Senate probably unanimously will authorize.

**Army Air Forces**—General Motors have announced that the Buick Division is tooling to manufacture two additional types of Pratt and Whitney aircraft engines for Liberator bombers and Douglas C-54 transport planes. The new engines will develop greater horsepower than current types.

Two new supply contracts have been signed with the AAF Materiel Command, Harlow H. Curtice, vice president of General Motors Corp. and general manager of the Buick Division said, involving upwards of \$60,000,000 for initial delivery of a specified quantity of both types and a manufacturing program has been launched involving extensive retooling and machinery procurement to meet proposed schedules. The new engines are expected to increase altitude, speed and range of the two planes.

Capt. Don S. Gentile, 23-year-old Mustang pilot, who has destroyed 23 German planes in the air and seven on the ground, in his official report gives a large measure of credit to his wingman, 1st Lt. John T. Godfrey. He said: "It is the way that Lieutenant Godfrey stayed with me in every maneuver that made our success possible."

Lieutenant Godfrey, 21 years old, who now has 12 destroyed enemy planes to his credit, wrote in his report: "Captain Gentile and I were together during all this engagement, giving each other cover alternately."

The reports referred to an attack on the outskirts of Berlin, 8 March, in which they were able to destroy six German Messerschmitt 109s. Of the six planes destroyed, Captain Gentile shot down three, Lieutenant Godfrey two, the sixth being shared between them.

Captain Gentile stressed the importance of wing men in combat. "If you have a reliable wing man," he said, "you are much more aggressive. You know you have got someone looking out for your tail while you concentrate on your shooting."

"Without a good wing man, you are likely to be much more cautious and much less effective. I can recall four or five times when my wing man saved me. I would be shooting at a Jerry and not know another Jerry was positioning himself on me until my wing man would warn me to break. In one case Lieutenant Godfrey shot a German off my tail."

Captain Gentile and Lieutenant Godfrey flew in a squadron of the group commanded by Col. Donald J. M. Blakeslee, which has destroyed more enemy aircraft than any other in the European Theater of Operations.

**Army Ground Forces**—HQ. AGF—Two new officers reported at headquarters this week for permanent duty. They are Col. Joseph K. Bush, INF, G-3 Section, and Capt. Laurence L. Buck, SIG C, Ground Signal Section.

Rapid and heroic action in repelling an enemy tank attack in Sicily won the nation's second highest military award, the Distinguished Service Cross, for Maj. Bryce F. Denno, assigned to the G-3 Section at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. Major Denno was presented the award by Lt. Gen. Leslie J. McNair, commanding general of the Army Ground Forces, at a ceremony this week which was attended by a number of officers at headquarters.

Award of the Distinguished Service Medal to Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges for his organization and expansion of the replacement training centers and schools of the Army Ground Forces was announced this week.

**HDQS. ANTI AIRCRAFT COMMAND**—Brig. Gen. Clarence H. Schabacker, GSC, assistant chief of staff, G-3, Antiaircraft Command, accompanied by Maj. Vernon E. Harvey, CAC, and Maj. James B. Glover, CAC, visited the Airborne Center, Camp Mackall, N. C., last week in connection with airborne training.

Lt. Col. Donald V. Webber, CAC; Maj. W. Craig Boyce, CAC; Maj. Henry Von Kolnitz, CAC, and Capt. William A. Ackerman, CAC, members of the inspection division, G-3 Section at Headquarters, Antiaircraft Command in Richmond, Va., have been relieved from assignment to duty there. Lieutenant Colonel Webber has been assigned to command an AAA battalion and Major Boyce, Major Von Kolnitz and Captain Ackerman have been detailed to attend advanced courses at the AAA School, Camp Davis, N. C.

Lt. Col. K. C. Smith, CAC, who formerly served at the Antiaircraft Artillery Training Center, Camp Edwards, Mass., has been assigned to duty in the G-3 Section at Headquarters, Antiaircraft Command.

**CAVALRY SCHOOL**—Col. Raymond W. Curtis, director of training at the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kans., since 26 June 1943, has left for a new assignment. Colonel Curtis was a member of the United States Olympic equestrian team in 1932 and 1936, and has served several tours of duty as a Cavalry School instructor. He was an observer in the North African theater for six weeks last year.

Maj. George T. Pitts, Jr., of the Cavalry School staff and faculty has been notified of the presidential citation awarded the American Division, with which he served when it was in action on Guadalcanal. A ribbon bar with star is authorized.

Lt. Col. Edward H. Jacobsen, until recently commanding officer of the 2nd Cavalry School Detachment, has left for an overseas station.

Capt. George P. Taylor has been released from the Cavalry School staff and faculty and assigned to an engineers unit at Camp Robinson, Arkansas.

**ARMORED CENTER**—Headquarters of the 11th Armored Division has announced the appointment of Col. Wesley W. Yale as chief of staff. Col. Yale, a graduate of West Point, class of 1922, and former commander of Combat Command "B" of the 8th Armored Division, succeeds Col. Charles D. Palmer, who has been transferred to a new assignment.

Col. Willard A. Holbrook has assumed the duties of commander of Combat Command "A" of the 11th Armored Division, succeeding Brig. Gen. Charles S. Killburn, recently appointed commanding general of the 11th.

Lt. Col. Robert G. Lowe has assumed command of the 11th Armored Division Trains, succeeding Colonel Holbrook. Colonel Lowe, a graduate of West Point, class of 1927, has been assigned to the 11th Armored Division since its activation.

Headquarters of the 20th Armored Division has announced that Col. S. S. Koszewski, Division Trains commander, has been transferred to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces and will soon take up his new post at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Md. Lieutenant Colonel Val Hakanson will succeed Colonel Koszewski as Division Trains Commander.

Maj. Edwin H. Moore has assumed new duties as 20th Armored Division ordnance

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officer and commanding officer of the 138th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion. Major Moore has been with the division since its activation.

Four officers of the 20th Armored Division have recently completed the Command and General Staff course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and returned to duty with the division. They are Maj. George F. McKenna, assistant G-4; Capt. John R. Lehman, assistant G-2; Capt. Robert P. Evans, Combat Command "A" S-3 Air and Communications Officer, and Capt. William J. Burton, 138th Ordnance S-2 and S-3.

**INFANTRY SCHOOL**—New additions to the Infantry School include Col. Oscar R. Johnston, Captain Donald F. Cothram and 2nd Lt. Harry C. Price, Jr., assigned to the Secretary's Office; Lt. Col. Lyle Bernard, Lt. Col. James B. Leer and Capt. Clarence R. Neher, assigned to the Tactical Section; Maj. George Cullison, Capt. Willard L. Lamberton and Capt. Walter L. Shealy, assigned to the Communications Section; Capt. Robert T. Brooks and 2nd Lt. Robert E. Grable, assigned to the General Section; 2nd Lt. Stephen T. Early, Jr., 2nd Lt. Frank P. Billingsley, 2nd Lt. Edward J. Brown, 2nd Lt. Samuel W. Curry, Jr., 2nd Lt. Alan A. Dunlap, Jr., 2nd Lt. Neil E. Funk, Jr., 2nd Lt. Frank Hickman, 2nd Lt. Warren W. Lewis and 2nd Lt. Charles P. Walker, assigned to the Weapons Section. Transferred to assignments at new stations are Col. Temple C. Holland of the Secretary's Office; Capt. Wendell W. Collcott and Capt. William J. Finch of the Weapons Section, and 1st Lt. Karyl H. VanBenthuyzen of the Training Literature Section.

The first group of former Coast Artillery Antiaircraft officers assigned to the Infantry School for a special eight weeks basic course to prepare them for assignment to Infantry units, was graduated this week. Fifty of the officers qualified as experts or sharpshooters with the M-1.

The British Distinguished Service Order was pinned on Lt. Col. Lyle W. Bernard of the Tactical Section of the Infantry School by Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, commandant, this week. Colonel Bernard led an assault battalion in five amphibious landings in Sicily and Italy, including the landing on the Anzio beachhead.

**Marine Corps Aviation**—Capt. Garth Thomas, USMC, dove a Grumman Avenger torpedo plane so low over an enemy target during a recent South Pacific raid that the plane was struck by fragments of an exploding 2,000-pound bomb dropped by a preceding aircraft. The windshield was shattered, the bomb bay punctured and hydraulic lines severed.

On the way back to the base his turret gunner discovered that because of the damage one of a cluster of four bombs released over the target had not dropped out of the bomb bay and was live and loose.

Unable to jettison the bomb Captain Thomas flew over an island plantation and ordered his men to jump after which he returned to his base and made a safe landing after the field had been cleared.

**Naval Aeronautics**—The Navy's newest air weapon, a General Motors revamping of the single-seat Wildcat pursuit plane, is termed by Rear Adm. DeWitt C. Ramsey, chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, as being able to outperform anything of its size in any fleet.

The plane is praised also by the British. A message from Capt. Caspar John, British naval attache for air in Washington, read at a dinner last week in Newark, N. J., said: "Wildcats, in addition to providing escort and cover for the attacking Barracudas concentrated most effectively on ship and shore flak."

The F-2 Wildcat was revealed to have shared in the British attack of 3 April which set the German battleship Tirpitz afire in Norway.

The improvements on the Wildcat appear to be a faster rate of climb, shorter take-off and lower landing speed. The plane has been lightened by a change to a new motor with forged cylinder heads instead of cast. Horsepower has consequently been increased but engine weight decreased.

**NAVAL AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE**—The Navy inaugurated a new service 23 April with the transporting of 14 sailors and Marines, all suffering from rheumatic fever, from the National Airport, Washington, D. C., to the Naval Hospital at Corona, California.

Overseas, plane evacuation of the disabled from forward to rear areas has been conducted on a systematic basis since the first Solomon operations in 1942. In the United States, air ambulance transport for shorter distances has been practiced for many months. This flight, however, marked the first time that a large group have been transported with a medical officer and pharmacist's mate in attendance for a transcontinental flight.

**Bureau of Ships**—The Bon Homme Richard, 27,100-ton Essex Class aircraft carrier, will be launched today, 20 April, at the New York Navy Yard. Mrs. John S. McCain, wife of Vice Adm. John S. McCain, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), will be the sponsor. The new carrier is named for the Continental frigate made famous by Capt. John Paul Jones.

The Secretary of the Navy has designated Miss Mary Jane Jacobs, daughter of Vice Adm. Randall Jacobs, USN, Chief of Naval Personnel, as the sponsor to christen the new submarine Clamagore. The Clamagore will be launched at the yards of the Electric Boat Co., Groton, Conn.

The submarine Blower was launched 22 April at the Groton, Conn., yards of the Electric Boat Co. The sponsor was Mrs. Richard F. J. Johnson, Jr., wife of Captain Johnson, USN.

At the Bethlehem Steel Co. yard, San Francisco, Calif., the destroyer Strong was launched 23 April. The sponsor was Lt. (jg) Susan Olsen, USNR, great-grand niece of Rear Adm. James H. Strong, for whom the ship was named.

Other launchings in the Twelfth Naval District were: Admiral R. E. Coontz, troop transport, 22 April at the Bethlehem Steel Co., Alameda, sponsored by Mrs. Edwin Kokio, daughter of the late Admiral Coontz; Salvage tug ATR, at the Fulton Shipyard, Antioch, sponsored by Mrs. Thelma McCormick; Ocean-going tug Tolowa, 22 April at the United Engineering Co., Alameda, sponsored by Mrs. B. D. Bales; Harbor tug YT 257, 22 April at the Anderson and Cristofani yard, San Francisco, sponsored by Mrs. Walter Anderson.

The destroyer escort Charles E. Brannon, honoring a Navy ensign killed in the Battle of Midway, was launched 23 April at the Port Newark, N. J. yard of the Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. The sponsor was Ensign Brannon's widow, Lt. Dorothy M. Brannon, an Army Medical Corps dietitian.

The PC 1264, 173-foot submarine chaser, was placed in commission 25 April at a Navy pier in New York City. The vessel will carry 53 Negroes in her ship's company and will be the second Navy vessel to be manned by a predominantly Negro crew.

**Army Signal Corps**—Col. O. K. Sadler, former Signal Officer of the Second Army under Lt. Gen. Ben Lear and later under Lt. Gen. Lloyd L. Friendenthal, has been assigned as Signal Officer of the Army Ground Forces with headquarters at the Army War College. Before his assignment to the Second Army, Colonel Sadler served as the Signal Officer of the First Army at Governors Island, New York.

Lt. Col. Earle B. Williams, SC, has been named Commandant at Fort Wood, N. J., and Commanding Officer of the 848th Signal Service Training Battalion, succeeding Col. James R. Philbrook and Maj. J. C. Mosier, respectively, who have been assigned to new stations. Since his return from the Mediterranean theater several weeks ago, Colonel Williams has been serving on the staff of Brig. Gen. George L. Van Deusen, Commanding General of the Eastern Signal Corps Training Center at Fort Monmouth, N. J.

Maj. Edward W. Pride, SC, formerly on duty in the Philadelphia Signal Corps Procurement District, has been assigned to the Production Division, Office of the

Chief Signal Officer.

For performing "the seemingly impossible task of installing and maintaining wire communications between a corps headquarters and rapidly advancing divisions during the Sicilian campaign," Lt. Walter G. James, SC, of Bellingham, Washington, has been awarded the Legion of Merit.

**Retired Regular Officers**—A retired regular officer, interested in learning the number of such officers recalled to active duty, recently compiled a set of figures which show: there are 6,500 retired officers in the Navy of whom 4,241 are now on active duty; the Marine Corps has 538 retired officers of whom 246 are on active duty; while in the Army there are 4,519 retired officers of whom only 629 are on active duty. Thus it is seen that the Navy is utilizing 65 per cent of its retired officers, the Marine Corps 46 per cent, and the Army only 12 per cent.

It is pointed out that because of the peace time system of selection and forced retirements in the Navy and Marine Corps the average age of their retired officers is much lower than that of the Army. On the other hand, the Army's insistence upon relieving officers over 60 years of age regardless of physical condition, undoubtedly has contributed to their small usage of this class of personnel.

**Bureau of Supplies and Accounts**—A Navy Material Redistribution and Disposal Administration will be established in New York City, as an activity of the Third Naval District, and will be responsible for the Navy's entire Material Redistribution program, including the supervision of Navy Material Redistribution Centers, Material Redistribution and Disposal Offices, Offshore Material Reception Centers and Material Recovery Units.

Capt. W. A. Buck, (SC) USN, has been appointed as Director, and Comdr. J. G. Dean, (SC) USNR, has been named as assistant director. Lt. Comdr. H. T. Dinsmore, (SC) USNR, will be Officer-in-Charge of the Material Redistribution and Disposal Administration Liaison Division that will be maintained in the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

The present Material Redistribution and Disposal Branch of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts is absorbed by the new administration, and all personnel, civilian and military, will be transferred to the new activity in New York as soon as practicable.

The Naval Training School for Aviation Storekeepers has been transferred from the Naval Air Center, Alameda, California, to the Naval Air Technical Training Center, Jacksonville, Fla. The school, originally set up to accommodate 90 trainees, has been enlarged to take care of 366 and the 6-week instructional period classes are formed at 2-week intervals. The first class at the new location convened 24 April.

**Chemical Warfare Service**—Brig. Gen. Charles E. Loucks, USA, has been appointed Chief of the Industrial Division, Office of the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service. General Loucks has been Commanding General of Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Denver, Colo. He will be succeeded in that post by Brig. Gen. Alexander Wilson, USA, now Commandant of the Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

In his new position in the War Department, General Loucks succeeds Brig. Gen. Paul X. English, who has been assigned to Headquarters, Seventh Service Command, Omaha, Neb. Successor to General Wilson at Edgewood Arsenal has not been named.

**Field Artillery**—Twenty-one new instructors have been added to the staff and Faculty of the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla. Eight of the officers were assigned to the Combined Arms department and seven to the Gunnery department.

Capt. Perry H. Graves, instructor in the Combined Army department, has been transferred to the Animal Transport department.

The new instructors: Combined Arms department—Lt. Col. Willoughby L. Sturt, Maj. Charles A. Reinhard, Maj. David F. Danser, Capt. Harry D. Turner, Capt. Ralph V. Lennen, Capt. Oscar J. Vogl, 1st Lt. William Musetter, 1st Lt. Edward Shindelar; Gunnery department—Capt. Bradford A. Clark, 1st Lt. Tom C. Gary, Jr., 1st Lt. Donald T. Nelson; 2nd Lt. Philip M. Fairchild, 2nd Lt. Bruce F. Gilh, 2nd Lt. Raymond A. J. Nelson, 2nd Lt. Robert F. McMahon; Communications department—1st Lt. Francis M. Bradley, 1st Lt. Alfred D. Douglas, 2nd Lt. Ernest H. Baker; Materiel department—Maj. Buford A. Merritt, 2nd Lt. Benjamin F. Morrison; Motor Transport department—2nd Lt. James J. Bambeck.

**Army Nurse Corps**—As soon as the President approves an executive order now awaiting his signature, setting the stipend of senior cadet nurses in government hospitals at \$60 a month, the Army Nurse Corps will begin assignment of the cadets to 30 general and station hospitals. Plans call for detail of 50 students to each hospital for six-month tours of instruction, but entrance of students will be effected at semi-monthly intervals to avoid handling of large numbers of incoming and outgoing senior cadets at any one time.

To supervise the senior cadets, a director and assistant director of cadets has been designated at each hospital which will receive the students. The Army nurses appointed to this duty are: Camp Edwards Station Hospital, Mass.—1st Lt. Gertrude Wilson, director; 1st Lt. Raide Poole, assistant. Ft. Devens Station Hospital, Mass.—1st Lt. Lillian V. Salsman, director; 1st Lt. Margaret V. Dougherty, assistant. Cushing General Hospital, Framingham, Mass.—1st Lt. Jacqueline Davis, director; 1st Lt. Helen M. Braun, assistant. England General Hospital, Atlantic City, N. J.—1st Lt. Mona R. LeGrand, director; 2nd Lt. Esther G. Skelley, assistant. Deshaw General Hospital, Butler, Pa.—1st Lt. Jean F. Richards, director; 2nd Lt. Eleanor W. Miller, assistant. Valley Forge GH, Phoenixville, Pa.—Capt. Mary E. Grove, director; 2nd Lt. Rose C. Hapich, assistant. W. Wilson GH, Staunton, Va.—1st Lt. Katherine C. Cox, director; 2nd Lt. Helen J. Monday, assistant. McGuire GH, Richmond, Va.—2nd Lt. Annie L. Wyant, director; 2nd Lt. Mary J. King, assistant. Kennedy GH, Memphis, Tenn.—1st Lt. Edna C. Pruis, director; 2nd Lt. Elsa D. Pearson, assistant. Lawson GH, Atlanta, Ga.—1st Lt. Ruth M. Henley, director; 2nd Lt. Eloise Roth, assistant. Moore GH, Louisville, Ky.—1st Lt. Marion W. Candon, director; 2nd Lt. Eskalene D. Morgan, assistant. Percy Jones GH, Battle Creek, Mich.—2nd Lt. Ruth M. Jubb, director; 1st Lt. Mary L. Smith and Sarah F. Holbrook, assistants. Cpl. McCoy Station Hospital, Sparta, Wise.—Maj. Agnes C. Jensen, director; 1st Lt. Louise Rososco, assistant. Camp Grant Station Hospital, Rockford, Ill.—1st Lt. Dorothy H. Chapman, director; 1st Lt. Marion Greilach, assistant. O'Reilly GH, Springfield, Mo.—2nd Lt. Marjorie M. Sorenson, director. Fitzsimons GH, Denver, Colo.—1st Lt. Myra H. Heeren, director; 2nd Lt. Helen M. White, assistant. Schick GH, Clinton, Iowa.—1st Lt. Myrna M. Tomlinson, director; 2nd Lt. Esther R. Widhalm, assistant. Brooke GH, San Antonio, Tex.—2nd Lt. Mary E. Hendrixson, director; 2nd Lts. Nina Basham and Zola Cook, assistants. McCloskey GH, Temple, Tex.—1st Lt. Mildred V. Lucka, director; 2nd Lt. Dorothy R. Shrier, assistant. Bushnell GH, Brigham City, Utah.—2nd Lt. Jessie A. Tyra, director; 2nd Lt. Marie J. Stone, assistant. Barnes GH, Vancouver, Wash.—1st Lt. Virgiline B. Mulvane, director; 2nd Lt. Harriet Cross, assistant. Letterman GH, San Francisco, Calif.—1st Lt. Shirley R. Timewell, director; 2nd Lt. Lorraine E. McKenna, assistant. Hoff GH, Santa Barbara, Calif.—2nd Lt. Helen VanGilder, director; 2nd Lt. Eleanor S. Gill, assistant.

## Text of Admiral King's Report on Navy's Growth and Combat Record

**FOLLOWING** is the full text of the report of Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Commander in Chief, US Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, as released 23 April 1944:

### Letter of Transmittal

27 March 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary,  
In view of the importance and complexity of our naval operations and the tremendous expansion of our naval establishment since we entered the war, I present to you at this time a report of progress.

It is of interest to note that the date of this report happens to be on the 150th anniversary of the passage by Congress of a bill providing for the first major ships of the United States Navy—the 44-gun frigates Constitution, United States, President and Chesapeake, and the 36-gun frigates Constellation and Congress.

This report includes combat operations up to 1 March 1944. I know of no reason why it should not be made public.

(Signed) Ernest J. King

Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander in Chief, United States  
Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations

### INTRODUCTION

For more than two years, the United States has been engaged in world-wide war. Our geographical position, our wealth, resources and industrial development, combined with an unfaltering will to victory have established and enhanced our position as one of the dominant powers among the United Nations. As such we have been closely and deeply involved with our Allies in all the political, economic and military problems and undertakings which constitute modern war. Historically, the conduct of war by allies has rarely been effective or harmonious. The record of the United Nations in this regard, during the past two years, has been unprecedented, not only in the extent of its success but in the smooth working and effective cooperation by which it has been accomplished. As one of the United Nations, the United States has reason to be proud of the international aspects of its conduct of the war, during the past two years.

As a national effort, the war has shown the complete dependence of all military undertakings on the full support of the nation in the fields of organization, production, finance, and morale. Our military services have had that support in a full degree.

The Navy has also had full support from the nation with respect to manpower. Personnel of our regular Navy, who, in time of peace, serve as a nucleus for expansion in time of war, now represent a small portion of the total number of officers and men. About ninety per cent of our commissioned personnel and about eighty per cent of our enlisted personnel are Naval Reserves, who have successfully adapted themselves to active service in a comparatively short time. Thanks to their hard work, their training, and their will to become assets, their performance of duty has been uniformly as excellent as it has been indispensable to our success.

As to the purely military side of the war, there is one lesson which stands out above all others. This is that modern warfare can be effectively conducted only by the close and effective integration of the three military arms, which make their primary contribution to the military power of the Nation on the ground, at sea, and from the air. This report deals primarily with the Navy's part in the war, but it would be unwarranted, though an unintended, distortion of perspective, did not the Navy record here its full appreciation of the efficient, whole-hearted and gallant support of the Navy's efforts by the ground, air and service forces of the Army, without which much of this story of the Navy's accomplishments would never have been written.

During the period of this report, the Navy, like the full military power of the Nation, has been a team of mutually supporting elements. The Fleet, the shore establishment, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Waves, the Seabees, have all nobly done their parts. Each has earned an individual "well done"—but hereafter are all included in the term, "The Navy."

### PEACETIME NAVY

#### Prior to the War in Europe

The fundamental United States Naval policy is "To maintain the Navy in strength and readiness to uphold national policies and interests, and to guard the United States and its continental and overseas possessions."

In time of peace, when the threats to our national security change with the strength and attitude of other nations in the world who have a motive for making war upon us and who are—or think they are—strong enough to do so, it is frequently difficult to evaluate those threats and translate our requirements into terms of ships and planes and trained men. It is one thing to say that we must have and maintain a Navy adequate to uphold national policies and interests and to protect us against potential enemies, but it is another thing to decide what is and what is not the Naval strength adequate for that purpose.

In the years following World War I, our course was clear enough—to make every reasonable effort to preserve world peace by eliminating the causes of war and failing in that effort, to do our best to stay clear of war, while recognizing that we might fail in doing so. For a number of years the likelihood of our becoming involved in a war in the foreseeable future appeared remote, and our fortunate geographical position gave us an added sense of security. Under those circumstances, and in the interest of national economy, public opinion favored the belief that we could get along with a comparatively small Navy. Stated in terms of personnel this

meant an average of about 7,900 commissioned officers, all of whom had chosen the Navy as a career, and 100,000 enlisted men more or less.

This modest concept of an adequate Navy carried with it an increased responsibility on the part of the Navy to maintain itself at the peak of operational and material efficiency, with a nucleus of highly trained personnel as a basis for war time expansion.

For twenty years in its program of readiness, our Navy has worked under schedules of operation, competitive training and inspection, unparalleled in any other Navy of the world. Fleet problems, tactical exercises, amphibious operations with the Marines and Army, aviation gunnery, engineering, communications were all integrated in a closely packed annual operation schedule. This in turn was supplemented by special activities ashore and afloat calculated to train individuals in the fundamentals of their duties and at the same time give them the background of experience so necessary for sound advances in the various techniques of Naval warfare. Ship competitions established for the purpose of stimulating and maintaining interest were climaxized by realistic fleet maneuvers held once a year, with the object of giving officers in the higher commands experience and training in strategy and tactics approximating these responsibilities in time of war.

Our peacetime training operations, which involved hard work and many long hours of constructive thinking, were later to pay us dividends. For example, it would be an understatement to say merely that the Navy recognized the growing importance of air power. By one development after another, not only in the field of design and equipment, but also in carrier and other operational techniques—such as dive bombing—and in strategic and tactical employment, the United States Navy has made its aviation the standard by which all other naval aviation is judged and has contributed its full share to the advances which were to make aviation the sine qua non of modern warfare. It may be stated here, with particular reference to naval aviation, that the uniform success which has characterized our Naval air operations is unmistakably the result of an organization which was based on the conviction that air operations should be planned, directed and executed by Naval officers who are Naval aviators, and that in mixed forces Naval aviation should be adequately represented in the command and staff organization.

### Size and Composition

The effects of treaty limitations on our Navy are too well known to require more than a brief review. In 1922, under the terms of the Washington Arms Conference, limitations upon capital ships and aircraft carriers were agreed upon, the ratio established being five for the United States, five for Great Britain, and three for Japan. Pursuant to that treaty, the United States scrapped a number of battleships, but was permitted to convert the Lexington and Saratoga, then under construction as battle cruisers, to aircraft carriers. Whatever the other effects of the treaty, that particular provision has worked to our advantage because those two ships, as battle cruisers, would now be obsolete, and as aircraft carriers they were—and the Saratoga still is—effective units of our fleet.

In 1930, at London, the parties to the 1922 treaty agreed upon further limitations, this time with respect to cruisers, destroyers and submarines. As a result of these two treaties, which reflected world condition at the time, and also because of our decision to maintain our Navy at considerably less strength than that allowed by the treaties, we experienced a partial building holiday that threw our small construction program out of balance. Except for cruisers, hardly any combatant ships (no battleships or destroyers) were added to our fleet during that period, and few were under construction. In size, therefore, our Navy remained static, with certain types approaching obsolescence. Moreover, advances in the science of naval construction were hampered by the lack of opportunity to prove new designs. As the accompanying chart indicates, our Naval strength was at low ebb during the year 1927.

Our failure to build progressively was a mistake which is to be hoped will never be repeated. When a total building holiday in any type of ship is prolonged, and there is no opportunity to proceed on a trial and error basis, our designers are placed under handicaps taking years to overcome.

In 1923, and again in 1929, in response to representations to the effect that we were dangerously deficient in cruisers even in a world at peace, the Congress authorized the construction of a number of cruisers. These were appropriated for from time to time, as were ships of certain other types (except battleships), usually one or two at a time.

In 1933, our building program was stepped up materially by the authorization for the construction of two new aircraft carriers, four more cruisers, 20 destroyers and four submarines. The two carriers were considerably different in design from those previously built. The other types were more evolutionary as to new features, with the possible exception of the Brooklyn class of cruisers, which were to a degree a departure from former light cruisers, both as to ship design and armament. These cruisers were notable for their six-inch guns which combined light but strong construction with rapid loading, giving them a volume of fire far greater than any other light cruisers then—or now—in existence.

In the previous year, eight destroyers of the Farragut class had been laid down. These were the first of a long series of new designs which had been improved in each succeeding class up to the latest type laid down in 1943. The 1933 program, which was considered large at the time, used the Farragut

type of armament, not only for destroyers but for the broadside batteries of the larger ships, because of the five-inch 38 caliber dual purpose gun which, because of its power, reliability and extremely rapid loading proved to be the best Naval antiaircraft gun of comparable caliber.

In March 1934, the Congress authorized but did not appropriate for a Navy of treaty strength.

In 1935, in anticipation of making replacements under the terms of the treaties, work was begun on the design of battleships of the North Carolina class. Original designs (completed in 1937) included many features which have proved to be of great importance in the war; namely, increased armor protection against bombs and gunfire, heavy fragmentation protection around important control stations, modern five-inch antiaircraft weapons, good torpedo protection, and excellent speed and steering qualities for rapid maneuvering. Contract designs for the South Dakota and Iowa classes were completed in 1938 and 1939, respectively. Most of these ships did not come into service until after the war had been declared.

The 6,000-ton Atlanta class cruisers, featuring powerful antiaircraft batteries, were designed in 1937.

In 1938, foreseeing the submarine menace, an experimental program for patrol vessels was started. At the same time the motor torpedo boat was started through a series of developmental stages.

In 1938, it had become apparent that in spite of all efforts on the part of the United States to reach an agreement covering limitation of armaments, and thus to establish at least the probability of world peace, other nations were increasing their navies at an accelerating rate. At that time, in spite of the fact that there was a general desire on the part of most people everywhere in all countries of the world to remain at peace, about one-fourth of the world's population was engaged in war, and civilians were being driven from their homes and subjected to bombing attacks. In view of the situation, the President, in his message to the Congress, recommended an increase of 20 per cent in our Naval strength, exclusive of replacements permitted under the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934. In May 1938, the Congress authorized the recommended program, giving us, on paper, what appeared to be reasonably adequate Naval strength.

The so-called agreement at Munich was such as to require an upward revision of the defense requirements of this country. Subsequent events in 1939 resulting in the outbreak of the war in Europe not only confirmed those estimates, but made our building up to them a matter of urgency. A great increase in design activity, in preparation for later building programs, began at this time. War had become a distinct possibility.

### As Affected by the War in Europe

As a result of Germany's policy of expansion by political, economic and military aggression, culminating in the invasion of Poland, the European war began on the 3rd of September, 1939. While our position was for the time being not clearly established, it was nevertheless apparent that this war would affect the United States in a degree which might extend to our becoming involved in a war for our national existence.

### The Limited Emergency

The first step taken by the United States was the declaration of the limited emergency by the President on 8 September 1939. The immediate effect of this, so far as the Navy was concerned, was to fix the authorized enlisted personnel strength of the Navy at 191,000 instead of 131,485, and to authorize the recall to active duty of officers and men and nurses on the retired and reserve lists of the Navy and Marine Corps. Other direct effects were that the procurement of materials and equipment, and the taking over of land needed for military purposes, could be accomplished more readily. Also, the Coast Guard could be made a part of the Navy if it appeared desirable, by Presidential order. Indirectly, the limited emergency was responsible for changes in contracting authority which eliminated competitive bidding, and for the suspension of certain labor provisions relating to hours of work on government contracts.

### Neutral Zone

On 2 October 1939, the Congress of American Republics assembled at Panama agreed upon a resolution which established a neutral zone surrounding the Americas, with the exception of Canada, at an average distance of 300 miles. By the terms of the resolution belligerent raiders and submarines were to be prevented from operating close to the Western Hemisphere, as they had done in the World War, the thought responsible for the resolution being that if belligerent operations took place in that area, the United States and her Latin American neighbors might well become involved in the war. The United States Navy being the only armed force equal to the task of maintaining patrol in this extensive area, the primary responsibility for the implementation of the proclamation was obvious. The patrol was in fact taken by the United States Navy, and at that time a portion of the 112 decommissioned destroyers were recommissioned for the purpose of making it effective.

Preceded by heated debates, during which it was argued that for insufficient reason, we would be abandoning our traditional policy of freedom of the seas, the Neutrality Act of 1939 became law on 4 November 1939, and American vessels and citizens were thereby prohibited from entering combat zones. The Act also established a so-called cash and carry policy under which all belligerents were required to do their own transporting of goods purchased in the United States, and pay for them before being granted clearance. In addition, it authorized the President to

place restrictions on the use of ports and territorial waters of the United States by states (pursuant to which he prohibited their use by foreign submarines or merchant vessels of foreign states, except when there by force majeure) and prohibited the use of United States ports as bases for furnishing men and supplies of ships of belligerent states lying off those ports. Other consequences of the Neutrality Act were to make effective certain laws previously enacted, having for their purpose the maintenance of neutrality. These included prohibitions against sending our armed vessels for delivery to belligerents, and contained provisions for detaining armed vessels or vessels manifestly built for warlike purposes or conversion thereto. Included also, insofar as detention and permissible length of stay were concerned, were laws covering the use of our ports by foreign vessels.

### Naval Expansion

In view of the situation, our requirements as to Naval strength were again presented to the Congress, in January, 1940. At that time, the part the United States was to play in the war was still not clear, but with due regard for our national safety and with aggressor nations disregarding treaties and pacts without hesitation—the immediate result being rapid changes in the international situation—Congress recognized that our security would be measured by our ability to defend ourselves. Coupled with this uncertainty was the knowledge that the international situation had been very difficult to predict. Many keen observers were certain that no European war would break out in 1939, and there were others who felt that we would be able to stay out of the war.

Pursuant to the recommendation of the Navy Department, and following a careful examination of world conditions, the Congress authorized an expansion of 11 per cent in our combatant ships, and the President signed the bill on 14 June 1940.

Meanwhile, the aggressor nations had succeeded in imposing their will upon numerous European countries. Germany had disposed of France and had overrun the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and Poland, and stood on the Channel coast poised for an all-out attack on Britain. In view of that alarming situation, the Congress passed the so-called Two-Ocean Navy Bill, which was signed by the President on 19 July 1940. The increase in our Naval strength authorized by this Act was 1,325,000 tons of combat ships—by far the largest Naval expansion ever authorized. This authorization was followed by the necessary appropriations in due course, and in the making, we had a Navy commensurate with our needs.

### The Destroyer—Naval Base Exchange

During the summer of 1940, the Battle of Britain was in its initial stages and the German submarine campaign had been prosecuted with telling effect. At the beginning of the war Great Britain had suffered severely from the general attrition of operations at sea, particularly in destroyers in the Norwegian campaign and during the retreat from Dunkirk. Faced with this situation, Great Britain entered into an agreement with the United States, under the terms of which 50 of our older destroyers no longer suited for the type of fleet service for which they had been designed, but still adequately suited for anti-submarine duty, were exchanged for certain rights in various localities suitable for the establishment of Naval bases in the Atlantic area, and essential to the national defense. In addition to the bases acquired in return for the 50 destroyers, we were granted, "freely and without consideration," similar rights with respect to the leasing of bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda.

This acquisition of bases operated to advance our sea frontier several hundred miles in the direction of our potential enemies in the Atlantic, and as the bases were leased for a term of 99 years, we could profit by their strategic importance to the United States not only immediately, but long after the crisis responsible for the exchange.

The bases thus obtained by the United States were briefly as follows:

British Bases Acquired	Location	Facility Established
Antigua, B.W.I. ....	Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)	
British Guiana, S.A. ....	Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)	
Jamaica, B.W.I. ....	Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)	
St. Lucia, B.W.I. ....	Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)	
Bermuda, B.W.I. ....	Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)	
Great Exuma, Bahamas .....	Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)	
Newfoundland .....	Naval Operating Base Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base, Air Field)	
Trinidad .....	Naval Operating Base Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base) Lighter-than-Air Base Radio Station	

### Lend-Lease and its Implementation

On 11 March 1941, the so-called "Lend-Lease" Act was signed by the President. The provisions and effects of that Act are too well known to require comment in this report. Naturally, we were unwilling to see a large part of the material built with our labor and money lost in transit, and our only recourse was to give the British assistance in escorting the convoys carrying that material within North American waters.

Incident to our decision, the United States entered into an agreement with Denmark on

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## Text of Admiral King's Report (Continued from Preceding Page)

9 April 1941, relative to the defense of Greenland, and on that day our Marines were landed there to prevent its being used by Axis raiders. The Coast Guard cutter Cayuga had already landed a party there to conduct a survey with respect to airfields, seaplane bases, radio stations, meteorological stations and additions to navigation, and on the 1st of June, the first of the Greenland patrols was organized consisting chiefly of Coast Guard vessels and personnel.

On 27 May 1941, an unlimited national emergency was proclaimed by the President.

On 7 July 1941, the United States Marines were landed in Iceland and relieved some of the British forces stationed there.

On 11 August 1941, on board the USS Augusta, the President and Prime Minister of Great Britain agreed upon a joint declaration covering the principles of mutual interest to the two countries.

For some months, for the purpose of ensuring safe passage of goods shipped under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act, our Naval forces had been patrolling waters in the vicinity of the convoy routes, and had been broadcasting information relative to the presence of raiders. On 4 September 1941, the USS Greer, a four-stack destroyer was en route to Iceland, with mail, passengers and freight. When about 175 miles south of Iceland, she detected a submarine ahead. The submarine fired a torpedo at her and missed, whereupon the Greer counterattacked with depth charges. Another torpedo was fired at the Greer but it also missed, and the Greer continued to Iceland. As a result of this incident, our Naval forces were ordered by the President to shoot on sight any vessel attempting to interfere with American shipping, or with any shipping under American escort.

On 15 October, the USS Kearny, a new destroyer, one of a number of vessels escorting a convoy from Iceland to North America, was torpedoed amidships. Eleven of her crew were killed and seven were wounded, and the ship was badly damaged but able to make port.

On 30 October, the USS Salinas, a tanker, was hit by two torpedoes about 700 miles east of Newfoundland. There were no casualties to personnel, and the Salinas reached port safely.

On 31 October, in the same vicinity the USS Reuben James, another old destroyer, was struck amidships by a torpedo. The ship was broken in two; the forward part sank at once, but the after part stayed afloat long enough to enable 45 men to reach the deck and launch life rafts from which they were rescued. About 100 men were lost in this sinking.

Whatever the situation technically, the Navy in the Atlantic was taking a realistic viewpoint of the situation. During the month of November, further steps were taken to enable our Naval forces to meet the steadily growing emergency. On 1 November, the Coast Guard was made a part of the Navy, and at about the same time nine Coast Guard cutters were transferred to the British. On 17 November, sections 2, 3 and 6 of the Neutrality Act of 1939, were repealed by an Act of Congress, thereby permitting the arming of United States merchant vessels and their passage to belligerent ports anywhere.

Another effect of the European war, of major importance to the United States, was the alliance by which on 27 September 1940, Japan became one of the Axis powers.

For many years it had been predicted and expected that eventually Japan's policy of expansion would conflict with our interests in the Pacific. Recognition of that possibility, plus Japan's growing naval strength, were indicated by her being a party to the 1922 treaty on limitation of armaments, and to subsequent treaties dealing with that subject.

At the time of the 1922 treaty Pearl Harbor and Manila were fortified bases, and Guam was being fortified. None of our other Pacific territories and possessions was fortified. When, therefore, the parties to that treaty agreed to maintain the fortification of certain Pacific islands in status quo, the fortification of Guam was halted. Subsequently conforming to the treaty provisions, we maintained the status quo at Guam and Corregidor, and confined our precautionary measures in the Pacific to the strengthening of Pearl Harbor and our West Coast bases. After we were no longer bound by the treaty, the proposal was made to proceed with the fortification of Guam, but after considerable debate in Congress, it was rejected.

Our foresight in developing Pearl Harbor and our West Coast bases has increased, immeasurably, our ability to carry on the war in the Pacific. Whether or not Guam could have been made sufficiently strong to withstand the full force of enemy attack is of course problematical, but we appear to have had an object lesson to the effect that if we are to have outlying possessions we must be prepared to defend them.

When, in the winter of 1935-1936, the Japanese declared themselves no longer willing to abide by existing treaty provisions or be a party to further negotiations, it gave rise to a feeling of uneasiness concerning the trend of Japanese policy and activities. Unfortunately, the full import of that move did not become apparent until later.

In 1931, Japan had embarked on a policy of aggression by the seizure of Manchuria. This was followed by other conquests in China, and as we have since learned, was accompanied by the fortifying of certain islands mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, in direct violation of the treaty provisions. A complete history of our relations with Japan during the period 1931-1941 was issued by the State Department in the so-called "White Paper" dated 2 January 1943.

Continuing her aggression, Japan moved into French Indo-China in 1940. In 1941, the United States was engaged in protesting these and other moves, and while conversations with the Japanese were being held, the German offensive in Russia was being successfully pressed. It seems likely that this influenced the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

Whatever the reasons, Japan, while her representatives in Washington were still engaged in discussions, presumably with a view to finding a means of preventing war, on the morning of 7 December 1941, attacked our ships at Pearl Harbor. The attack was essentially an air raid, although there were some 45-ton submarines which participated. The primary objectives of the Japanese were clearly the heavy ships in the harbor and our grounded Army and Navy planes were destroyed in order to prevent them from impeding the attack. Damage done to the light surface forces and the industrial plant was incidental. Of the eight battleships in the harbor, the Arizona was wrecked, the Oklahoma was capsized and three other battleships were so badly damaged that they were resting on the bottom. The damages to the other three were comparatively minor in character. A total of 19 ships were hit, including three light cruisers which were not seriously damaged. Three destroyers were hit and badly damaged. (All three were later restored to service). Of the 202 Navy planes ready for use on that morning only 62 were able to take the air after the raid.

Personnel casualties were in proportion to the material damage. The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a loss of 2,117 officers and men and 660 missing.

The Japanese losses were about 60 planes, attributable mainly to antiaircraft fire, and it is probable that others were unable, on account of lack of fuel, to return to the carriers which composed the striking force. A few hours later a similar but less damaging attack was made on the Philippines. (The situation in the Far East is described elsewhere in this report.)

On the following day we declared "... that a state of war which has thus been thrust upon the United States by the Imperial Government of Japan is hereby formally declared." On 11 December, a similar declaration was made concerning Germany and Italy.

### II THE WARTIME NAVY Fighting Strength

#### Armaments

The world diplomatic situation had been deteriorating for some years, and Europe had been at war since September 1939. For those reasons, we had been adding to our fleet from time to time, beginning in 1933, but our decision to prepare ourselves fully for the inevitable conflict may be considered to have been made when the so-called Two-Ocean Navy Bill became law on 19 July 1940. At that time, we had to consider the possible disappearance of British sea power. England itself was threatened and its capture by the Germans would have meant the loss of the Royal Navy's home bases and the industrial establishments. These, we could readily see, would become very tangible assets indeed, in the event that we were drawn into the war.

In round numbers, provision for a "two-ocean Navy" meant an expansion of about 70 per cent in our combat tonnage—the largest single building program ever undertaken by the United States or any other country.

Upon the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, the Navy Department initiated expansion of Naval shipbuilding facilities in private yards and in Navy yards. In many instances, particularly in Navy yards, the expansion provided facilities which were to be available for repairs as well as new construction.

By 10 July 1940, when the two-ocean Navy was authorized, the program for expanding facilities was well started, and it continued thereafter at an accelerating rate until the early part of 1943. Early in the period of the shipyard expansion, it was apparent that as the new programs for cargo ships, tanks, planes, and Army and Navy equipment of all kinds started to pyramid, the country's latent manufacturing capacity would soon be overloaded. Thus the problem became not merely one of expanding shipyards, but of expanding the manufacturing capacity of industry as a whole to meet the needs of the Navy shipbuilding program.

Expansion of general industry to meet the requirements of this shipbuilding program began with plants producing basic raw materials. Next to be enlarged were plants capable of manufacturing the component parts of a modern man-of-war ranging all the way from jewel bearings to huge turbines. So comprehensive was the building program that nearly every branch of American industry was affected either directly or indirectly. Manufacturers were encouraged to let out their work to subcontractors, particularly to plants which had been producing non-essential materials. An automobile manufacturer, for example, was given the job of producing extremely intricate gyroscopic compasses, and a stone finishing concern undertook the manufacture of towing machines and deck winches. Early in the building program an acute situation in the construction of turbo-electric propulsion machinery was solved by the construction of an enormous new plant in a 50-acre corn field. As an illustration of the speed with which the whole program was undertaken, the construction of that particular plant was not begun until May 1942, and by the end of the year the first unit had been produced, completed and shipped.

The rapidity of this Naval expansion has had a profound effect upon our military strategy. As a result of it, we were enabled to seize and hold the initiative sooner than we had originally anticipated, and to deal successfully with the submarine situation in the Atlantic. The former has, of course, meant a vast improvement in our military situation everywhere, and the latter was of great benefit to the shipping situation, which was very serious in the early months of the war and threatened to become more so with the prospective increases in overseas troop movements and their support.

Immediately after the passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Bill, corresponding contracts for new construction were let and there were soon more warships and auxiliaries on the ways than had ever been under construction anywhere in the world at any one time. Simultaneously with this new construction, the

conversion of merchant ships was being accomplished, one of the most important of these being the escort carriers which later proved so effective in combatting the German submarine campaign in the Atlantic. It is interesting to note that the conversion of these ships was superimposed upon the shipbuilding effort following enactment of the Two-Ocean Navy Bill, it having been long appreciated that sea-borne aircraft would play a dominant role in overseas campaigns if and when war came.

With a construction program well under way, it was most important to keep alterations in design at a minimum in order to avoid delays. Nevertheless, changes which would increase military effectiveness or give greater protection to crews were not sacrificed for the sake of speeding up construction. Another consideration which industry had to take in its stride was the evolution of strategic plans and changes in the type of operations which made it necessary, from time to time, to shift the emphasis in construction from one type of ship to another. For example, when the war began our carrier strength was such that we could not stand much attrition. When, therefore, we suffered the loss of four of our largest aircraft carriers in the Coral Sea engagement, at Midway, and in the South Pacific, it was imperative that the construction of vessels of this category be pushed ahead at all possible speed. Shortly after we suffered the heavy loss in battleship strength at Pearl Harbor our battleships under construction at the time were given top priority. At another stage of the war, when the submarine situation in the Atlantic was a matter of great concern, emphasis was placed upon escort carriers and destroyer escort vessels. At the moment, major emphasis rests with the construction of landing craft, because we intend to use them in large numbers in future operations.

The production of aircraft quite naturally assumed proportions commensurate with the building program. Thanks to the research and experimentation that had been done in improving and perfecting the various types of airplanes, and thanks also to the genius of United States industry in the field of mass production, our air power increased with almost incredible rapidity as soon as our airplane factories were expanded and retooled for the various models of planes we needed. In view of the delays to be expected from changes in design when on a mass production basis, it was apparent that a nice timing in changes of design would be necessary, so that the performance of our aircraft would always be more than a match for anything produced by the enemy. A notable example is the change-over from the Grumman Wildcat to the Grumman Hellcat.

In order to obtain a properly balanced Navy the construction of combatant ships was supplemented by building patrol vessels, mine craft, landing craft and auxiliary vessels of all types. Some 55 building yards, and yacht basins, located in practically all areas of the United States served by navigable waters have participated in the patrol craft construction program.

No maritime nation has ever been able to fight a war successfully without an adequate merchant marine—something we did not have when the two-ocean Navy was authorized. The Maritime Commission therefore began a vast program of merchant ship construction at the same time we were expanding the Navy, and the merchant shipbuilding industry, too, faced an enormous expansion. Furthermore, the supply of materials necessary to complete the huge program had to be carefully allocated, in view of the country's other needs that had to be met. The Navy needed material to build ships and manufacture planes and equipment, the Army required the material for military purposes, and civilian needs could not be neglected. In order to control the allocation of material, the War Production Board was established by the President and decisions as to priorities have since been made by that agency.

Naturally, such a great undertaking involved thousands of business transactions on the part of the Navy Department, with the contracting builders and manufacturers. These transactions have been continuous, and have been entered into on the basis of statutes which limit the profits permissible, and provide for the negotiation and renegotiation of all contracts. This part of the program has, in itself, been a colossal job.

#### Battleships

At the beginning of the program ten battleships were under construction. By the time Pearl Harbor was attacked only two, the North Carolina and the Washington, were in service, but since that time, six more have joined the fleet. These include the South Dakota and three sister ships, the Indiana, Massachusetts, and Alabama, and two of a larger class, the Iowa and the New Jersey. A third ship in the latter class, the Wisconsin, was launched 7 December 1943, appropriately enough, two years to the day after Pearl Harbor was attacked. In speed, in fire power, particularly antiaircraft fire, in maneuverability, and in protection, these ships represent a great advance over previous designs.

#### Aircraft Carriers

Construction of aircraft carriers represents one of the most spectacular phases of the naval shipbuilding program. The carrier strength of the Navy on 7 December 1941, was seven first-line vessels and one escort carrier, a converted merchant ship. Contracts had been placed for several large carriers of the new Essex class, and some of these had been laid down. Conversion of a number of merchant vessels was under way. The pressing need to add to our striking power in the air and to replace losses suffered in the Pacific during 1942, led to a great expansion of the construction program for first-line carriers.

Concurrently, an even larger expansion of the escort carrier program was undertaken. By the end of 1943, more than 60 carriers of all types had been put into service in our Navy, and in addition a large number of escort carriers had been transferred to Great Britain.

This remarkable record in construction en-

abled us in a single year to build up our carrier strength from the low point reached in the autumn of 1942, when the Saratoga, the Enterprise, and the Ranger were the only ships of our fleet carrier forces remaining afloat, to a position of clear superiority in this category. The rapidity with which new carriers of various types were put into service in 1943, influenced Naval operations in many important respects. Availability of several ships of the Essex class and of a considerable number of smaller carriers, completed months ahead of schedule, contributed to the success of our operations in the Southwest Pacific, aided materially in checking the submarine menace in the Atlantic, and enabled us to launch an offensive in the Central Pacific before the end of the year.

A large proportion of the Essex class carriers have joined the fleet. Excellent progress is being made on construction of the remaining ships in this class authorized after the Pearl Harbor attack. The carriers of the Independence class, converted from light cruisers, have been completed. These ships, though smaller than the Essex class vessels, are first-line carriers. It is planned to supplement these two basic types of carriers with a third, substantially larger than any of our present classes, which will displace 45,000 tons, and will be capable of handling bombing planes larger than any which heretofore have operated from the decks of aircraft carriers. They will be far more heavily armed than smaller carriers and will be much less vulnerable to bomb and torpedo attack.

The Navy's first escort carrier was the Long Island, converted early in 1941, from the merchant vessel Mormacalm. When experiments with this ship proved successful, a sizeable conversion program was initiated, using Maritime Commission C-3 hulls, and a number of oilers. In 1942, because of pressing need, this program was greatly expanded.

The "baby flat-tops" have three principal uses. They serve as antiaircraft escorts for convoys; as aircraft transports, delivering assembled aircraft to strategic areas; as combatant carriers to supplement the main air striking force of the fleet. Although their cruising speeds are lower than those of our first-line carriers, these auxiliary carriers can be turned out more rapidly and at a fraction of the cost of conventional carriers. These ships have proved invaluable in performing convoy escort and other duties for which larger and faster carriers are not needed.

#### Cruisers

The Baltimore class heavy cruisers, a number of which are now in service, were designed during the period from 19 July 1940 to 7 December 1941. These cruisers are considered as powerful as any heavy cruisers afloat, particularly as recent technical developments have made it possible to improve their fighting characteristics. The Cleveland type of light cruiser (a development of the Brooklyn class) was approved for a large part of the cruiser program, its design having been completed just before the expansion was authorized. The design of the large Alaska class was the result of a series of studies commenced when treaty limitations bound by the board and we were no longer bound by any limitations on the size of ships.

#### Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts

The Fletcher class of destroyers designed just after the outbreak of the war in Europe, formed a large part of the new destroyer building program. As compared with earlier destroyers, they are larger and have greatly increased fighting power, made possible by the same technical developments that permitted similar improvements in our cruisers.

Destroyer production has been highly satisfactory, and it has been possible to expand and accelerate this part of the program in an orderly manner. Although some new yards were engaged in building destroyers the increases were made possible by expanding facilities in yards which had had experience in destroyer construction. An idea of the acceleration in the rate of delivery of destroyers may be had by comparison with the figures for 1941 and 1943. In 1943, the rate was approximately eight times that of 1941.

Contracts for the first destroyer escorts were let in November 1941. In January 1942, the program was increased, and as Germany stepped up the construction of U-boats several more increases were found necessary. Because of priorities the commencement of a large building program was delayed, but after delivery of the first vessel of the class, in February 1943, mass production methods became effective in the 17 building yards concerned. The result was a phenomenal output of those very useful vessels.

#### Submarines

As a result of the orderly progress which had been made in the construction of submarines involving continuous trial under service conditions, the main problem to be solved in building more submarines was the expansion of facilities. For a period of 15 years or more, there were only three yards in the United States with the equipment and the know-how to build submarines. These were the Navy yards at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Mare Island, California, and the Electric Boat Company at Groton, Connecticut.

In addition to the expansion that took place at these yards, two other yards went into the production of submarines. One of these was the Cramp Shipbuilding Corporation of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the other was the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company at Manitowoc, Wisconsin. The building at the latter yard is a further testimonial to the ingenuity displayed throughout the entire program, in that submarines are built at Manitowoc, tested in the Great Lakes, then taken through the Chicago drainage canal, and down the

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Mississippi River to New Orleans, where they are made ready for sea.

**Landing Craft**

One of the most important achievements has been the landing craft construction program. Although the Navy had begun to experiment with small landing craft in 1936, we had only a few thousand tons in this category when we entered the war. In 1942, a billion dollar program for the construction of landing craft was superimposed on the already heavy building schedule, and the work was given top priority until the desired quota was filled. The facilities of existing public and private shipyards were given part of the burden. New yards were constructed, many of them in the Mississippi Valley, where bridge-building and steel-working companies which had had no previous experience in shipbuilding put up new plants and swung into production. In the second half of 1942, almost a quarter of a million tons of landing craft were produced, and the figure increased to well over a third of a million tons for the first half of 1943.

This production included a tremendous variety of vessels from small rubber boats to tank landing ships more than 300 feet in length. Within this range are small craft designed to carry only a few men, and ships with a capacity of 200 tracked craft capable of crawling over coral reefs or up beaches, craft for landing tanks or vehicles, craft for landing guns, craft for giving close fire support—in fact, all types necessary for success in that most difficult of military operations, landing on a hostile shore.

**Airplanes**

As a natural consequence of the importance of aviation in war, there has been a tremendous growth in the number of aircraft in the Navy.

Lessons learned in battle have been incorporated in the design of combat planes. New Naval aircraft have larger engines and more power, increased protection for both crew and plane, and greater firepower than the models in service at the time of Pearl Harbor. The Grumman Wildcat, which served with distinction through the first year of the war, has been largely replaced by two new fighters—the Chance-Vought Corsair and the Grumman Hellcat. These two fighters were born of the war. While the Corsair existed as an experimental model before Pearl Harbor, it was so modified before going into production as to represent virtually a new plane. Offering greatly increased speed and firepower, the Corsair went into production in June 1942, and large numbers were being sent to the war fronts by the end of the year. The Corsair was followed, but in no sense succeeded by the Hellcat, which carries more armament and has greatly increased climbing ability. In production since November 1942, and in service with the fleet since September 1943, the Hellcat rounds out a powerful striking force for Naval aviation. These two planes are superior to anything the Japanese have.

The Douglas Dauntless scout and dive bomber, in service when this country entered the war, has undergone successive modifications but is still in use. A new plane in this category—the Curtiss Helldiver—is now ready for the fighting front. This plane can carry a greatly increased bomb load, has more firepower, and is speedier than the Dauntless.

Twelve days after the attack on Pearl Harbor the Navy approved the final experimental model of a new torpedo bomber, the Grumman Avenger. Six weeks later, this plane began coming off the production line. Undergoing its baptism of fire at the Battle of Midway, it gradually replaced the Douglas Devastator and has now become almost an all-purpose plane for the fleet. The Avenger is a speedy, strongly protected, rugged aircraft capable of delivering a torpedo attack at sea or a heavy bomb load on land targets. Since it was first put into service, its defensive armament and auxiliary equipment have been improved, and a new model introducing other improvements is almost ready for volume production.

No field of aviation has been more important to the Navy than that of long range reconnaissance and patrol. After two years of war, the Consolidated Catalina flying boat remains in active service, having proved its usefulness in performing such varied tasks as night bombing patrol, rescues, anti-submarine warfare, and even dive bombing. Since Pearl Harbor, the Catalina has been supplemented by the Martin Mariner, a larger plane, which has likewise proved to be versatile in this field.

The Navy has made increasing use of land-based patrol airplanes because of the greater speed and range of newly developed models of this type and their greater defensive ability as compared with seaplanes. With more land bases becoming available, it has been possible to utilize them effectively for long over-water operations. Their superior offensive and defensive power makes them more valuable in anti-submarine warfare and for combat reconnaissance photography and patrol.

Two principal types of land-based patrol planes are now in service with the Navy—the four-engine Consolidated Liberator and the two-engine Vega Ventura. The Navy's version of the Liberator is an extremely useful plane for fast, long range reconnaissance, search and tracking. A new version, with more powerful defensive armament and greater offensive strength, soon will be available. The Ventura is a strongly armed aircraft which carries a heavy bomb load. It has proved a powerful weapon, particularly in the war against the submarine. Two other land-based bombers—the Lockheed Hudson and the Douglas Havoc—have seen limited service with the Navy, and a third—the North

American Mitchell—is in use by Marine air squadrons.

The principal plane used by the Navy for scout observation work during the war, has been the Vought-Sikorsky Kingfisher. A newer plane in this field, now in service, is the Curtiss Seagull.

The field of air transport has been enormously expanded since the beginning of the war. The Naval Air Transport Service now operates, either directly or through contract with private airlines, more than 70,000 miles of scheduled flights to all parts of the globe, helping to maintain the Navy's long supply lines. Thus far, standard type transport planes have been used. In December 1943, however, the Martin Mars, world's largest flying boat, was accepted by the Navy after exhaustive tests which proved its ability to carry heavy loads at long range. Manufacture of the Mars, under a prime contract with the Navy, is now under way, and the first production planes of this type recently entered actual service as cargo carriers.

**Auxiliaries**

The tremendous increase in the number of fighting ships and the global nature of the war required the acquisition of a commensurately large fleet of auxiliaries. These ships were obtained by construction, by conversion of standard Maritime Commission commercial hulls and by acquisition and conversion of commercial vessels. A considerable number of conversions of standard Maritime Commission types have been accomplished under the supervision of the Maritime Commission. Probably the most important vessels produced under the auxiliary program during 1943 were those which take part in actual landing operations, consisting of attack transports, attack cargo vessels and general headquarters ships. The demand for repair ships of standard and special types which increased many-fold during 1943, was met by new construction and conversion.

**Patrol Craft**

As previously stated, patrol vessels were necessary to a properly balanced Navy. The first group of patrol craft whose design was developed before the war, was completed in the spring of 1942, and more than 600 vessels of this type were completed in 1943. Motor torpedo boats (which have been employed to good advantage in several different theaters) were produced at intervals in accordance with military requirements. The classification "Patrol Craft" includes the 110-foot sub-chaser and the 136-, 173- and 184-foot steel vessels. The greatest emphasis on this type of ship prevailed prior to and during the German submarine offensive off our Atlantic Coast and in the Caribbean.

**PERSONNEL**

The expansion program and the additional requirements following the outbreak of war resulted in increases in personnel as follows. The figures given include officers and men and the Women's Reserve, but not officer candidates or nurses:

	Sept.	Dec.	Dec.
8, 1939	7, 1941	31, 1943	
Naval	126,418	325,095	2,252,806
Marine Corps	19,701	70,425	391,820
Coast Guard	10,079	25,002	171,518

The increases in enlisted Naval personnel are shown graphically on the accompanying chart.

Taking the number of men indicated into an organization was in itself an enormous undertaking. Training them was an even greater undertaking, in spite of their high intelligence and the other characteristics which make the American fighting man the equal of any in the world.

**Procurement of Officers**

In time of peace the Navy is manned almost entirely by officers of the regular Navy, most of whom are graduates of the Naval Academy. Several years before the war, knowing that the Naval Academy would not be able to supply officers in sufficient quantities for wartime needs, the Navy established Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps units at various colleges throughout the country. Under the system set up, students were given the opportunity to take courses in Naval science (which included training at sea during the summer months) and upon successfully completing them, were commissioned in the Naval reserve. When the limited emergency was declared, these officers were ordered to active duty, but when the war broke out it became apparent that the combined supply of commissioned officers from the Naval Academy and from ROTC units would not be sufficient to meet our needs for the rapidly expanding Navy.

In February 1942, therefore, offices of Naval officer procurement were established in key cities throughout the country. Hundreds of thousands of officer candidates went to these offices and there presented their qualifications. With the requirements of health, character, personality and education duly considered, the applications of those who appeared qualified were forwarded to the Navy Department for final consideration. Under this procedure some 72,000 officers were commissioned in the Navy directly from civil life, to meet immediate needs.

Meanwhile, educational programs designed to produce commissioned officers had been established in numerous colleges throughout the country. Included were the aviation cadet program (V-5) principally for physically qualified high school graduates and college students, and later the Navy college program (V-12) which absorbed under-graduate students of the accredited college program (V-1), and of the reserve midshipman program (V-7). At the present time there are 66,815 members of the V-12 program in some 241 different colleges.

From the foregoing, it will be seen that high school graduates are now the Navy's principal source of young officers. Their training is described elsewhere in this report, but the various programs for Naval reserve officers have supplied the fleet with large numbers, many of whom have already demonstrated their ability and the wisdom of the policy calling for their indoctrination and training before being sent to sea. Officers

of the regular Navy are universally enthusiastic over the caliber of young reserve officers on duty in the fleet.

In general, procurement of officers has kept up with the needs of the service, with the exception of officers in the medical, dental, and chaplain corps and in certain highly specialized fields of engineering. As graduates of professional schools are the chief source of commissioned officers in the various staff corps and as there must be a balance between military and civilian needs, we are at present somewhat short of our commissioned requirements in certain branches of the service.

By comparison with the increase in size of the Naval reserve, the increases in the regular Navy have been small. The output of the Naval Academy is at its peak, however, having been stepped up by shortening the course to three years and by increasing the number of appointments. In addition, during 1943, 20,652 officers have been made by the advancement of outstanding enlisted personnel.

**Recruiting of Enlisted Personnel**

When the President declared the existence of a limited emergency on 8 September 1939, the personnel strength of the Navy had been increased by calling retired officers and men to active duty and by giving active duty status to members of the Naval reserve who volunteered for it. At the time the large Naval expansion was authorized in July 1940, however, there were still only slightly more than 160,000 men in the Navy and by the end of that year only 215,000. As late as June 1941, the total was still well below 300,000, and it was apparent that a radical increase over and above the existing figure was an immediate necessity. Various measures were therefore taken to stimulate recruiting, by virtue of which the Navy strength stood at 290,000 on 7 December 1941. In other words, we doubled our personnel in two years.

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor there was a large increase in enlistments, and by the end of that month some 40,000 additional men had been accepted for Naval service. This heavy enlistment rate, however, experienced in December 1941, and January 1942, subsequently fell off at a time when the requirements were still mounting. In order to meet the situation and to provide an adequate method of recruiting the large numbers of men needed, our recruiting system, which had already been expanded, was fortified by a field force of officers commissioned directly from civil life, and by the fall of 1942, we were accepting each month a total equivalent to peacetime Navy strength.

On 5 December 1942, the voluntary enlistment of men between the ages of 18 and 37, inclusive, was ordered terminated as of 1 February 1943, on which latter date the manpower requirements of the Navy were supplied by operation of the machinery of the Selective Service system. During the period of active recruiting about 900,000 volunteers were accepted. Since 1 February 1943, 779,713 men have entered the Navy through Selective Service. During the same period voluntary enlistments within the age limits prescribed totalled 205,669.

On 1 June 1943, the Army and Navy agreed on joint physical standards which were somewhat lower than those previously followed by the Navy, but still sufficiently rigid to permit all inductees to be assigned to any type of duty afloat or ashore.

**Training**

Strictly speaking, it is probably true that training is a continuous process, which begins when an individual enters the Navy and ends when he leaves it. In time of peace the number of trained men in the Navy is relatively high. In time of war, however, particularly when we experience a personnel expansion such as has been described, trained men are at a premium. It is not an exaggeration to state that our success in this war will be in direct proportion to the state of training of our own forces.

When we entered the war we experienced a dilution in trained men in new ships because of the urgency of keeping trained men where fighting was in progress, and initial delays in getting underway with the huge expansion and training program had to be accepted. As the war progressed, and as the enemy offensive was checked, we were able to assign larger numbers of our trained men to train other men. Our ability to expand and train during active operations reflects the soundness of our peacetime training and organization. With that as a foundation on which to build, and with the tempo of all training stepped up, adequate facilities, standardized curricula, proper channeling of aptitude, full use of previous related knowledge, lucid instructions, and top physical condition became the criteria for wartime training.

Generally speaking, the first stage in the training of any new member of the Navy is to teach him what every member of the Navy must know, such as his relationship with others, the wearing of the uniform, the customs of the service, and how to take care of himself on board ship. The second stage involves his being taught a specialty and becoming thoroughly grounded in the fundamentals of that specialty. The third stage is to fit him into the organization and teach him to use his ability to the best advantage.

**Commissioned Personnel**

The over-all problem of training officers involves a great deal more than the education of the individual in the ways of the Navy. The first step is classification according to ability, which must be followed by appropriate assignment to duty. This is particularly true in the case of reserve officers, who must be essentially specialists, because there is insufficient time to devote to the necessary education and training to make them qualified for detail to more than one type of duty.

As previously stated, ROTC units, which were part of the V-1 training program, had been established in various colleges and courses in naval science, which included drills and summer cruises, were worked into the academic careers of the individuals enrolled. With the approach of war, the training of these students was shortened in most colleges to two and one-half years, and

eventually they became part of the Navy college training program (V-12).

In 1935, the Congress authorized the training of Naval aviation cadets, and that statutory authority was implemented by a program for their training, known as the V-5 program, which was open to physically qualified high school graduates and college students. Under the methods adopted, a decision as to whether or not a candidate would be accepted for the V-5 program was made by Naval Aviation Cadet Selection Boards, who were guided by high standards covering the educational, moral, physical and psychological qualifications of each individual. The period of training normally requires from 12 to 15 months, exclusive of additional college training required for 17-year-old students. Of this time, six to eight months are spent in preliminary training in physical education and ground school subjects at pre-flight education schools. The remainder of the training consists of primary, intermediate and advanced flight training. Upon successful completion of the full flight training course, an aviation cadet is commissioned ensign in the Naval Reserve or second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve and is then ordered to active duty as a pilot.

The V-12 (Navy college training) program was established on 1 July 1943. It consisted initially of students who were on inactive duty in the Naval Reserve, new students from civilian life, and young enlisted men especially selected. The new students from civilian life consist of selected high school graduates or others with satisfactory educational qualifications who can establish by appropriate examination their mental, physical and potential officer qualifications. These students are then inducted into the Navy as apprentices, seamen or as privates, United States Marine Corps, placed on active duty, and assigned to designated colleges and universities to follow courses of study specified by the Navy Department.

V-12 training embodies most of the features of preceding Naval Reserve programs. Depending on training requirements, and with the exception of medical and dental officers, engineering specialists, and chaplains, length of courses vary from two to six semesters. The courses of study include fundamental college work in mathematics, science, English, history, Naval organization and general Naval indoctrination for the first two terms for all students. This is followed by specialized training in a particular field, assignment of a student to special training being based upon his choice and upon his demonstrated competence in the field chosen, subject to available quotas. Upon satisfactory completion of college training, students are assigned to further training in the Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard, and if found qualified after completion of that training they are commissioned in the appropriate reserve.

So far, the V-12 program has worked well. It permits the selection of the country's best qualified young men on a broad democratic basis without regard for financial resources, and the induction and training of those young men who show the greatest promise of having superior ability and other qualities likely to make a good officer.

The link between the College Training Program and the fleets is the Naval Reserve Midshipman Program. The Navy college graduates who are going to deck and engineering duties with the forces afloat are sent to one of the six reserve midshipman schools for a four months' course. Upon the successful completion of the first month's study, they are appointed reserve midshipmen, and after the remaining three months' intensive training, they are appointed ensigns in the Naval Reserve.

Originally four reserve midshipman schools were established, located at Columbia University, Northwestern University, Notre Dame, and the Naval Academy. The program has been such an outstanding success, and the demand for its graduates has so increased, that two additional schools recently have been put into commission, at Cornell and at Plattsburgh, New York, with the result that there are nearly 9,000 men in this training program at any one time. The combined result of the College Training Program and the Reserve Midshipman Program is to meet the need of the fleets for thoroughly trained young deck and engineering officers.

**Enlisted Personnel**

Recruit training, in addition to the instruction given the individual in the ways of the Navy, consists of his being fully informed of the training opportunities open to him. This is followed by a series of tests designed to determine the ability of each recruit. These tests are based on the type of duty to be performed in the Navy, and in addition to such tests as the general classification test, consists of a systematic determination of aptitudes in reading and mechanical ability and any knowledge of specific work. Through a system of personal interviews these tests are supplemented by considering the background and experience of the individual, so that the special qualifications of each recruit may be evaluated. This information is then indexed and recorded and used in establishing quotas for the detail of men to special service schools or to any other duty for which they seem best qualified.

While the recruit is learning about the Navy, therefore, the Navy is learning about him. A practical application of this system was the assembly of the crew for the USS New Jersey, a new battleship. While the ship was fitting out, a series of tests and a thorough study of the requirements of each job on board were conducted. For example, special tests determined those best fitted to be telephone talkers or night lookouts or gun captains, and as a result, when the crew went aboard each man was assigned to a billet in keeping with his aptitude for it.

As permanent establishments, we had four training stations—Newport, Rhode Island, Norfolk, Virginia, Great Lakes, Illinois and San Diego, California. As soon as we entered the war it became apparent that it would be necessary to expand these four stations radically.

(Continued on Next Page)

## Text of Admiral King's Report

(Continued from Preceding Page)

ally and to establish others. By November 1942, we had expanded the four permanent training stations and established new ones at Bainbridge, Maryland, Sampson, New York, and Farragut, Idaho.

The training in the fundamentals of the specialty to be followed by a newcomer to the Navy is carried on ashore and afloat. Recruits showing the most aptitude for a particular duty are sent to special service schools designed to give the individual a thorough grounding in his specialty before assuming duties on board ship. If he hopes to become an electrician's mate, he may be assigned to the electrical school; if a machinist's mate, to the machinist's mate school; if a necessary steward, to the cook's and baker's school, and so forth. Approximately 32 per cent of those who receive recruit training are assigned to special service schools.

An advanced type of training is given men who are already skilled in a specialty by assembling them and training them to work as a unit. This is known as operational training, and in addition to the special meaning of the term as applied to aviation training, it encompasses such special activities as bomb disposal units as well as the training of ship's crews before the ship is commissioned.

When the individual goes on board ship, he discovers that his training has only begun, because he must learn how to apply the knowledge he has already gained and how his performance of duty fits into the organization of the ship. This is another form of operational training—conducted, of course, by the forces afloat—which is a preliminary to the assignment of that ship as a unit of the fleet. This does not mean that the ship is fully trained, but it means that the training is sufficiently advanced to fit the crew for the additional training and seasoning that comes only with wartime operations at sea. With the proper background of training, the most efficient ship is very likely to be the one which has been in action. In other words, actual combat is probably the best training of all, provided the ship is ready for it.

### HEALTH

The health of the personnel in our Naval forces has been uniformly excellent. In addition, the treatment and prevention of battle casualties has become progressively better.

The Medical Corps of the Navy has not only kept up with scientific developments everywhere, but it has taken the lead in many fields. The use of sulfa drugs, blood plasma and penicillin, plus the treatment of war neuroses probably represents the outstanding medical accomplishment of the war, but all activities requiring medical attention have been under continuous study.

For example, the conditions under which submarines must operate have been found to require special diet, air conditioning, sun lamps, special attention to heat fatigue, and careful selection of personnel. Similarly, in the field of aviation medicine, such matters as supply of oxygen, decompression treatment, acceleration stresses, air sickness, and fatigue, require the closest attention. In the case of aviation medicine, flight surgeons, who are themselves qualified Naval aviators and therefore familiar with all aviation problems, have been instrumental in keeping our aviation personnel at the peak of their efficiency.

Naval mobile hospitals were developed shortly before the war. These are complete units, capable of handling any situation requiring medical attention. Each unit contains officers of the Medical Corps, the Dental Corps, the Hospital Corps, the Nurse Corps, the Supply Corps, the Civil Engineer Corps and the Chaplain Corps, and in addition, enlisted personnel of a wide variety of non-medical ratings such as electricians, cooks, and bakers. Mobile hospitals are organized and commissioned, and being mobile as the name implies, are placed under the orders of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, for such duty as may be deemed desirable, the same as a ship. These mobile hospitals have proved invaluable in all theaters.

While it is hardly possible to single out any one activity as outstanding, the practice of evacuating sick and wounded personnel from forward areas by plane to be treated elsewhere, has been estimated to have increased the efficiency of treatment by about one-third. The beneficial effects of this practice on our ability to carry on a prolonged campaign, such as in the Solomon Islands, are obvious.

There have been many more contributions to our military efficiency having to do with not only medicine, but health in general. The question of malaria control in the Solomon Islands, protective clothing, the survival of personnel in lifeboats, the purification of drinking water, the treatment of flash burns, the recording by tag of first aid treatment received in the field, and periodic thorough physical examinations are a few of the progressive measures which, collectively, have been responsible for marked increases in our military efficiency.

### The Marine Corps

Statistics previously given indicate the personnel expansion of the Marine Corps. In terms of combat units those figures represent a ground combat strength of two half-strength divisions and seven defense battalions expanded to five divisions, 10 defense battalions and numerous force and Corps troop organizations and service units; 12 aviation squadrons expanded to 85; and increases in ships' detachments to keep pace with the ship construction program. Under the leadership of Lieutenant General T. H. Holcomb, USMC, the Marine Corps successfully met the greatest test in its history by forging a huge mass of untrained officers and men into efficient tactical units especially organized, equipped, and trained for the complicated amphibious operations which have characterized the war in the Pacific.

The personnel of the expanding Marine Corps personnel had to be conducted by stages because existing bases were inadequate in hous-

ing, space, and facilities. Basic training for all Marines was continued at the established recruit depots at Parris Island, South Carolina, and San Diego, California. Specialized advanced training for ground and aviation personnel before being assigned to combat units was conducted chiefly at Camp Lejeune, New River, North Carolina; at Camp Elliott, near San Diego, California; and at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California. Improvised facilities were used at those three bases until they had been developed into centers capable of affording training in all the basic and special techniques required in amphibious warfare. The final stage of training began with assignment of personnel to combat units and ended with the movement of those units to combat areas. (The effectiveness of individual and unit training of the Marine Corps was first demonstrated at Guadalcanal and Tulagi, eight months after the beginning of the war. That first test showed Marine Corps training methods to be sound and capable of producing combat units in a minimum of time.)

The commissioned personnel of the expanding Marine Corps were initially obtained from reservists and graduates of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. Later, commissioned personnel were obtained by including the Marine Corps in the Navy V-12 program, by selecting candidates from graduates of designated colleges and universities, and by increasing the number of enlisted men promoted to commissioned rank.

Marine Corps aviation, while expanding to a greater degree than the Corps as a whole, has continued to specialize in the providing of air support to troops in landing or subsequent ground operations. Training and organization in the United States and excellent equipment have made it possible to operate planes from hastily constructed airfields with limited facilities. The generally excellent performance of Marine aviation squadrons operating from forward bases in the Central and South Pacific areas in successful attacks against enemy aircraft, men-of-war, and shipping, attests the soundness of the organization.

In November 1942, the Marine Corps Women's Reserve was established, the authorized strength being 1,000 commissioned and 18,000 enlisted women, to be reached by 30 June 1944. By 31 December 1943, there were 600 officers and 12,592 enlisted women in the organization, all of whom have released male Marines for service in combat areas. The remarks relating to the performance of duty of the Waves, contained in that part of the report covering their organization and training, are equally applicable to women in the Marine Corps.

Participation of Marines in combat is covered in Part III of this report.

### The Coast Guard

The duties of the Coast Guard under Naval administration consist of the civil functions normally performed by the Coast Guard in time of peace which become military functions in time of war, and the performance of Naval duties for which the personnel of the Coast Guard are particularly fitted by reason of their peacetime employment. The organization operates separately with respect to appropriations, required for Coast Guard vessels, shore stations, and personnel.

The increase in the size of the Coast Guard was necessitated chiefly by additional duties in connection with captain-of-the-port activities in the regulation of merchant shipping, the supervision of the loading of explosives, and the protection of shipping, harbors, and waterfront facilities. In addition, the complements of Coast Guard vessels and shore establishments were brought up to wartime strength, certain transports and other Naval craft, including landing barges, were manned by Coast Guard personnel, and a beach patrol (both mounted and afloat) and coastal lookout stations were established. The Coast Guard also undertook the manning and operating of Navy section bases and certain inshore patrol activities formerly manned by Naval personnel, and furnished sentries and sentry dogs for guard duty at various Naval shore establishments.

Coast Guard aviation, which is about three times its previous size, has been under the operational control of Sea Frontier Commanders, for convoy coverage, and for anti-submarine patrol and rescue duties. Other squadrons outside of the United States are employed in ice observation and air-sea rescue duty. Miscellaneous duties assigned to Coast Guard aviation include aerial mapping and checking for the Coast and Geodetic Survey and ice observation assistance on the Great Lakes.

The assignment of certain Coast Guard personnel to duties radically different from those they normally perform required numerous changes in ratings. This resulted in extensive classification and retraining programs designed to prepare men for their new duties. The replacement of men on shore jobs by Spars, both officer and enlisted, has been undertaken as a part of this retraining program. Approximately 30,000 Spars—whose performance of duty and value to the service

is on a par with that of the Waves and the women of the Marine Corps—will be commissioned and enlisted when the contemplated strength of that organization is reached.

The present strength of the Coast Guard was attained by the establishment of the Coast Guard Reserve and by commissioning warrant officers and enlisted men for temporary service. Other increases in the commissioned personnel of the Coast Guard have been accomplished by appointments made direct from civil life in the case of individuals with particular qualifications, such as special knowledge in the prevention and control of fires, police protection and merchant marine inspection.

A feature peculiar to the Coast Guard is the Temporary Reserve, which consists of officers and enlisted men enrolled to serve without pay. Members of the Temporary Reserve have full military status while engaged in the performance of such duties as pilotage, port security, the guarding of industrial plants, either on a full or part-time basis. At the present time there are about 70,000 members of the Temporary Reserve, but it is anticipated that it will eventually be reduced to about 50,000. The Coast Guard Auxiliary, which is a civilian organization, has contributed much of its manpower to the Temporary Reserve, the result being a substantial saving in manpower to the military services.

Under the general direction of Vice Admiral R. R. Wuesche, USCG, Commandant, the Coast Guard has done an excellent job in all respects, and as a component part of the Navy in time of war, has demonstrated an efficiency and flexibility which has been invaluable in the solution of the multiplicity of problems assigned. The organization and handling of local defense in the early days of the war were particularly noteworthy.

### The Seabees

For some months before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor we had been strengthening our Insular outposts in the Pacific by construction of various fortifications. When these islands were attacked by the Japanese, the construction was only partially completed, and the civilians who were employed there by various construction companies, were subjected to attack, along with our garrisons of Marines.

In that situation, the civilians were powerless to aid the military forces present because they lacked the weapons and the knowledge of how to use them. Furthermore, they lacked what little protection a military uniform might have given them. As a consequence, the Navy Department decided to establish and organize Naval construction battalions whose members would be not only skilled construction workers but trained fighters as well.

On 28 December 1941, authorization was obtained for the first contingent of "Seabees" (the name taken from the words "Construction Battalions") and a recruiting campaign was begun. The response was immediate, and experienced men representing about 60 different trades were enlisted in the Navy and given ratings appropriate to the degree and type of their civilian training.

## Army and Navy Journal

April 29, 1944

After being enlisted these men were sent to training centers where they were given an intensive course in military training, toughened physically, and in general educated in the ways of the service. Particular attention was paid to their possible employment in amphibious operations. Following their initial (Continued on Next Page)

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
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
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
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Text of Admiral King's Report  
(Continued from Preceding Page)

training, the Seabees were formed into battalions, so organized that each could operate as a self-sustained unit and undertake any kind of base building assignment. They were sent to advance base depots for outfitting and for additional training before being sent overseas.

The accomplishments of the Seabees have been one of the outstanding features of the war. In the Pacific, where the distances are great and the expeditious construction of bases is frequently of vital importance, the construction accomplished by the Seabees has been of invaluable assistance. Furthermore, the Seabees have participated in practically every amphibious operation undertaken thus far, landing with the first waves of assault troops to bring equipment ashore and set up temporary bases of operation.

In the Solomon Islands campaign, the Seabees demonstrated their ability to outbuild the Japs and to repair airfields and build new bases, regardless of conditions of weather. Other specialized services performed by the Seabees include the handling of pontoon gear, the repair of motor vehicles, loading and unloading of cargo vessels, and in fact every kind of construction job that has to be done.

At present the Seabees number slightly more than 240,000, nearly half of whom are serving overseas at various outposts. Fleet commanders have been and are generous in their praise and appreciation of the work done by construction battalions everywhere. There can be no doubt that the Seabees constitute an invaluable component of our Navy.

## The Waves

Early in 1942, when the need for expansion of Naval personnel became acute, the Navy Department proposed to the Congress that there be established, as an integral part of the Navy, a Women's Reserve. The stated purpose of the proposal was to employ women in shore billets, so that men could be released for sea duty. Acting on that recommendation, the Women's Reserve was established on 30 July 1942, and the organization became known as the Waves, the name being derived from the expression "Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service." In November 1943, certain statutory changes were made which provided for women becoming eligible for all allowances or benefits to which men are entitled, and made certain alterations in the composition of the organization, chiefly with respect to promotions.

Initial plans called for 1,000 officers and 10,000 enlisted women, and immediately upon obtaining the necessary statutory authority for the organization, officer training schools were established, one at Northampton, Massachusetts, utilizing the facilities of Mount Holyoke College. At the same time, a training school for yeomen was established at Stillwater, Oklahoma, one for radio personnel at Madison, Wisconsin, and one for storekeepers at Bloomington, Indiana. Under the procedure followed at that time all Waves went to one of these schools immediately after joining the Navy and upon the successful completion of their training, to duty somewhere in the continental United States where they could take the place of men.

All officer candidates now go to Northampton for their indoctrinal training and may then receive further training elsewhere—there are 16 schools for special training—in communications, supply, aeronautical engineering, Japanese language, radio and electronics, chemical warfare, general ordnance and photographic interpretation, and many others, including pharmacist's mate, and ship and aircraft recognition.

All enlisted Waves now go to a general indoctrination school at Hunter College in New York City, and there receive their basic training. Further training at some other schools—there are now 19 of them—designed to train them in their chosen specialty, is now standard practice. Enlisted personnel are trained as radio operators, yeomen, storekeepers, for various aviation ratings, and for many others, including pharmacist's mate. Approximately one-fourth of all enlisted women are now on duty with Naval aviation activities.

On 31 December 1943, there were 6,459 commissioned Waves and 40,391 enlisted Waves serving in various capacities. Present plans call for nearly 100,000 Waves by the end of 1944.

The organization has been a success from the beginning, partly because of the high standards Waves had to meet to be accepted, partly because no effort has been spared to see that they are properly looked out for, and partly because of their overpowering desire to make good. As a result of their competence, their hard work, and their enthusiasm the release of men for sea duty has been accompanied in many cases, particularly in offices, by increases in efficiency. The natural consequence is an esprit de corps which enhances their value to the Navy, and it is a pleasure to report that in addition to their having earned an excellent reputation as a part of the Navy, they have become an inspiration to all hands in Naval uniform.

III  
COMBAT OPERATIONS  
General

## Organization of the United States Fleet

On 1 February 1941, command afloat in the high echelons was vested in three Commanders in Chief, one of whom commanded the Asiatic Fleet, one the Pacific Fleet, and one the Atlantic Fleet, provision being made whereby one of these three, depending on the circumstances, would act as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, chiefly for purposes of standardization. In case two or more fleets operated together, he would coordinate their operations. At the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet was also Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet.

Almost immediately after our entry in the

war it became apparent that for the purpose of exercising command all oceans must be regarded as one area, to the end that effective coordinated control and the proper distribution of our naval power might be realized. On 20 December 1941, therefore, the President changed this organization by making the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, separate and distinct and in addition to the other three Commanders in Chief, and ordered the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, established in the Navy Department in Washington.

As of 1 January 1942, Admiral H. R. Stark was Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral E. J. King was Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral T. C. Hart was Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral C. W. Nimitz, who relieved Admiral H. E. Kimmel late in December, was Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and Vice Admiral (now Admiral) R. E. Ingersoll was Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

In March 1942, (coincident with my appointment as such) the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations were combined with the duties of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Admiral Stark, who had so ably performed the duties of Chief of Naval Operations during the vital period preceding the war, became commander of United States Naval Forces in Europe. This move was accompanied by a number of adjustments in the Navy Department organization, calculated, among other things, to facilitate the logistic support of the forces afloat by providing for its coordination. Except for the fact that the Asiatic Fleet ceased to exist as such in June 1942, that basic organization of the United States Fleet and supporting activities is still in effect. In the spring of 1942, however, and from time to time thereafter, independent commands were established directly under the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

## Organization Within Each Fleet

In time of peace, for purposes of standardization, and to facilitate training and administration, our forces afloat operate under what is known as a type organization. Each fleet is subdivided according to types of ships in that fleet, (this includes shore-based naval aircraft), and in general, the officers assigned to command each subdivision are the next echelon below the Commander in Chief of a fleet. The "type commands" are primarily for administrative purposes. For operations, vessels and aircraft of appropriate types are formed into operating commands known as "task forces."

## Sea Frontiers

As of 1 February 1941, Naval Coastal Frontiers consisted of one or more Naval Districts, depending on their geographical location, and Naval Coastal Frontier forces were administrative and task organizations. Commanders of those forces were responsible to the Navy Department for administrative purposes and to the Chief of Naval Operations for task purposes.

On 20 December 1941, the operating forces of Naval Coastal Frontiers were placed under the command of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

On 6 February 1942, Naval Coastal Frontiers became Sea Frontiers, and Commanders of Sea Frontiers were made responsible to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, for that portion of their commands comprising ships and aircraft duly allocated as Sea Frontier forces. For the portion comprising ships and aircraft allocated by the Chief of Naval Operations as local defense forces, they were made responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations.

The foregoing change in designation of Naval Coastal Frontiers is not to be confused with the designation "Coastal Frontier." The latter, of which Sea Frontiers form a part, are coastal divisions with geographically co-terminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a Naval officer exercise command over their respective forces and activities.

In continental United States there are four Sea Frontiers: the Eastern, covering the Atlantic seaboard; the Gulf, covering the Gulf of Mexico; the Western, which takes in the southern part of the Pacific Coast; and the North West, which covers the northern part of the Pacific Coast.

## Advance Base Units

Early in the war the Navy undertook a large expansion of its system of advance bases, many of which represented the consolidation of gains made by combat units. Depending on the circumstances, that is to say, whether they were gained as a result of a raid or as a result of an advance, the permanency of their construction was varied to meet the situation. In the South and Central Pacific, the entire campaign thus far has been a battle for advance bases where we can establish supply ports, ship repair facilities and landing fields, to act as a backdrop for a continuing offensive.

Advance bases range in size from small units for the maintenance and repair of PT boats, manned by a handful of officers and men, to major bases comprising floating dry docks, pattern ships, foundries, fully equipped machine shops, and electrical shops, staffed by thousands of specialists. Some of these bases are general purpose bases; others are established for a special purpose. Convoy escort bases, located at terminals of the convoy routes, provide fuel, stores, ammunition, and repair facilities for merchant ships and their escort vessels. Rest and recuperation centers afford Naval personnel facilities for relaxation and recreation after they return from combat zones. Air stations provide the facilities of an aircraft carrier on an expanded scale.

Once bases are built, they must be maintained. The problem of supplying the Navy's worldwide system of advance bases, is one of great complexity, requiring a high degree of administrative coordination and attention to the most minute detail. Food, clothing, fuel, ammunition, spare parts, tools, and many types of special equipment must be made available in sufficient quantities and at the proper times to maintain the fighting effi-

cacy of the Fleet.

In view of the difficulties involved, the arrangements made for the procurement and distribution of supplies to advance bases have been extremely effective. New methods have been improvised and shortcuts devised to simplify procedures and expedite deliveries. Among other devices adopted is the mail order catalogue system. Through use of the Navy's "functional component catalogue," it is possible to order all the parts and equipment needed to set up any type of base, from a small weather observation post to a fully equipped airfield or Navy yard.

As our forces advance, new bases must be established and economy of personnel and material demands that this be accomplished largely by stripping the old bases that have been left behind as the front is extended. This process is known as "rolling up the back areas."

## Fighting Efficiency

When Pearl Harbor was attacked, the forces comprising the Atlantic Fleet had been engaged with Axis submarines, but the forces comprising the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets had not been previously engaged in combat. In the case of all ships everywhere, the transition from a state of peace to state of war involved a great number of immediate changes, some of which could not possibly be made until our ships had been in action. For example, we profited from experiences gained after the war started with respect to the use of certain of our weapons in actual combat. Such things as depth charges and explosive charges in torpedoes and shells were put to the real test by our forces, and all personnel have become accordingly familiar with their handling and use. We also learned from experience the best practice in such matters as the painting and preservation of the interior of ships, camouflage, deficiencies and improvement of equipment, and from time to time what new contributions were of value. The most valuable of all experience has been that gained with respect to the operational technique in such fields as air combat, amphibious operations, and escort of convoys.

Another consideration was the correct use of the initiative by officers and men, especially the former. We had spent years training officers to think, judge, decide and act for themselves—a policy that paid dividends when the war began.

The war was also the real test of the training methods we had followed in time of peace, particularly the exercise of initiative by officers. As used in connection with the exercise of command, initiative means freedom to act, but it does not mean freedom to act in an off-hand or casual manner. It does not mean freedom to disregard or depart unnecessarily from standard procedures or practices or instructions. There is no degree of being "Independent" of the other components parts of the whole—the fleet. It means freedom to act only after all of one's resources in education, training, experience, skill and understanding have been brought to bear on the work in hand. This requires intense application in order that what is to be done shall be done as a correlated part of a connected whole—much as a link of a chain or the gear within a machine.

In other words, our officers had been indoctrinated and were now in larger measure on their own. Most of those officers understood perfectly the transition that becomes automatic when we passed from the peacetime to the wartime status, but it was thought desirable to define and emphasize the standards expected in time of war, not only to confirm their understanding, but for the benefit of newcomers. Without correct exercise of the principle calling for initiative on the part of the subordinate, decentralization, which is so essential, and which is premised on division of labor, will not work.

## Calculated Risk

The ability of a naval commander to make consistently sound military decisions is the result of a combination of attributes. The natural talent of the individual, his temperament, his reactions in emergencies, his courage, and his professional knowledge all contribute to his proficiency and to the accuracy of his judgment. We have spent years training our officers to think clearly and for themselves, to the end that when entrusted with the responsibility of making decisions in time of war they would be fully qualified.

One of the mental processes that has become almost a daily responsibility for all those in command is that of calculating the risks involved in a given course of action. That may mean the risks attendant upon disposition of forces, such as had to be taken before the Battle of Midway, when an erroneous evaluation might have left us in a most unfavorable strategic position; the risks of losses in contemplated engagement, such as the Battle of Guadalcanal 13-14-15 November 1942; the risks of success or failure dependent upon correct evaluation of political conditions, of which the North African landings are an example, and a host of others.

Calculating risks does not mean taking a gamble. It is more than a formula. It is the analysis of all factors which collectively indicate whether or not the consequences to ourselves will be more than compensated for by the damage to the enemy or interference with his plans. Correct calculation of risks by orderly reasoning, is the responsibility of every Naval officer who participates in combat, and many who do not. It is a pleasure to report that almost universally that responsibility is not only accepted, but sought, and that there have been few cases where it has not been properly discharged.

## Logistics

The war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of machines. Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics. The ways and means to supply and support our forces in all parts of the world—including the Army—of course—have presented problems nothing short of colossal, and have required the most careful and intricate plan-

ning. The profound effect of logistic problems on our strategic decisions is described elsewhere in this report, but to all who do not have to traverse them, the tremendous distances, particularly those in the Pacific, are not likely to have full significance. It is no easy matter in a global war to have the right materials in the right places at the right times in the right quantities.

Superimposed on the shipping requirements for the overhead of logistic needs has been the transportation of Army troops and the demands of lend-lease. The combination of circumstances has made shipping a question of primary importance which has been reflected in the shipbuilding industry and the merchant marine.

When war was declared, an immediate estimate of the situation with respect to materials was made, as a result of which we could see that no matter how much material was produced within the next year, it would not be enough. Therefore, with the idea of doing the first thing first, every effort was made to produce as much material as possible of all kinds, with the idea that as the war progressed our estimates could be revised to fit our needs. Stock piles of spare parts and materials needed for routine maintenance and repair of ships and aircraft were therefore established at advance bases, additional supplies being delivered under regular schedule.

Plate Number III is an over-generalization of the situation which existed in April 1942, with respect to the relationships involving munitions, manpower, and the eight fronts. From an examination of the diagram it will be seen that in order to keep our operating forces balanced in such a way as to conform to our planned operations, we had to maintain a continuous flow of munitions and manpower from sources of supply. The quantities involved, of course, had to be varied in accordance with the importance of any particular front, that is to say, the urgency of a particular campaign or operation. It is interesting to note that the United States was, and is, the only nation represented as having a full supply of both munitions and manpower.

It became possible to anticipate the needs for material much more accurately after we had been in the war a little over a year, and numerous changes were made in the methods of controlling the flow to the operating forces.

In supplying the forces afloat with the material they need, different methods are required. For example, spare parts and materials can be put on a regular schedule, but in distributing battle damage spares, which consist of complete units of pumps, turbines, boilers, turbo generators, steering gear and other assemblies, it has been found advantageous to keep them in stock at depots in the United States, and to effect immediate delivery to points where they are needed. For example, on one occasion a damaged submarine put into a distant base for extensive replacement of her main drive controls and power cables. Within thirty-six hours after receiving the information covering her needs a transport plane loaded with nine tons of parts took off for the advance base.

## Character

While every kind of Naval warfare has been experienced, with Naval air power more often than not predominating, the war to date has to a degree become characterized by numerous amphibious operations—a method of warfare with which the Japanese had had considerable experience. Our previous conclusions that this type of warfare required a technique of its own involving the closest coordination of all forces engaged—land, sea and air—have been confirmed. The very exigencies of such operations have done much to promote effective cooperation between those forces, and they have also made all hands realize that the uniforms they wear signifies first that they are members of United States forces, and second that they are members of a particular unit of those forces. The inevitable solution to successful amphibious warfare is unified command, under which all those participating are under the command of the individual best qualified to conduct the operation regardless of his status in our armed forces.

## Enemy Losses

As previously stated, the object of this report is to give a general, rather than a detailed picture of our operations. Since the Japanese do not publish their losses there is no exact record of enemy ships sunk and planes destroyed.

## Strategy

The trend of events during the two years following the outbreak of war in Europe indicated that the war would eventually engulf the United States and become global in all its aspects. In keeping with that trend, the growing truculence of Japan and the continuous change of Japan's policies with the policies of the United States made it likely that that country would enter the war at the most propitious moment. Because of that attitude, we were forced to retain the major part of our Naval strength in the Pacific, in spite of the unfavorable situation in Europe reflecting the possibility of the need of our Naval strength in the Atlantic. We were therefore placed in an unfavorable strategic position, in that our Naval forces at that time were not adequate to meet the demands in both oceans should we be forced into the war.

The sudden treacherous attack by Japan which resulted in heavy losses to us, made our unfavorable strategic position at the outbreak of war even worse than we had anticipated. Had we not suffered those losses, however, our fleet could not have proceeded to Manila as many people supposed and there relieved our hard pressed forces. Such an undertaking at that time, with the means at hand to carry it out and support it, would have been disastrous.

Although we had made some progress, and had for some months been increasing our de-

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Pacific.  
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war were  
intensified.  
Our strategy in the Atlantic involved main-  
taining our lines of communications to Great  
Britain and to future bases of operations  
against our enemies in Europe, in addition to  
insuring the security of the western hemi-  
sphere. The control of the Atlantic was being  
vigorously contested by German submarine  
and air forces, while the Axis surface forces  
constituted a threat of no mean proportions.  
To meet the situation we trained men and  
manned ships and aircraft as soon as we could  
in order to assume the offensive. By the end  
of 1942, we were ready and moved overseas  
in force with the Army.

By the spring of 1943, the war against German  
submarines in the Atlantic had turned in  
our favor and we were fully on the offensive  
in that area. Furthermore, we had built up to  
our strategic requirements for the transportation  
and support of our Army ground and  
air forces overseas and the reinforcement of  
British naval forces guarding against the out-  
break of the German surface forces. Coin-  
cident with this expansion and general in-  
crease in our strength, there was a rapid  
buildup in the forces employed in the Pacific.  
At the outbreak of the war with Japan, we  
were initially placed on the defensive, but  
while we were so engaged we made all pre-  
parations to seize the initiative as soon as  
possible and embark on our own offensive  
operations. To that end, our fleet supported  
the operations of the Allied forces through-  
out the Pacific in retaining key positions and  
preventing further encroachments by the  
enemy.

In view of the absence of any well developed  
bases in Australia and in the South  
Pacific islands between Australia and the  
United States one of our first problems was to  
establish bases which would serve as links in  
the line of communications. Early in  
1942, therefore, after surveying the situation,  
Estate, Espiritu Santo, and certain islands in the  
Fiji and New Caledonia were selected for  
advance bases, and developed in varying  
degree to suit our purposes. The establish-  
ment of those bases, which have been in con-  
stant use as fuel and troop staging stations  
and as distribution points for material and  
supplies, was in large measure responsible for  
our ability to stand off the Japanese in their  
advances toward Australia and New Zealand.  
Without them we should have been at  
a disadvantage that is doubtful if the  
enemy could have been checked.

While essential sea and air communications  
to Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, and other intermediate positions were being established and protected, our subma-  
rines immediately took the offensive in  
enemy waters. Also during this period, our  
Naval air task forces were instrumental in  
attacking enemy positions and in turning back  
enemy sea-borne forces, particularly in the  
Coral Sea and off Midway. The enemy  
succeeded in making an incursion into the  
Western Aleutians.

The actions in the Coral Sea and at Mid-  
way did much to wrest the initiative from  
the enemy and slow down further advance.  
Our first really offensive operation was the  
seizure of Guadalcanal in August 1942. This  
campaign was followed by a general offen-  
sive made possible by increases in our am-  
phibious forces and in our Naval forces in  
general, which has continued to gain momen-  
tum on the entire Pacific Front. At the end  
of February 1944, the enemy had been cleared  
from the Aleutians, had been pushed well out  
of the Solomons, had been ejected from the

Gilberts, and Western Marshalls, was being  
attacked elsewhere, and was forced to adopt a  
defensive delaying strategy. Meanwhile,  
our own positions in the Pacific had been  
strengthened.

At the end of February, therefore, we were  
in position to support our submarines which  
had been on the offensive from the beginning  
of the war, with strong Naval forces, some  
of which were ground and air forces not  
needed on the European front. A similar sit-  
uation exists in the Atlantic, in that the sea-  
lanes are under our control and we are defi-  
nitely on the offensive in that area.

#### THE PACIFIC THEATER

The war in the Pacific may be regarded as  
having four stages:

(a) The defensive, when we were engaged  
almost exclusively in protecting our shores  
and our lines of communication from the  
encroachments of the enemy.

(b) The defensive-offensive, during which,  
although our operations were chiefly defen-  
sive in character, we were able nevertheless  
to take certain offensive measures.

(c) The offensive-defensive, covering the  
period immediately following our seizure of  
the initiative, but during which we still had  
to use a large part of our forces to defend  
our recent gains.

(d) The offensive, which began when our  
advance bases were no longer seriously  
threatened and we became able to attack the  
enemy at places of our own choosing.

#### The Defensive

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese  
withdrew from the Central Pacific and for the time being, except for the capture of  
the islands of Guam and Wake, confined their  
major attacks to the Philippine Islands and  
Netherlands East Indies. Our own operations  
were of necessity limited to that line of enemy  
advance. Guam was easily taken. Our forces  
on Wake, after gallant resistance which took  
a large toll of enemy attacking forces, far  
superior in strength, were overcome at the  
end of December.

Except for the forces in the Philippine Islands  
under General MacArthur, our strength in the  
western Pacific area consisted chiefly of the  
Asiatic Fleet, a few aviation units, and the garrisons of marines at Guam and  
Wake already referred to. The small Asiatic  
Fleet commanded by Admiral Thomas C.  
Hart, U. S. Navy, included the heavy cruiser  
Houston, the light cruiser Marbelhead, 13  
overage destroyers, some 29 submarines, two  
squadrons of Catalinas comprising Patrol  
Wing Ten, and a few gunboats and auxiliaries which could not be counted on for  
combat. With this force (plus the light  
cruiser Boise, which happened to be in Asiatic  
waters when the war warning was received)  
we undertook to delay the enemy's  
advance until such time as we could muster  
sufficient strength to put up any real resistance.  
In so far as completely stopping the  
advance was concerned, the campaign was  
foredoomed, but it nevertheless contributed  
materially to the ultimate check of the Japanese  
advance, and the energy and gallantry of the  
officers and men participating constitute a remarkable chapter in the history  
of naval warfare.

During the latter part of November, when the  
Japanese advances along the coast of Indo China indicated the approach of a crisis, Admiral Hart had sent the Marbelhead and  
eight destroyers to Borneo. Likewise, the  
Houston, Boise, and the destroyer tender  
Black Hawk had been dispatched to operate in  
southern waters. On the evening of 8 December, therefore, after the Japanese had  
bombed our airfields and destroyed many of  
General MacArthur's planes, our submarines  
and motor torpedo boats, which were still in  
Philippine waters, were left with the task of  
impeding the enemy's advance. On 10  
December, the navy yard at Cavite, which  
had long been recognized as insecure, was  
practically wiped out by an air attack which  
also damaged the submarine Sealion and the  
destroyer Peary, the Sealion being destroyed  
by our own forces to prevent its capture. On  
the same day the Japanese effected landings  
on the islands, and thereafter all attempts to  
bring in effective quantities of supplies by  
sea proved unsuccessful. It should be noted,  
however, that on 10 December, there were  
some 200,000 tons of Allied shipping in  
Manila Bay, most of it good, and some of it  
with valuable cargoes. All but one of these  
ships got clear to the southward, under  
what amounted to cover by our surface  
forces, and escaped via the Sulu Sea and  
Makassar Strait. This was an important  
"save."

The holding of the Army's positions on  
Bataan and Corregidor became only a ques-  
tion of time, and Rear Admiral F. W. Rock-  
well, U. S. Navy, who was in command of the  
local Naval defense forces, moved with  
them to Corregidor on 26 December.

Admiral Hart set up his headquarters in  
the Netherlands East Indies. Shortly there-  
after General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, of the  
British Army, arrived and assumed supreme  
command in that theater, whereupon Admiral Hart  
became the Commander of the Allied  
Naval Forces. Until Admiral Hart's arrival  
in Java, Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral)  
William R. Glassford commanded the  
surface ships in southern waters, assisted by  
Rear Admiral William R. Purnell and other  
members of the Fleet Staff. Up to this point, (in so far as the Asiatic Fleet was concerned)  
the campaign was conducted in accordance  
with plans worked out in the Navy Depart-  
ment prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

The method adopted by the Japanese in  
making their advances through the Philippine  
Islands and the Netherlands East Indies was  
built around their air power. After  
building up their strength at a given base  
they would overcome the consistently inferior  
Allied air opposition at the next point of  
attack and then send along heavily screened  
amphibious forces to make landings. As a  
rule, the distances were too short to permit  
attack by our naval forces while the enemy  
was en route. As soon as the enemy were  
in control of a new area they would repair  
the airfields and gather forces for the next  
attack. These tactics were well adapted to

the geography of the Philippine Islands and  
the Netherlands East Indies, particularly as  
there was almost a total absence of interior  
communications in the islands occupied.

In January 1942, therefore, the Japanese  
had overrun the Philippine Islands, and the  
greatest part of our strength was in the  
Netherlands East Indies, for which the Japanese  
were obviously headed. Our sub-  
marines and motor torpedo boats were engaged  
in slowing down the enemy advance to give  
us as much time as possible to get organized  
for the surface actions that were in  
prospect in the Java Sea.

#### The Java Sea Campaign

In that situation, Admiral Hart had to  
plan all our operations without air support  
except for a few Army bombers and a few  
fighters based on Java. Our PBY4's of Pat-  
rol Wing Ten were not suited for the type  
of operations in prospect, and as a matter  
of fact it was only the superb work of their  
pilots in the face of enemy fighters coupled  
with the mobility of our tenders that made  
their use possible.

By the end of December, the Japanese were  
preparing bases at Davao, on Mindanao, and at  
Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago. From these  
points they moved south to attack Menado,  
on the northern tip of Celebes, Tarakan, in  
northeastern Borneo, and shortly afterward  
Ranau, with the obvious intention of moving  
down Molucca Strait toward Ambon, Ken-  
dari, and Makassar Strait. By 20 January,  
they appeared to be ready to move against  
Balikpapan, on the east coast of Borneo.

Collecting the few ships at his disposal,  
(until early February all British and Nether-  
lands surface ships had to be used to escort  
troop convoys into Malaya) Admiral Hart  
decided upon a night torpedo attack. This  
was delivered off Balikpapan (the action be-  
came known officially as the Battle of  
Makassar Strait) early in the morning of 24  
January, by the destroyers John D. Ford,  
Parrot, Paul Jones and Pope, under the com-  
mand of Commander (now Captain) P. H.  
Talbot, U. S. Navy. Whatever the losses sus-  
tained by the enemy, the attack, (one of four  
attempts by our cruisers and destroyers to  
come to grips with the enemy at sea) was  
brilliantly executed, and was responsible for the  
stalling of that particular force for some  
time at Balikpapan. Other amphibious  
forces, however, continued to advance east-  
ward, and landed at Rabau in New Britain  
and at Bougainville in the Solomons. New  
positions on the coast of Borneo were also  
seized by the enemy, and in the first few  
days of February they captured Ambon and  
began bombing Soerabaja and several other  
Javanese points.

In furtherance of the effort to delay the  
enemy drive, a striking force consisting of  
four cruisers and seven destroyers, about  
half of which were Netherlands and the  
other half American, was formed under the  
command of Rear Admiral Doorman of the  
Netherlands Navy. A large enemy convoy  
having gathered at Balikpapan, Admiral  
Doorman undertook to run up Madoera  
Strait into the Java Sea and deliver an at-  
tack, but our forces were discovered by

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Japanese planes and subjected to a pro-  
longed bombing attack which prevented the  
carrying out of the plan. During this attack the  
Houston suffered one direct hit which  
destroyed her number three turret and the  
Marblehead was forced to retire to the south  
coast of Java to effect temporary repairs.

Continuing their advance, the Japanese at-  
tacked Palembang in southeast Sumatra and  
entered Banks Strait. Admiral Doorman's  
force, in a second effort to interfere with  
the enemy operation was again forced to with-  
draw by enemy planes. By 14 February, the  
Japanese in Borneo and Celebes were in a  
position to advance on Bali and eastern Java,  
and Japanese forces in Sumatra were also  
threatening Java.

At this point in the campaign, in accordance  
with previous agreements providing  
that it would be conducted by the Nether-  
lands, Admiral Hart relinquished operational  
command of Allied naval forces to Vice  
Admiral Helfrich of the Netherlands Navy,  
and a few days later General Wavell turned  
over his command and left the area.

Having been subjected to daily bombing  
at Soerabaja, our headquarters were trans-  
ferred from Soerabaja to Tjilatjap on the  
south coast of Java. On 10 February, Dar-  
win, (most of our forces basing there had  
been transferred to Tjilatjap because Dar-  
win, not entirely suitable from the begin-  
ning, was becoming untenable) on the south  
coast of Australia, was subjected to a heavy  
air raid which destroyed the airport, ware-  
house, docks, and virtually every ship in the  
harbor, including our destroyer Peary.

Enemy forces having landed on the south-  
east coast of Bali, and seized the airfield  
there, Admiral Doorman, with his composite  
force, attacked enemy vessels in Bandoeng  
Strait on the night of 19-20 February. This  
action resulted in the sinking of the Nether-  
lands destroyer Piet Hein and damage to the  
Netherlands cruisers Java and Tromp and  
to our destroyer Stewart. Damage to the  
enemy in this action was impossible to  
assess but was believed to be considerable.

The action in Bandoeng Strait was en-  
couraging but it did little to impede the  
Japanese, who now controlled all the north-  
ern approaches to the Netherlands East  
Indies, and seemed about to move on Java.  
In an effort to bolster up our strength with  
fighter planes, the Langley, with planes and  
crew on board, and the Seawitch, with more  
planes, were diverted to Java. On 26 Febr-  
uary, the Langley was sunk by enemy bombers.  
The Pecos, a tanker, was sunk about  
the same time in the same area. The Sea-  
witch arrived safely at Tjilatjap but was  
too late.

On 27 February, Admiral Doorman's com-  
posite force, consisting of two heavy  
cruisers, three light cruisers and nine  
destroyers, attacked an enemy force in the  
Java Sea, not far from Soerabaja. After  
maneuvering for position, and after having


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## DIXIE CUPS

ONE OF THE VITAL HEALTH DEFENSES  
OF AMERICA AT WAR

Text of Admiral King's Report  
(Continued from Preceding Page)

joined action, the composite force, for one reason and another, suffered a series of losses. These included the sinking of the British destroyer Electra and the Netherlands destroyer Kortenaer, and damage to the British cruiser Exeter. Later that night the Netherlands cruisers De Ruyter and Java were sunk by a combination of torpedoes and gunfire. This left only the Houston and the Perth, the American destroyers having expended their torpedoes and retired to port to refuel. Accordingly, the Houston and Perth retired to Tandjung Ptoek. Although the Japanese suffered some damage, they were successful in preventing the striking force from reaching their convoys. The immediate problem was now to rescue our remaining vessels from the Java Sea, the exits to which were held by the enemy.

On 28 February, the Exeter, Pope, and Encounter headed for Soenda Strait and were never heard from again. On 1 March, the Houston and Perth, accompanied by the Netherlands destroyer Eversten headed in the same direction, and except for very meager reports of an engagement in Soenda Strait, they have not been heard from since. Of the entire Allied force, only the four American destroyers managed to make their way to Australia after a skirmish with Japanese destroyers patrolling Ball Strait.

On 28 February, the Japanese landed on the north coast of Java. As no port on the island of Java was tenable as a base for our surface forces, the Allied Naval Command was dissolved and the American ships remaining at Tjilatjap were ordered to proceed to Australia. Of the four destroyers so ordered, the Edsall and the Pillsbury were lost en route. All other craft escaped, with the exception of the gunboat Asheville. Thus ended the gallant campaign of the Java Sea, conducted against overwhelming odds by officers and men who did the best they could with what they had.

## Raids on Japanese Positions

While the situation in the Far East was growing steadily worse, and the Japanese were having things their own way there and elsewhere, our Pacific Fleet, now commanded by Admiral Nimitz, carried out its first offensive operation of the war. The targets selected were the Marshall and Gilbert Islands.

To carry out raids on these islands, there was placed under the command of Vice Admiral (now Admiral) William F. Halsey, Jr., US Navy, a force consisting of the carriers Enterprise and Yorktown, the heavy cruisers Chester, Louisville, Northampton, and Salt Lake City, the light cruiser St. Louis, and ten destroyers. Beginning January 1942, bomb and bombardment damage—very severe in some instances—was inflicted by that force upon the islands of Wotje, Maloelap, Kwajalein, Roi, Jaluit, Makin, Taroa, Loi and Guggegwe. It is quite possible that because of the success at Pearl Harbor, much of the enemy's air strength originally disposed in the Marshall Islands was withdrawn before these attacks were delivered. Except for the Chester, which suffered one bomb hit, and the Enterprise, which was slightly damaged by shell fragments, none of our vessels was damaged during the entire operation, and our personnel losses were slight.

The raid on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands was so successful that several other operations following the same pattern were conducted during the following weeks. On 20 February, a task force built around the carrier Lexington, and commanded by Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, USN, attempted a combination air and surface attack on Rabaul, New Britain. During the approach, the Lexington was discovered by enemy twin-engined bombers 16 of which were destroyed by our fighter planes and anti-aircraft, five of them by a single pilot. The element of surprise having been lost and fuel having been reduced by high-speed maneuvering the attack on Rabaul was not pressed home.

On 24 February, Admiral Halsey took the Enterprise, two cruisers, and seven destroyers and shelled and bombed Wake Island which had been in enemy hands since December 22. Considerable damage was inflicted. We lost only one aircraft during that operation. Eight days later planes from the Enterprise bombed Marcus Island with reasonably satisfactory results. Again, we lost only one plane.

On 10 March, Vice Admiral Brown, with the carriers Lexington and Yorktown and supporting ships, raided the New Guinea ports of Salamaua and Lae where enemy troops had landed three days earlier. A number of enemy war vessels and transport vessels were sunk or damaged, and the attack was fully successful, even though it did not appear to delay, appreciably, the enemy's advance toward Australia. Our losses were light.

On April 18, Tokio was bombed by army planes which took off from the carrier Hornet, the planes from the Enterprise providing search and fighter planes for the operation. As a carrier operation, this raid was unique in naval history in that for the first time medium land bombers were transported across an ocean and launched off enemy shores. Whatever the damage inflicted by these bombers, the attack was stimulating, the surrender of Bataan, and the situation in general in the Far East, was at low ebb.

## The Coral Sea

By the middle of April, the Japanese had established bases in the New Guinea—New Britain—Solomon Islands area, which put them in a position to threaten all Melanesia and Australia itself, and they were moving their forces through the mandates in preparation for an extension of their offensive

to the southeast. Our available forces at that time were eager and ready for battle, but they were not any too strong for effective defense against major enemy concentrations, much less adequate to carry out a large-scale offensive operation.

It should be noted at this point that during the first five months of the war, nearly every engagement with the enemy had demonstrated the importance of air power in modern naval warfare. Our initial losses at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines were the result of attack by aircraft, and the enemy's superiority in the air had been one of the controlling factors in our reverses in the Far East. Similarly, our successful though inconclusive raids on the Japanese-held islands in the Pacific had been conducted chiefly by carrier-based aircraft. The results had been excellent and the costs low. As yet, however, there had been no engagement between enemy carrier forces and our own, and although we had reason to believe that most of our naval aircraft was of good design and performance, we had no basis for comparison.

When the Japanese, on May 3, began to occupy Florida Island in the Solomons, Rear Admiral (Now Vice Admiral) Frank J. Fletcher, USN, who was cruising in the Coral Sea with a force composed of the carrier Yorktown, the three cruisers Astoria, Chester, and Portland, and six destroyers, proceeded north to interrupt the activity. On the morning of 4 May, about 100 miles southwest of Guadalcanal, planes launched by the Yorktown sank and damaged a number of enemy vessels at Tulagi with loss of only one aircraft, and in the afternoon, another attack group scored additional hits, with the loss of two fighters.

On 5 May, Rear Admiral Fletcher's force had joined other Allied units, one of which was a task group including the heavy cruisers Minneapolis, New Orleans, Astoria, Chester and Portland, and five destroyers. There were two flag officers in the task group, Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) Thomas C. King and Rear Admiral William W. Smith. The other unit, consisting of the Australian heavy cruiser Australia, and the light cruiser Hobart, plus the American heavy cruiser Chicago and two destroyers, was under the command of Rear Admiral J. G. Grace, Royal Navy, and was operated in conjunction with the carriers Lexington and Yorktown and four destroyers, which were under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) Aubrey W. Fitch, USN.

On the afternoon of the 6th, enemy forces had become sufficiently consolidated in the Bismarck Archipelago—New Guinea area to indicate an amphibious operation to the southward, perhaps against Port Moresby, on the northern tip of Australia. As enemy forces would have to round the southeastern end of New Guinea, Rear Admiral Fletcher stationed an attack group within striking distance of the probable track of the enemy fleet, and the remainder of his force moved northward in an attempt to locate enemy covering forces.

On the morning of the 7th, contact was made with the Japanese carrier Shoho, which was promptly attacked and sunk by aircraft from the Lexington and Yorktown. We lost only one dive bomber in the attack, but the same morning Japanese carrier planes sank our tanker Neosho and the destroyer Sims.

The next morning contact was made with two enemy carriers, four heavy cruisers, and several destroyers. One of the carriers was attacked and severely damaged by our carrier aircraft, and as was anticipated, enemy aircraft counterattacked about an hour later. During the counterattack, both the Yorktown and the Lexington were damaged, the latter rather severely. Both carriers and their planes shot down a considerable number of enemy planes during the engagement, and our aircraft losses were small by comparison, but early in the afternoon an explosion on board the Lexington made her impossible to control. She was therefore abandoned, and ordered sunk by one of our own destroyers. Nearly all of her personnel were saved.

Thus ended the first major engagement in naval history in which surface ships did not exchange a single shot. Although the loss of the Lexington was keenly felt, the engagement in the Coral Sea effectively checked the Japanese in their advance to the southward. Our losses of one carrier, one tanker, one destroyer, and a total of 66 planes were considerably less than estimated Japanese losses. Our personnel casualties totalled 543.

## Defensive — Offensive Midway

The engagement in the Coral Sea marked the end of the period during which we were totally on the defensive. There followed a lull during which both sides were preparing for further operations. Our immediate problem was to anticipate as nearly as we could what the next move of the enemy would be as we had lost touch with the heavy Japanese forces which had participated in the Coral Sea action.

It was clear that the Japanese would not long remain inactive. Naturally enough, our various important outposts would be good targets, with Dutch Harbor and Midway offering them the best chance of success, either in the nature of a raid or of an invasion. Furthermore, an operation directed against these points would permit the enemy to retire without too great loss or complete annihilation in case their plans did not work out. At the same time, we had to consider the possibility that they might renew actions in the Coral Sea. It was a plain case of calculating the risk involved in stationing our forces. A mistake at that point would have proved costly.

Considering the chance that the enemy knew little concerning the location of those of our ships which had not participated in the Coral Sea engagement, but certainly was aware that most of our available carrier and cruiser strength was then in southern waters, it seemed reasonable to expect that the Japanese would make the most of the opportunity to strike us in the central and/or

northern Pacific. Such an attack was likely because of the prospect of success in the immediate operation, and because if successful, the advance to Australia and the islands in the South Pacific could be accomplished in due course with comparative ease, once the enemy had cut our lines of communications.

Acting on our best estimate of the situation, our carriers and supporting vessels were recalled from the South Pacific. The Yorktown was patched up temporarily, and scouting and patrol lines were established well to the westward of Midway Island. Our total forces available in the central Pacific consisted of the carriers Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown, seven heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 14 destroyers, and about 20 submarines. These were divided into two task forces, one under the command of Rear Admiral (now Admiral) Raymond A. Spruance, Jr., ofers of this task force were commanded by Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) King and the other under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) Fletcher. Another flag officer, Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, was attached to the second task force. In addition, there was a Marine Corps air group based on Midway, augmented by Army bombers from Hawaii.

On the morning of 3 June, enemy forces were sighted several hundred miles southwest of Midway, on an easterly course. The composition of the force sighted was not determined at that time, but it was clearly a large attack force with supporting vessels. Late in the afternoon this force was bombed by a squadron of B-17's under the command of Lt. Col. Walter C. Sweeney, Army Air Corps. While results of the attack were not definitely determined, hits on several ships were reported. On the morning of 4 June contact was made with enemy aircraft headed toward the island of Midway from the northwest, and immediately thereafter, two carriers and the enemy main body were picked up in the same vicinity. Although the enemy aircraft were not prevented from dropping their bombs on Midway, the Japanese air attack force was nevertheless subjected to heavy fire and the enemy plane losses were large. Meanwhile, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps planes from Midway attacked carriers, battleships, and other vessels, inflicting serious damage on one enemy carrier.

At this point, our own carriers took a hand in the engagement. Having been launched from a position north of Midway, a torpedo squadron from the Hornet (the now famous Torpedo Eight) without the protection of fighters, and without accompanying dive bombers, attacked a force of four enemy carriers. All planes in the squadron were shot down and only one pilot survived, but the squadron made several hits on the enemy carriers. About an hour later, torpedo squadrons from the Enterprise and Yorktown attacked the same carriers, and also suffered heavy losses, but registered hits on two carriers. These attacks were followed by dive bombers from the Enterprise which smothered two carriers, and by more bombers from the Yorktown which hit a third carrier, a cruiser, and a battleship. Two carriers had been set on fire and put completely out of action. A third was damaged and was sunk later by the submarine Nautilus.

Planes from the only Japanese carrier remaining undamaged attacked the Yorktown, and although this attack force was annihilated, it succeeded in making three bomb hits. Shortly afterward, enemy torpedo planes scored two hits on the Yorktown, and orders were given to abandon ship. About two hours later, planes from the Enterprise attacked the undamaged Japanese carrier and left her a mass of flames and immediately thereafter, when a squadron from the Hornet arrived, the carrier was blazing so furiously that it was possible to concentrate on a nearby battleship and a cruiser, both of which were hit.

At this stage of the engagement, it was apparent that we had won control of the air and it remained for the aircraft from Midway to put on the finishing touches. Army Flying Fortresses attacked an enemy heavy cruiser and left it smoking heavily. Other planes scored hits on a battleship, a damaged carrier, and a destroyer. By the end of the day the Japanese were in full retirement.

On the morning of the 5th, aircraft from the Enterprise and the Hornet made an ineffective attack on an enemy light cruiser, but planes from Midway discovered two enemy cruisers, one of which they crippled. The planes scored hits on a battleship, a damaged carrier, and a destroyer. By the end of the day the Japanese were in full retirement.

On 6 June, Hornet planes located an enemy force consisting of two heavy cruisers and three destroyers and made hits on the two cruisers. Planes from the Enterprise also scored hits on those two cruisers and later in the day Hornet planes successfully attacked two more cruisers and a destroyer. On the same day, in an effort to save the Yorktown, which had been taken in tow, the destroyer Hammann went alongside to put on board a salvage party. While she was alongside, the Yorktown was struck by two torpedoes from an enemy submarine, and the Hammann sank within a few minutes and the next morning, the Yorktown also sank.

The Battle of Midway was the first decisive defeat suffered by the Japanese Navy in 450 years. Furthermore, it put an end to the long period of Japanese offensive action, and restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific. The threat to Hawaii and the West Coast was automatically removed, and except for operations in the Aleutians area, where the Japanese had landed on the islands of Kiska and Attu, enemy operations were confined to the South Pacific. It was to this latter area, therefore, that we gave our greatest attention.

## Offensive — Defensive Campaigns in the South Pacific

The Landings in the Solomons

From the outset of the war, it had been evident that the protection of our lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand represented a "must." With the advance

of the Japanese in that direction, it was therefore necessary to plan and execute operations which would stop them.

Early in April, the Japanese had overrun the island of Tulagi, where (on 4 May 1942) they were attacked by our carrier-based bombers just before the Battle of the Coral Sea. In July, the enemy landed troops and laborers on Guadalcanal Island and began the construction of an airfield. As the operation of landbased planes from that point would immediately imperil our control of the New Hebrides and New Caledonia areas, the necessity of our ejecting them from those positions became increasingly apparent. Developments in New Guinea, where the enemy had begun a movement in the latter part of July, paralleling his Solomons penetrations, increased the necessity for prompt action on our part.

The counter operation—our first real offensive move in force—was planned under the direction of Vice Admiral R. L. Ghormley, who, in April, had assumed command of the South Pacific Force with headquarters at Auckland, New Zealand. Forces participating were the First Marine Division, reinforced by the Second Marine Regiment, the First Raider Battalion, and the Third Defense Battalion, supported by Naval forces consisting of three major units, two of which were under the command of Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher. Another flag officer, Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, was attached to the second task force. In addition, there was a Marine Corps air group based on Midway, augmented by Army bombers from Hawaii.

On the morning of 3 June, enemy forces were sighted several hundred miles southwest of Midway, on an easterly course. The composition of the force sighted was not determined at that time, but it was clearly a large attack force with supporting vessels. Late in the afternoon this force was bombed by a squadron of B-17's under the command of Lt. Col. Walter C. Sweeney, Army Air Corps. While results of the attack were not definitely determined, hits on several ships were reported. On the morning of 4 June contact was made with enemy aircraft headed toward the island of Midway from the northwest, and immediately thereafter, two carriers and the enemy main body were picked up in the same vicinity. Although the enemy aircraft were not prevented from dropping their bombs on Midway, the Japanese air attack force was nevertheless subjected to heavy fire and the enemy plane losses were large. Meanwhile, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps planes from Midway attacked carriers, battleships, and other vessels, inflicting serious damage on one enemy carrier.

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In that situation, the cruisers of the screening force under the command of Rear Admiral Crutchley, R. N., took up a night disposition designed to protect the areas between the Guadalcanal and Florida Islands and the channel on either side of Savo Island. The northern group covering the latter area consisted of the heavy cruisers Vincennes, Quincy, and Astoria, screened by the destroyers Helm and Wilson. The southern group consisted of the Australian cruiser Canberra and the Chicago, screened by the Patterson and Bagley. Two destroyers, the Ralph Talbot and the Blue, were stationed not far from Savo Island. Late in the evening of 8 August, a conference was held on board Rear Admiral Turner's flagship, the McCawley. This conference included Rear Admiral Crutchley, in the Australia.

A force of enemy cruisers and destroyers entered the area undetected from the northwest at about 0415 and aided by flares dropped by enemy planes opened fire on our screening groups with guns and torpedoes. The result of the surprise and of the Japanese fire, which was sufficiently effective to inflict severe damage on our vessels in a few minutes, was that there was little effective return fire. The action ceased at about 0215 at which time the Japanese force, having rounded Savo Island, left the area on a northeasterly course. During those thirty minutes the Quincy, Vincennes, Astoria and Canberra were so severely damaged that they subsequently sank, and the Chicago, Ralph Talbot and Patterson were damaged.

The surprise, which was the immediate cause of the defeat, was the result of a combination of circumstances. Because of the urgency of seizing and occupying Guadalcanal, planning was not up to the usual thorough standards. Certain communication failures made a bad situation worse. Fatigue was a contributing factor in the degree of

\* The Korean Admiral Yi-sun administered a resounding defeat to the Japanese Admiral Hideyoshi (so called father of Japanese Navy) in 1592 off the Korean Coast.

(Continued on Next Page)

## Text of Admiral King's Report (Continued from Preceding Page)

Alertness maintained. Generally speaking, however, we were surprised because we lacked experience. Needless to say, the lessons learned were fully taken into account.

The immediate consequence of this cruiser battle was the retirement of the enemy force, without any attack being made on our transports unloading men and supplies on the beaches of Guadalcanal. The loss of the four cruisers, however, and the subsequent loss of two aircraft carriers left us inferior in strength for several months. The Japanese did not take advantage of this opportunity to engage in a fleet battle with the balance of power on their side, probably because they did not know—and we did not let them know—how severe our losses were.

### The Fight for Guadalcanal

Except as it affected the security of the islands to the south, and Australia and New Zealand, the island of Guadalcanal by itself was not particularly important, but having been selected by us as the point to step in and check the advance of the enemy, it became a focal point in the fighting front established.

After we had landed there, the immediate situation was that of opposing ground forces on the island, and as each depended on naval forces for supplies and reinforcements it was inevitable that there would be naval engagements until the issue was decided.

After the battle of Savo Island, the Japanese began bombing Marine positions and making the adjacent waters almost untenable during the daylight hours. At night, enemy surface forces bombarded our surface installations almost at will. The Japanese, however, were unable to bring up reserve ground forces from the Western Solomons.

So far as naval activity was concerned there was a lull of about ten days. During that time the Japanese, who reacted violently to the reverses suffered in the initial landing, collected all available reinforcements near Henderson Field. The reinforced troops immediately attacked. The result was a night battle at Tenaru River in which the Marines were completely victorious.

Meanwhile, the enemy was concentrating his forces in the Rabaul area. By 23 August, it was apparent that a major action was imminent.

### The Battle of the Eastern Solomons

In anticipation of an enemy move, in force, Vice Admiral Ghormley had concentrated two task forces southeast of the island of Guadalcanal. These were built around the carriers Saratoga and Enterprise, and included the battleship North Carolina, the cruisers Minneapolis, Portland, New Orleans, and Atlanta, and 11 destroyers. On the morning of 23 August, a transport group was sighted by a search plane about 250 miles north of the island.

During the night our combined force moved north and contact was made the next morning. In the afternoon of the 24th, planes from the Saratoga bombed an aircraft carrier and in addition damaged a cruiser and a destroyer. While these attacks were in progress, a flight of about 75 planes attacked the Enterprise and her escort vessels and inflicted moderately severe damage on the Enterprise, in spite of the intense antiaircraft fire from escorting ships, particularly the North Carolina. That night, Marine air attack groups from Guadalcanal attacked and damaged two more enemy destroyers, and the next morning destroyed a transport. In addition to the foregoing attacks, Army planes believed they scored a hit on a cruiser, planes from the Saratoga reported hits on a battleship and two cruisers, and Marine pilots reported damage to still another cruiser. As a result of the action, the Japanese were all but stripped of carrier support and broke off the fight although their powerful surface forces were still largely intact.

Following the engagement in the Eastern Solomons, no major action took place in the South Pacific area for a period of about six weeks. During those six weeks, however, the supply lines had to be kept open to Guadalcanal. Japanese submarines and air forces were active in the vicinity, and there were numerous scattered actions, which cost us the carrier Wasp, the destroyers O'Brien, Blue, Colhoun, Gregory, and Little, and several other ships damaged. Also the Japanese made almost nightly runs of what came to be termed the "Tokio express" from the Bataan-Faisi area to Guadalcanal, and enemy air forces bombed Marine positions by day and by night.

By September 13, enemy ground troops had been reinforced, and another attack was directed at Henderson Field. Although the issue was in doubt for several hours, the Marines, thanks to replacements and artillery support, succeeded in decimating the attacking force.

In spite of offensive operations directed against enemy ground troops and supporting naval forces by our ground troops and by our Marine air forces, the enemy by the end of September had succeeded in putting practically an entire new division on the island. In addition, more strong Japanese fleet units had been assembled to the northward, and the situation again was threatening. Reinforcements to the Marines had now become a necessity even though made in the face of enemy naval and air superiority. Contemplated reinforcements included Army elements available (the 16th Infantry).

### The Battle of Cape Esperance

After our carrier planes had attacked enemy shipping in the northern Solomons as a preliminary, our naval forces in the area were disposed in three groups. One was built around the carrier Hornet, to the westward of Guadalcanal. A second, to the eastward of Malaita Island, included the new battleship Washington. The third, under the command of Rear Admiral Norman Scott, was stationed south of Guadalcanal pending developments. Rear Admiral Scott's force

consisted of the heavy cruisers San Francisco, Lake City, the light cruisers Boise and Helena, and the destroyers Buchanan, Duncan, Farenholt, Laffey and McCalla.

On the afternoon of 11 October, enemy forces were reported in "the slot" between Choiseul Island and the New Georgia group, headed for Guadalcanal. Simultaneously, Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was attacked by about 75 enemy aircraft. Rear Admiral Scott therefore headed north with his force, which rounded the northwestern end of the island about two hours before midnight. Just before midnight contact was made, and our force opened fire.

Taken by surprise, the enemy did not return the fire for nearly ten minutes, during which time our cruisers made the most of the opportunity and delivered a devastating fire on the enemy force. In less than five minutes four enemy targets had disappeared, two more were put out of action by the Helena and Boise, and the Farenholt, Duncan, and Buchanan each scored torpedo hits on enemy cruisers. In addition, the Buchanan wrecked an enemy destroyer with gunfire and set an unidentified enemy ship on fire.

When the Japanese opened fire, the Boise found herself engaged with a heavy cruiser, and although the enemy cruiser soon burst into flames, the Boise was damaged. During this exchange, the Salt Lake City scored hits on an enemy auxiliary and destroyer. At this stage of the battle, Rear Admiral Scott ceased firing to rectify his formation, and as most of the enemy targets had disappeared there followed a short lull.

The Salt Lake City, the Helena, and the San Francisco, reopened fire with telling effect. The Boise damage (fire) had been brought under control, and she reentered the action, engaging a heavy cruiser and an unidentified ship, but upon receiving further damage she was forced to retire. The Salt Lake City, meanwhile, had covered the Boise, and assisted by the San Francisco, concentrated her fire on an enemy heavy cruiser until the action was broken off by the enemy.

During the engagement the Duncan was so badly damaged that she had to be abandoned, and the Farenholt was damaged. The San Francisco had been hit, and as previously stated, the Boise was severely damaged. Even so, the engagement was a victory for us, attributable in part to surprise and confusion, and in part to the accuracy of our fire.

During the succeeding days, in spite of the reverses suffered in the Battle of Cape Esperance, the Japanese continued their attacks on Guadalcanal. Notwithstanding heavy losses inflicted on them, they succeeded in getting a number of transports through, and landed nearly another entire division. Our air attacks, however, left that division with little equipment, few rations, and inadequate artillery support. Meanwhile, support for our Marines had been arriving, and General Vandegrift had been able to improve his position. He now had better air support, made more effective by new landing strips constructed by the Seabees, but as shelling by enemy units continued, he was still in need of strong naval support, especially as the Japanese gave no signs of discontinuing their efforts to launch a full-scale attack.

Enemy submarines and aircraft renewed their efforts to interrupt our communications, and it became increasingly clear that the next Japanese move would be supported by powerful surface and air units. The destroyer Meredith was sunk on October 15, while engaged in keeping our line of communications open and a few days later the heavy cruiser Chester was damaged by enemy submarines, but our naval forces were reinforced by the new battleship South Dakota, and the damaged Enterprise was again ready for duty. Our naval forces were now divided into two parts, one being the Washington group under the command of Rear Admiral W. A. Lee, Jr., and the other consisting of two carriers, one battleship, three heavy cruisers, three anti-aircraft light cruisers and 14 destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) T. C. Kinkaid. The former group, reinforced by the ships surviving the Battle of Cape Esperance remained in the vicinity of Guadalcanal. The other moved northward in an effort to engage the enemy.

On the night of 23-24 October, the Japanese began a land assault at the south of the Matanikau River, and although thrown back with heavy losses continued their attack the following day. On the 25th, enemy ground forces were supported by naval gunfire from two Japanese cruisers and four destroyers which slipped into Savo Sound, and on the night of 25-26 October, the enemy ground offensive reached its peak. At this point the Japanese moved their naval units in force toward Guadalcanal.

### The Battle of Santa Cruz Island

Early on the morning of 26 October, our patrol planes made contact with three enemy forces. One of these forces included a carrier. Another consisted of two battleships, one heavy cruiser and seven destroyers. The third, which included two carriers, was attacked by the patrolling planes, and hits were scored on one of the carriers.

Simultaneously, our carriers launched three attack waves, one from the Enterprise and two from the Hornet. While en route, the Enterprise attack group encountered Japanese planes. After a short engagement during which some of our planes were shot down, it located the enemy force containing the battleships and made bomb hits on one of them. The first Hornet wave reached the enemy carrier group without interference and reported at least four 1000-pound bomb hits on a carrier. Other Hornet aircraft in that group registered three torpedo hits on a heavy cruiser. The second Hornet group discovered an enemy cruiser force and succeeded in bombing two heavy cruisers and a destroyer.

While our aircraft were delivering their attacks, our own carriers were being attacked by enemy carrier aircraft. The Hornet suffered one bomb hit and was set on fire by

an enemy bomber which purportedly dived into the carrier's stack. Blazing gasoline was spread over the signal bridge, which was further damaged by one of the bombs carried by the plane. Resulting fires were extinguished in about two hours, but while the dive bombing attack was being delivered, a torpedo attack developed and the Hornet received two hits which disrupted her power and communications. The torpedo hits were followed by three more bomb hits and another suicide plane crash which started more fires. Of 27 attacking aircraft, 20 were shot down at anti-aircraft fire, but the attack, which lasted 11 minutes, left the Hornet dead in the water with many fires on board and with a decided list. Our wounded personnel were promptly removed by destroyers, the fires were extinguished in about a half hour, and the Hornet was taken

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in tow by the Northampton, but in the afternoon she was again attacked by torpedoes and dive bombers and had to be abandoned and sunk by our own forces.

Just before noon the Enterprise was subjected to an attack by 24 enemy dive bombers, of which seven were shot down by anti-aircraft fire in which the South Dakota participated. Shortly after, weathered two attacks by torpedo planes and one more attack from dive bombers.

The first dive bombing attack resulted in three hits on the Enterprise. Of the torpedo planes making the first attack, one dived on

(Please turn to Page 1044)

## SCHOOL AND CAMP DIRECTORY

The Schools and Camps listed below are effectively equipped to care for the educational and recreational needs of the children of members of the services and this Directory is recognized as an authentic and reliable aid to service parents in solving the problem of child education. For details as to the Schools listed in this Directory address them directly, or communicate with the Army and Navy Journal Department of Education, 1711 Conn. Ave., Washington 9, D. C.

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
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THE Chief of Staff of the Army and Mrs. George C. Marshall attended a dinner given 24 April by the Australian Minister Lady Dixon in honor of the Prime Minister of Australia and Mrs. Curtin. Among the other guests were General and Mrs. Henry H. Arnold, USA.

Mrs. Roosevelt also gave a reception for the visiting Prime Minister and Mrs. Curtin, at which Mrs. Robert P. Patterson and Mrs. James V. Forrestal, wives of the Under Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments, were present.

Col. Ralph R. Glass, recently retired from active duty at Fort Lewis, Wash., has purchased a home at 1019 Ardmore avenue, Oakland, Calif., where he and Mrs. Glass are now residing.

The old-fashioned, commodious George town home of the Under Secretary of War and Mrs. Patterson was the scene of a gay gathering Sunday last when the feminine contingent of the Army was entertained. WACS and JANGOS (Junior Army and Navy Girls), mingling for tea. Mrs. Philip Porter, president of the latter, headed the receiving line.

On the Reception Committee were Miss Ella Harlee and Mesdames Richard W. Forbes, C. L. Hayen, Harry C. Porter, Laurence Crolius, E. C. Schum, William Durat, Frank A. Klaveness and R. M. Watson.

Members of the Jango board poured tea during the receiving hours.

Maj. Bernice L. Keplinger, WAC staff officer for the District, marshalled the groups coming from Fort Belvoir, Fort Myer and Gravelly Point, Fort Washington, Bolling Field and the Army Medical Center.

The Hospitality Committee included Misses Jean Holloway, Sally Jones,

Dependable Floral Service—Delivery to all parts of USA  
Say it with FLOWERS

order NOW . . . for . . . birthdays, Anniversaries,  
Graduations, etc.

MOTHER'S DAY . . . . . May 14th  
MEMORIAL DAY . . . . . May 28th  
(Cut Flowers, Complete Flowering Plants)

Send remittance to cover amount you wish to spend.  
date for delivery, name and address of person to receive  
the flowers and inscription for card to

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507 Seventh Ave. (at 57th St.) New York City  
Priests: New York City . . . . . \$3.00 up  
Residents and Friends . . . . . 4.00 up  
Elsewhere in U. S. A. . . . . 5.00 up  
Please write your order plainly

## SERVICE SOCIAL NEWS



MRS. DeWITT McDougal  
PATTERSON

who before her recent marriage to  
Lt. Patterson, USN, was Ens. Nancy  
J. Shetky, USNR, daughter of Captain  
and Mrs. G. L. Shetky, USN.

Frances Lee, Betty McMillan, Mary Mc-  
Nell, Barbara Moreland, Peggy Oster-  
man and Louise Thompson.

Lt. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift,  
Commandant of the Marine Corps and  
Mrs. Vandegrift will entertain at their  
first at-home since his taking command  
at the Marine Barracks tomorrow from  
5 to 6 o'clock.

Brig. Gen. and Mrs. Victor V. Taylor  
dined with Mrs. Garlington Chamberlain  
before departing the Capital for their  
future home in Santa Barbara, Calif.

Miss Teresa Emerson, daughter of Col.  
Gouverneur V. Emerson, MC, USA, and  
Mrs. Emerson, arrived in Washington  
Monday and has been the guest of Mrs.  
Henry F. Pipes. Miss Emerson has de-  
parted for Annapolis, where she will  
spend several days before returning to  
New York.

Mrs. James Defendorf, wife of Colonel  
Defendorf, entertained last Tuesday at  
a bridge luncheon at her home in Chevy  
Chase, complimenting her guest, Mrs.  
Charles Appleman.

Col. L. D. Tharp, USA, and Mrs. Tharp,  
and their daughter, Barbara, were the  
guests of Mr. and Mrs. Pierce Riddle for  
a week. They have now returned to  
Colonel Tharp's station at Fort Omaha.  
Mrs. Tharp is the sister of Mrs. Riddle.

Mrs. Felix Johnson, wife of Captain  
Johnson, USN, has returned to Annapolis  
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where she was the guest of her uncle,  
Col. Garland Fay, USMC, retired.

Mrs. Thomas Nelson Coppedge, Jr., ar-  
rived in the Capital this past week end  
to make "her home base" with her par-  
ents, Captain and Mrs. Atherton Macon-  
dray, at their home in Georgetown. Her  
husband, Lieutenant (jg) Coppedge,  
USN, is now on overseas duty.

The former Mary Lord Andrews and  
her husband have been in California ever  
since their marriage last October at  
Seminary Hill, Alexandria, Va.

Brig. Gen. and Mrs. Gordon R. Young  
are now at Fort Belvoir, where General  
Young is commandant of the engineer  
school, a command held by Gen. Roscoe  
C. Crawford until recently.

The Youngs have just come back to the  
States from the Canal Zone. Mrs. Young  
is the former Dorothy Mills, daughter of  
General and Mrs. Mills.

Mrs. Mortimer Irion returned to the  
Capital Tuesday after a visit of several  
weeks with her son-in-law and daughter,  
Lieut. and Mrs. Frank Whitehouse, Battle  
Creek, Mich.

Mrs. Arthur G. Robinson, the wife of  
Admiral Robinson, commandant of the Naval  
Operating Base at Trinidad, was  
chairman of the Stage Door Canteen's  
benefit luncheon held Thursday. This  
much-talked-of event was at the canteen  
headquarters at the Old Schubert-Belasco  
Theater on Lafayette Square.

### Weddings and Engagements

Rear Admiral and Mrs. Gilbert J.  
Rowcliff announce the engagement of  
their daughter, Caroline Gilbert, to En-  
sign Clifford R. J. Schaible, USNR, son  
of Mr. and Mrs. J. C. Schaible, of Hos-  
mer, S. D. Miss Rowcliff is the grand-  
daughter of Rear Adm. and Mrs. E. H.  
C. Leutze, of Washington, D. C., and the  
late Mr. and Mrs. John W. Rowcliff, of  
Peoria, Ill. She is a graduate of Mills  
College, Oakland, Calif., Class of 1943,  
and now has a position with the  
United States News. Ensign Schaible is  
a graduate of the University of Minne-  
sota, Class of 1943, and is a member of  
Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity. He is now  
on duty in the Pacific. No date has been  
set for the wedding.

Col. and Mrs. Walter C. Phillips have  
announced the engagement of their  
daughter Elizabeth Perry to Mr. Lee  
Mountcastle Kenna, son of Judge and  
Mrs. Jo N. Kenna, of Charleston, W. Va.  
The wedding will take place in June at  
the First Presbyterian Church in  
Charleston. Miss Phillips graduated from  
Stuart Hall, in Stanton, Va. She attended  
the University of Hawaii and is now  
a student at Hollins College, Va. Mr.  
Kenna received his A.B. and LL. B. de-  
grees from Washington and Lee Univer-  
sity, belonging to P. B. K. Sigma Chi  
social and Phi Delta Phi legal fraterni-  
ties.

Mrs. Phillips is now making her home  
at 1570 Kanawha Blvd., while the Colonel  
is serving overseas.

Mr. and Mrs. Wilson K. Page, of Olean,  
New York, announce the engagement of  
their daughter, Elizabeth, to Capt. Rus-  
sell F. Greenawalt, AUS, son of Mr. and  
Mrs. William C. Greenawalt, of Orwigs-  
burg, Pa.

Miss Page was graduated from Mount  
Holyoke College and is secretary to the  
Dean of the College of Engineering, Cor-  
nell University, Ithaca, N. Y. Captain  
Greenawalt is a graduate of Cornell and  
is now stationed in the Office of the Chief  
of Ordnance, Washington, D. C.

Miss Alice Clarke Woodbury, daughter  
of Brig. Gen. and Mrs. Woodbury, be-  
came the bride of Maj. Edward Gaitley,  
Jr., United States Army Air Forces, son  
of Mr. and Mrs. E. D. Gaitley, of Flor-  
ence, S. C., 19 April in St. Luke's Cath-  
edral, Orlando, Fla.

The ceremony was performed by the  
Very Rev. Melville E. Johnson, dean of  
St. Luke's, who had officiated at the mar-  
riage of the bride's parents, April 19,  
21 years ago.

The bride was given in marriage by  
her uncle, Mr. James Holmes, of Jackson-  
ville, in the absence of her father, Brig.  
Gen. Woodbury, who is with the armed  
forces in England. She was lovely in a  
simple two-piece suit of white French  
crepe, the jacket close fitting and  
trimmed with narrow pleated ruffling  
which outlined the lapels and extended  
the length of the coat. A bandeau hat of  
white violets, the back draped with  
white veiling, made a striking contrast  
with her dark hair. Her corsage was of  
gardenias and she carried a white  
prayer book, the gift of Dean Johnson.

The bride's sister, Miss Sally Wood-  
bury, came from Bartrum's School in  
Jacksonville to be her sister's only at-  
tendant.

Acting as best man for Maj. Gaitley  
was Capt. Joe Carr, who is stationed in  
Tampa.

Following the wedding, an informal  
reception was held in the foyer of the  
Highland Lake Apartments.

The bride's table was overlaid with a  
long banquet cloth of Point de Venise  
lace and centered with a tiered wedding  
cake. Bowls of white flowers flanked the  
center decoration.

Upon returning from their wedding trip  
to the Florida East Coast, Maj. Gaitley  
and his bride will make their home at  
the Highland Lake.

Brig. Gen. and Mrs. William Ayres  
Borden announce the engagement of  
their daughter, Miss Dorothy Adams Borden,  
to Lieut. Hugh Blanchard Vickery,  
USN, son of Rear Admiral and Mrs.  
Howard L. Vickery.

The bride-elect was graduated from  
Madeira School, Smith College and the  
Sorbonne and is a member of the Wash-  
ington Junior League. She is the grand-  
daughter of Mrs. William C. Borden and  
the late Colonel Borden and of Mrs. Sam-  
uel S. Adams and the late Dr. Adams.

Lieutenant Vickery was graduated  
from the United States Naval Academy,  
class of 1940. He is the grandson of Mrs.  
Willis Vickery and the late Judge Vick-  
ery, of Cleveland, and of the late Mr.  
and Mrs. John H. Blanchard, of Boston.

Announcement has been made of the  
engagement of Miss Ann George, daughter  
of Brig. Gen. and Mrs. Charles Pea-  
lee George, to Capt. Edward Harrison  
Humphreys, Army Air Forces, son of Mr.  
and Mrs. William Humphreys, of Mem-  
phis, Tenn.

The bride-elect, granddaughter of the  
late Charles Curtis, former Vice President  
of the United States, and grandniece of  
Mrs. Edward E. Gann, of Washington,  
formerly lived in the Capital when her  
father was stationed at Fort Myer, Va.  
General and Mrs. "Toddy" George are  
now in San Antonio, and the wedding will  
take place there 19 May in St. Paul's  
Memorial Church.

A Navy daughter and a Navy son are  
engaged to be wed, the former, Miss Ab-  
bie Dora Ansel, daughter of Capt. Wal-  
ter Ansel, USN, and Mrs. Ansel, and her  
fiance, Midshipman Carvel Hall Blair,  
USNA, son of Comdr. and Mrs. Roswell  
H. Blair.

Miss Ansel was graduated from Brent  
School, Baguio, Philippine Islands, and  
attended Middlebury College in Vermont.  
She is a member of Sigma Kappa and  
Tau Omicron Phi Service Sorority.

Midshipman Blair was graduated from  
St. Albans School in this city and will  
be graduated from the Naval Academy in  
June.

Captain Ansel is at present on sea duty  
and Mrs. Ansel is living in Annapolis,  
while Commander and Mrs. Blair are in  
Cambridge, where Commander Blair is at-  
tached to the Massachusetts Institute of  
Technology.

All Souls' Unitarian Church in Wash-  
ington was decorated with white blos-  
soms and candle-lighted for the wedding  
Saturday last, 22 April, of Miss Betty  
Alden Waitt, daughter of Brig. Gen. and  
Mrs. Alden H. Waitt, and John William  
White, AUS, son of Mr. and Mrs. James  
Todd White, of Washington, Dr. Seth  
Brooks officiating.

General Waitt escorted and gave his  
daughter in marriage. She wore a gown  
of white marquisette fashioned with a  
square-cut neckline, fitted bodice and her  
full skirt with ruffled panels fell into a  
long train. A veil of tulle was held to her  
head by a cap of lace and her shower  
bouquet was of white lilies and gardenias.

Mrs. James Teat, roommate of the  
bride at college, was her only attendant.

Cadet James Todd White, United  
States Military Academy, was best man  
for his brother, and the ushers were  
classmates of the bridegroom at George  
Washington School of Medicine. They in-  
cluded Christopher Murphy, John Sher-  
burne and Thomas Waitt, all members of  
the armed forces, and Midshipman Wil-  
liam Zeller.

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**Bachrach**  
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Baltimore Washington

Service Favorite

Everybody salutes Crosse & Blackwell's Orange Marmalade—the breakfast favorite all around the world. The order of the day: Try it on hot buttered toast.

**CROSSE & BLACKWELL'S**  
Orange Marmalade

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## Posts and Stations ANNAPOLIS, MD.

24 April 1944

The Naval Academy Women's Club gave a large bridge party last week at the North Officers' Mess for the benefit of the Red Cross. The co-chairmen were Mrs. Hull, wife of Comdr. Vance Hull, and Mrs. Fletcher, wife of Lt. Comdr. J. Stuart Fletcher. Mrs. Bonquet was in charge of prizes.

Capt. and Mrs. Neal B. Farwell, of Boston, and Mrs. Farwell's sister, Mrs. John E. Merrill, Jr., wife of Capt. Merrill, USA, have been visiting Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. C. B. Farwell, of Perry Circle, Naval Academy.

Comdr. and Mrs. R. N. Ernest entertained at dinner Saturday evening in honor of Mrs. Ellsworth Curry, wife of Col. Curry, USA, of North Carolina, who is visiting Mrs. N. Cannon Mancy, of the Naval Academy. Other guests were Comdr. and Mrs. Stuart S. Purves, Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. Cannon Mancy, and Mrs. William H. McKechnie, of Philadelphia.

Mrs. Jupp, wife of Commodore Stanley Jupp, attended the reception last week in Washington given by the retiring New Zealand Minister and Mrs. Walter Nash, in honor of the Right Hon. Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand and Mrs. Fraser. Mrs. Jupp and her daughter, Marshall, are staying at Carvel Hall.

The class of 1921 of the Naval Academy had a reunion and oyster roast at the Skeet Club last Saturday evening. Many from out of town attended.

Mrs. Thompson, wife of Comdr. Wells Thompson, USN, has returned from New York and is living with her parents, Comdr. and Mrs. Louis J. Gulliver.

Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. Donald M. Clay and their young daughter, Jessie, arrived last week to spend a short time with Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. Harold M. Lindsay in their apartment at the Naval Academy.

—

NORFOLK, VA.

27 April 1944

Mrs. William E. Ellis was hostess Sunday night at a buffet supper given at her home in the Larchmont Apartments, in honor of Mrs. Laurence O. Matthews, sr., of San Antonio, Texas, and Mrs. Nancy F. Leonard of New York, who are visiting Comdr. and Mrs. Laurence O. Matthews, Jr. The other guests included Capt. and Mrs. Robert L. Swart, Comdr. and Mrs. Charles C. Howerton, Comdr. and Mrs. Laurence O. Matthews, Jr., Miss Mary Joerg, Lt. Comdr. Charles McManus, Lt. Comdr. John Lowes and Lt. Comdr. Robert Joerg.

One of the most interesting of the spring weddings will take place next Saturday evening in Christ and St. Luke's Church when Miss Shirley Barker Windholz, daughter of Mrs. Louise Henry Windholz and the late Mr. Windholz, will become the bride of Lt. Harry Innes Warren, 3rd, USNR. The wedding will be followed by a reception. Miss Windholz has been honored at a number of lovely parties this week. Miss Mary Alice Williams was hostess at a bridge luncheon on Wednesday in honor of the bride-to-be when the guests numbered 12; Mrs. James M. Jordan entertained this week at a bridesmaids' luncheon in the Princess Anne Club at Virginia Beach honoring Miss Windholz, and the much-feted prospective bride and her fiance will be guests of honor at a beautiful luncheon given on Saturday by Mrs. Leigh Richmond Powell, Jr., at her home on Rummymede Road following the rehearsal for the wedding; and preceding the rehearsal, Mrs. Charles Edwin Snyder, Jr., will be hostess at a breakfast at her home on Mowbray Arch honoring the bride and members of the wedding party and out-of-town guests.

Mr. and Mrs. John W. Field entertained Saturday night at a supper party in the Norfolk Yacht and Country Club in honor of Lt. and Mrs. Sheridan Cabell Dudley who were married recently in Richmond and are making their home at the club. Mrs. Dudley is the former Miss Cary Edna Winstead of Northumberland County. In addition to Lt. Dudley and his bride, the other guests at the supper were Comdr. and Mrs. H. A. Bamman, Lt. and Mrs. Joseph H. Baker, Jr., Mrs. S. V. Priddy of Richmond, Mrs. Cornelia McBlair Brabbling, Miss Charlotte Winstead, Lt. John Greene and John Colonna.

Mrs. Sanford Taylor was hostess Sunday afternoon at a tea given at her home on Oak Grove Road, in honor of her daughter, Miss Violet Cruiser Taylor, whose marriage to Lt. Clarkson Monk Price took place last Friday. Hours were from 4 to 6 o'clock and

the guests numbered fifty. Miss Taylor was also guest of honor on Friday evening at a miscellaneous shower given by Mrs. Marvin Johnson at her home on Mayflower Road when the guests numbered 20.

## FORT DOUGLAS, UTAH

18 April 1944

Mrs. L. B. C. Jones was hostess recently at a most enjoyable luncheon at the Alta Club, Salt Lake City. Thirty guests sat at the beautifully appointed table.

Mrs. Lewis M. Means together with her attractive daughters, Mrs. F. Waddell and Miss Becky Means, have recently arrived to be with Colonel Means.

Lt. Col. R. L. Kappa and Mrs. Kappa entertained at dinner at the Alta Club March the eleventh. The party later attended the formal dance at the Officers' Mess Fort Douglas.

There was an informal get-together at the Officers' Mess in honor of St. Patrick. The Mess has become a meeting place for the hundreds of young officers stationed in this area.

Maj. Gen. Howard K. Loughry, Chief of Finance, USA, was the guest of Col. and Mrs. E. J. O'Hara recently. General Loughry made the trip from Washington, D. C., to present the Treasury "T" Flag to the civilian workers of the Ninth Service Command in recognition of the war savings bond program. Owing to inclement weather, the ceremony was conducted at the Post Theatre, the afternoon of March the twenty-fourth. General Loughry was honor guest at a cocktail party given by Colonel and Mrs. O'Hara, Thursday, March twenty-third.

Saturday, March twenty-fifth was the evening of the monthly dinner dance at the Officers' Mess. Among the hosts for the evening were Col. and Mrs. John H. Wilson who entertained about thirty guests and Col. and Mrs. M. E. Conable who extended their hospitality to the same number of friends. Cocktails were enjoyed at their respective quarters before dinner.

Mrs. Wing, wife of Col. Charles K. Wing, was hostess at a luncheon given at her quarters Wednesday the twenty-fourth of March. Covers were laid for ten.

Lt. Gordon Jones, USMC, has been spending a short leave with his parents, Lt. Col. and Mrs. L. B. C. Jones.

Col. and Mrs. Charles K. Wing have had their son, Pfc. Charles K. Wing, with them for a few days.

Lt. Col. Henry I. Ingham has departed for a new assignment. Mrs. Ingham plans to make her home in San Leandro, Calif., for the present.

## LONG BEACH, CALIF.

21 April 1944

Vice Adm. J. W. Greenslade was in Long Beach the first of the week and dined at the Riviera Room of Villa Riviera, popular headquarters for the ranking Navy and Army contingent. His companions were Capt. James T. Alexander, USN, and Major Harry A. Mohler, USA.

Capt. and Mrs. Oliver W. Butler joined the naval colony not long ago and were honor guests of Mr. and Mrs. Philip McLaughlin at Sunday afternoon tea. Sharing in the courtesy were Lt. and Mrs. Adrian W. Davis, also naval contingent newcomers. The hosts invited 100 civilians and several service set couples to the affair.

Preceding the annual ball of Al Malakah Shrine Monday evening at the Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, Lt. Comdr. Robert Langley, USN, and Mrs. Langley opened their nearby Beverly Hills home for a cocktail party. Guests were naval officers attached to the Navy Hospital in Long Beach and their ladies. These included Capt. J. N. C. Gordon and Mrs. Sonia Atkins, Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. Maynard Wood, Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. H. D. Newton, and Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. W. A. Hall.

Empire Room of the Hilton Hotel was the scene of an evening reception honoring Capt. Marshall T. Hunt, son of Lt. Col. and Mrs. Herbert T. Hunt, with 200 ranking Army officers, their wives, Navy officers and others attending. Capt. Hunt was home for a few days from Camp Shelby, Miss.

Mrs. Jess R. Sherrod, wife of Maj. Sherrod, USAAC, is the house guest a few weeks of her parents, Mr. and Mrs. James Rhoten, and her small son, Stephen, is with her. Maj. Sherrod is director of flying at Minter Field near Bakersfield.

Navy Doctors' Wives Club had as special guests at a luncheon in Brittany Kitchen Mmes. Charles F. LeComte, Edward F. Kline, William M. Stilliphant, Henry Carlisle Knight and Marion Wade, whose husbands have been prisoners since the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Mrs. F. H. Haigler is president of the club.

## The Searchlight

(Navy — Address: The Searchlight, U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md.)

NEW names added to the wanted list have again lengthened the list, and we are waiting for information. Please forward all addresses direct to Searchlight at above address.

Carter, Mrs. William J., wife, R. Adm.; Abbott, Mrs. Wallace E., wife, Lt. USNR; Baker, Mrs. John L., wife, Lt. C., USNR; Battle, Mrs. Charlton E., wife, Capt.; Bingham, Mrs. James T., wife, Lt. Comdr.; Boal, Mrs. John E., wife, Lt.; Brown, Mrs. William D., wife, Comdr.; Browning, Mrs. C. L., wife, Lt. C.; Bunker, Mrs. F. H., wife, Comdr.; Clarkdon, Mrs. Wm. P., wife, Comdr.; USNR; Colt, Mrs. Stockton B., wife, Lt. C., USNR; Cook, Mrs. R. M., wife, Lt. USMC; Dautzier, Mrs. Tilman, wife, Comdr.; Doyle, Mrs. Thomas, wife, Capt.; Eldridge, Mrs. E. P., wife, Capt.; Fagan, Mrs. R., wife, Major, USMC-Ret.; Ford, Mrs. Francis D. A., wife, Lt. C.; Goebel, Mrs. Charles A., wife, Comdr.; Gold, Mrs. Charles, wife, Comdr.; Good, Mrs. George D., wife, Lt. C.; Gray, Mrs. John, wife, Chaplain; Harenburger, Mrs.

C. H., wife, Lt.; Holman, Mrs. Charles J., wife, Capt.; Holland, Mrs. Charles G., wife, Lt. C. (SC); Jackson, Mrs. C. B. Jr., wife, Comdr.; Johnson, Mrs. William D., wife, Capt.; Kait, Mrs. Hart, wife, Lt. C.; Knight, Mrs. Page, wife, Lt.; Lee, Mrs. Charles L., wife, Lt. C.; Lewis, Mrs. Thomas, wife, Capt.; Long, Mrs. John, wife, Lt. C.; Lucas, Mrs. F. C., wife, Comdr.; Maher, Mrs. Paul, wife, Comdr.; Marshall, Mrs. Preston, wife, Capt.; Mayo, Mrs. Claude, wife, Capt.; McLeary, Mrs. Howard, wife, Capt.; Melhorn, Mrs. Kent C., wife, R. Adm.; Moore, Mrs. French, wife, Comdr.; Mitchell, Mrs. Gelbert H., wife, Comdr.; McCann, Mrs. W. J., wife, Lt. USMC; McCroskey, Mrs. Clyde, Jr., wife, Lt. C.; Nichols, Mrs. Newton L., wife, Capt.; Payne, Mrs. Samuel S., wife, Capt.; Pearce, Mrs. J. B. Jr., wife, Capt.; USMC; Perry, Mrs. Wadell H., wife, Capt.; Phillips, Mrs. John L., wife, Lt. C.; Porter, Mrs. Carl W., wife, Comdr.; (CEC); Pratt, Mrs. S. H., wife, Capt.; USMC; Renn, Mrs. Joseph B., wife, Capt.; Roberts, Mrs. Frank, wife, Capt.; Rodriguez, Mrs. G. L., wife, Comdr.; Sanders, Mrs. Carl H., wife, Capt.; Smart, Mrs. P. A., wife, Chaplain; Smith, Mrs. Oscar, wife, Commodore; Snowden, Mrs. Ernest M., wife, Comdr.; Smith, Mrs. Robert Hall, wife, Comdr.; Sperry, Mrs. E. R., wife, Comdr.; Stone, Mrs. Ellis S., wife, Capt.; Thomas, Mrs. Wm. E., wife, Major, USMC; Thompson, Mrs. Robert R., wife, Capt.; Tyler, Mrs. Carroll, wife, Capt.; Washburn, Mrs. Edward D., wife, Capt.; Wattles, Mrs. Thomas, wife, Capt.; Welch, Mrs. Leo, wife, Capt.; Westholm, Mrs. Rollin E., wife, Lt. C.; Williamson, Mrs. Thomas B., wife, Comdr.; "23.

## Army and Navy Journal

April 29, 1944

1043

Mrs. Stuart Crawford (Lahoma) (Col., FA); Mrs. Carl J. Codler (Mildred) (Col., Cav.); Mrs. Charles Finley (Helen) (Col., CAC); Mrs. Jack B. Gillespie (Annie Lee) (Lt. Col., AC); Mrs. Howard A. Hale (Gladys) (Lt. Col., DC); Mrs. Edward Harke (Clare) (1st, Inf.); Mrs. Benjamin T. Harris (Ruth) (Lt. Col., Inf.); Mrs. Harry H. Hammond (Babs) (Lt. Col., AC); Mrs. L. H. Hewitt (Birdie) (Col. or Brig. Gen., CE); Mrs. Wm. Kraus (Heavy) (Col., MC); Mrs. James Earl Luckey (Lt. Col., AC); Mrs. Vincent Meyer (Agnes) (Brig. Gen.); Mrs. John Mitchell (Margaret) (Lt. (?) ); Mrs. A. P. O'Meara (Ellen) (Col., FA); Mrs. Norman Petrocine (Cora) (Lt. Col., AC); Mrs. Kurt Sprengling (Lt. or Capt., Ord.); Mrs. Patrick Shea (Florence) (Col. or Gen., FA); Mrs. C. S. Svare (Cars) (Maj., MC); Mrs. Robert Warren Southerland (Helen) (Lt. Col., AC); Mrs. Harry F. Van Leuven (Betty Dean) (Lt. Col., AC); Mrs. William Withers (Bunkie) (Col., Armored Force or GSC).

## Celebrate Octane Week

Under Secretary of War Patterson will be the guest of honor and principal speaker on Sunday, 30 April, at the ceremonies being held at the Wood River, Ill., refinery of the Shell Oil Company, commemorating the first shipment to the U. S. Army, Wright Field, of 100-octane gasoline ten years ago, and the dedication of the twin units of Shell's new Catalytic Cracking Plant at Wood River. The event will also inaugurate "100-Octane Week" being celebrated by the Army, Navy and the Petroleum Administration for War.

At the Wood River Ceremony, Judge Patterson will bury a time capsule containing a gallon of the original 100-octane fuel made ten years ago by Shell, the first formula for its manufacture, a copy of the contract between Shell and the Army, and a scroll citing its history. Fifteen minutes of the celebration will be carried over the nation-wide hook-up of the Army Hour over the N.B.C. with Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle addressing the nation and the gathering at Wood River from overseas.

Remember, if you don't care how you take care of your equipment, someone is sure to find out about it—maybe the "Old Man"—or maybe a Nazi or a Jap. Heaven help you in either case!

## The Locators

(Army — Address: The Locators, P. O. Box 537, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.)

PLEASE note—if you write us for an address, and are a wife, sister or mother of an army officer, or are otherwise connected with army personnel, don't forget to make it clear. That will save us the time and trouble of identifying you, and will assure you a speedier reply to your request. The identification is necessary to avoid sending information to those interested for commercial reasons.

The Locators will appreciate any help that you can give in locating the following:

Mrs. Harold Base (Maj.); Mrs. Rosco Bates (Maj.); Mrs. Waldo Broberg (Marjorie) (Col., Ord.); Mrs. Charles Branham (Camilie) (Brig. Gen.); Mrs. Sam Connell (Judy) (Brig. Gen.); Mrs. E. B. Crabb (Teresa) (Col., Inf.);

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**Text of Admiral King's Report**  
(Continued from Page 1041)

to the destroyer Smith setting her on fire forward and exploding the plane's torpedo. By energetic measures, however, the Smith brought the flames under control and was able to make port. During this action dive bombers scored a hit on the South Dakota, wounding her commanding officer Captain (now Rear Admiral) T. L. Gatch, and inflicted considerable damage on the light cruiser San Juan.

There were no further attacks and the two task forces were ordered to retire independently. During the night they were pursued by Japanese surface units, which turned back when it became clear that the enemy attacks were not succeeding.

Enemy planes estimated to have taken part in the attacks on the Hornet and Enterprise numbered between 170 and 180. Of that number 56 were shot down by anti-aircraft fire and about the same number by our own planes. Our own losses were the Hornet, the destroyer Porter, which was torpedoed while rescuing personnel of one of our planes, and 74 aircraft. We sank no enemy vessels in the engagement, and our carrier strength in the Pacific was now dangerously low, but there were partial compensations. Two enemy carriers had been put out of action and four Japanese air groups had been cut to pieces.

**Battle of Guadalcanal**

For a brief period on 28 October, following the all-out enemy attack, the question of whether or not we could retain Henderson Field hung in the balance. A counterattack by Marines and Army troops, however, restored our lines—the enemy lost 2,200 men killed in that attack—and General Vandegrift took the offensive on both flanks. Except for a minor setback the following day, this constituted the last serious threat by enemy land forces on Guadalcanal.

The enemy still exercised control over the waters adjacent to Guadalcanal, and for the next two weeks our forces were engaged in scattered actions calculated to interfere with that control. Our submarine attacked Japanese supply lines, inflicting considerable damage, and on the morning of 28 October, our light cruiser Atlanta and four destroyers bombarded enemy positions near Point Cruz. On the next day the Marines, supported by naval gunfire, crossed the Matanikau River and by November 3, had advanced beyond Point Cruz. On the evening of 2 November, the Japanese had landed about 1,500 men and some artillery east of Rull Point but were unable to support that unit, and after our naval forces bombarded the beach heads, destroying stores and ammunition, the force was driven into the jungle and eventually exterminated. On 7 November, our aircraft from Henderson Field inflicted heavy damage on an enemy light cruiser and two destroyers and shot down a number of enemy planes.

By this time it must have been apparent to the Japanese that their position was not being sufficiently improved by their continued night landings from surface craft dispatched from neighboring islands (one PT boat based at Tulagi attacked them repeatedly, sinking a destroyer and many landing craft). As evidence of that realization they again began to concentrate surface forces in the Rabaul-Buin area and by 12 November, were estimated to be ready with two carriers, four battleships, five heavy cruisers, about 30 destroyers, and enough transports for a decisive invasion attempt. To oppose this force we had two new battleships, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, three anti-aircraft light cruisers, and 22 destroyers. The damaged Enterprise was not ready for action and we were outnumbered in land-based aircraft.

Our troops on Guadalcanal had been reinforced on 6 November, but more supplies and reinforcements were vitally needed. Under these circumstances, Vice Admiral (now Admiral) William F. Halsey, Jr., who on 18 October, had replaced Vice Admiral Ghormley as Commander, South Pacific Force, realized that we would have to cover our supply lines and at the same time counter the expected enemy offensive, otherwise our position in the South Pacific would be seriously jeopardized. Following this general plan, Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) R. K. Turner was placed in charge of the supply operation and Rear Admirals D. J. Callaghan and Norman Scott assigned to command the covering forces. In addition, Rear Admiral Turner was to be supported by a task force commanded by Rear Admiral Kinkaid, built around the damaged Enterprise and the battleship Washington and South Dakota.

On the morning of 11 November, three of our cargo vessels escorted by Rear Admiral Scott's task force reached Guadalcanal and began unloading off Lunga Point. Loading operations were interrupted by an air attack about four hours later which damaged the transport Zeilin and by a second air attack two hours after that. Our protecting aircraft and anti-aircraft batteries took a heavy toll of both attacking air groups. We lost a total of seven planes. Our escorts, under Rear Admiral Scott, retired to Indispensable Strait for the night.

On the morning of the 12th, the second contingent of ships with supplies and reinforcements, under Rear Admirals Turner and Callaghan, arrived and joined forces with Rear Admiral Scott. Unloading was immediately begun. As on the previous day, the enemy delivered an air attack in the afternoon but so effective was our air opposition that only one of about 25 bombers and torpedo planes escaped. One damaged enemy plane, however, dived onto the San Francisco, starting a number of minor fires.

Meanwhile, our scouts had located strong enemy forces bearing down on Guadalcanal

from the northwest, disposed in three groups. To meet that force Rear Admiral Turner assigned two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, two anti-aircraft light cruisers and eight destroyers to Rear Admiral Callaghan and withdrew with the transports and cargo vessels, escorted by three destroyers. The plan was for Rear Admiral Callaghan to fight a delaying action, so that the battleship-carrier force under Rear Admiral Kinkaid would have time to intercept the Japanese landing forces believed to be en route.

After Rear Admiral Callaghan's force had escorted the transport group clear of the area, it reentered the sound shortly after midnight through Lengo Channel for the purpose of searching the vicinity of Savo Island. Near Lunga Point three groups of enemy ships were picked up to the northwestward and shortly afterward a fourth group to the northward. Our own force was a single column, with four destroyers in the van, five cruisers in the center, and four destroyers in the rear. In that situation—which was by no means as clear then as it is now, it being a very dark night with no moon—accurate identification of enemy ships was almost impossible, and in the darkness the forces nearly collided with each other before a gun was fired.

The action began when the Japanese illuminated our ships with searchlights and both sides opened fire at close range. Immediate results of the exchanges of gunfire were favorable to us. An enemy ship in the right hand group blew up within a minute under the fire from the San Francisco and other ships, and on the other side, two enemy cruisers burst into flames. Other vessels were set on fire, and the Atlanta believed she sank one of a division of Japanese destroyers crossing ahead of her. Simultaneously, the Atlanta, after suffering some hits herself, took a light cruiser under fire. At this point the Atlanta was struck by a torpedo and with all power lost, her rudder jammed. While she was circling, an enemy heavy cruiser battered her heavily, starting intense fires and killing Rear Admiral Scott and many other personnel on board.

A few minutes later the San Francisco found herself engaged with an enemy battleship in the enemy center group. In addition to the fire of the San Francisco, the battleship was attacked by the Laffey, and the Cushing, although badly damaged, scored torpedo hits on her. The Laffey, during this part of the action, was hit by a torpedo and later blew up. The Cushing was put out of action by gunfire.

The Barton was also torpedoed and sank almost immediately, but the O'Bannon closed with the battleship and made more torpedo hits. By this time, the Portland had wrecked a destroyer, but had been torpedoed herself, and the Juneau, having lost all fire control, retired from the action.

The San Francisco, assisted by the Portland (which responded to Rear Admiral Callaghan's radio, "We want the big ones"), concentrated fire on the battleship, the Helena, meanwhile, engaging an enemy cruiser firing at the San Francisco. At this point, a salvo from the enemy battleship smashed the San Francisco's bridge, killing Rear Admiral Callaghan, Captain Cassin Young, commanding officer of the San Francisco, and many other officers and men; but the San Francisco continued to fire, and before she was put out of action she had also accounted for a destroyer.

To recapitulate the damages sustained in the first 15 minutes of the action:

The Cushing had been put out of action by gunfire and was dead in the water; the Laffey had sunk, the Sterrett and O'Bannon had been damaged; the Atlanta was burning, and the San Francisco and Portland were badly holed. The Juneau had been forced to leave the action, and the Barton had blown up. The Helena had suffered minor damage. Only the Aaron Ward, Monsen and Fletcher remained undamaged.

The three undamaged destroyers continued the attack with gunfire and torpedoes, each scoring hits on cruisers and destroyers, the Monsen in addition having scored torpedo hits on the damaged enemy battleship. In delivering those attacks, however, the Monsen suffered damage which forced her to be abandoned, and the Sterrett, also damaged by gunfire, had to retire. The action, which lasted 24 minutes, and which was one of the most furious sea battles ever fought, was terminated when the Fletcher torpedoed an enemy heavy cruiser. During the last few minutes of the action the scattered Japanese forces had been firing at each other.

After the firing ceased, the Helena, San Francisco, and Fletcher joined up, proceeded out the bay, and later fell in with the Juneau, O'Bannon, and Sterrett. At daylight the next morning the Portland observed a Japanese battleship circling slowly northwest of Savo Island, with a cruiser standing by. The Atlanta was near the beach, but her fires had been extinguished. The Cushing and Monsen were on fire, and the Aaron Ward was dead in the water. Observing an enemy destroyer south of Savo Island, the Portland, still turning in circles, sank it. Our planes interrupted the Japanese battleship firing at the Aaron Ward.

The Cushing and Monsen finally went down, and as the conditions on board the Atlanta were impossible to control she had to be sunk on the afternoon of the 13th.

Just before noon on the 13th, the damaged Juneau was attacked by an enemy submarine and sank almost immediately with heavy personnel losses.

On the morning of 13 November, the Enterprise launched a flight of torpedo planes which found the Japanese battleship and fired three torpedoes into it. Other attacks on the battleship were made by Army planes and other land-based aircraft from Guadalcanal and Espiritu Santo, and sometimes during the evening the battleship sank.

On the morning of the 14th, a strong enemy force of cruisers and destroyers shelled Henderson Field. A few planes were destroyed, but the field was not damaged, and the bombardment was broken off when the force was attacked by our PT boats. Subsequently,

planes from Henderson Field (including Enterprise planes there) attacked and hit two heavy cruisers, one of which was later subjected to a second attack by Enterprise planes. Other planes hit a light cruiser, and still another attack group from the Enterprise scored hits on a second light cruiser.

As anticipated, an enemy transport force, preceded by a heavy advance guard of battleships, cruisers and destroyers, was discovered north of Guadalcanal. This obviously was the main invasion force, and was escorted by fighter planes. Throughout the 14th, this transport group was subjected to heavy air attack by our forces, which resulted in the destruction of six transports, the probable destruction of two more, and the damaging of four. The four damaged vessels continued to Guadalcanal and beached themselves on Cape Esperance that evening. Our losses in these attacks were slight.

Rear Admiral W. A. Lee, Jr., with the Washington, South Dakota, and Enterprise had been unable to reach the scene of the action before early evening on the 14th. Upon arrival he was ordered to conduct a search, his objective being to intercept and destroy enemy bombardment forces and the transport force itself.

Shortly after midnight a Japanese force was reported north of Savo Island, headed west. Contact was made by the Washington which immediately opened fire on the leading target. The South Dakota also opened fire, selecting the third ship as her target. Both targets disappeared and were presumed sunk. Simultaneously, four of our destroyers, which were leading the battleships, attacked an enemy group of six to ten ships, which also were taken under fire by the secondary batteries of our battleships. During this part of the action, the Preston was sunk by gunfire, the Benham was damaged by a torpedo, and the Walke was hit by both torpedoes and gunfire. The Walke was abandoned and sank in a few minutes. The remaining destroyer, the Gwin, was damaged and forced to retire.

At this stage of the action all of our destroyers had been eliminated but neither the Washington nor the South Dakota had been hit. The Washington soon located new targets, one of which was a battleship, and immediately opened fire. The South Dakota fired on an enemy ship which had turned on her searchlights. The enemy in returning the fire concentrated on the South Dakota. The result of this exchange was that the South Dakota shot out all lights, and apparently sank one of the illuminating vessels, but was herself hit, suffering considerable damage to her upper works. The Washington continued to fire at the battleship, and after setting her on fire and after inflicting damage on other ships, forced the enemy to retire. The enemy battleship is believed to have been sunk in this action.

The action having been broken off, and the South Dakota and Washington having become separated, both ships retired, and joined up the next morning. At daylight on November 15, the four Japanese vessels which had beached themselves on Guadalcanal were bombed by aircraft from Henderson Field, and shelled Marine artillery. The destroyer Meade, which now exercised complete control in the area, all by herself, then completed the destruction of the beached ships by leisurely bombardment. The three day fight ended with an air engagement between Enterprise fighters from Henderson Field and a flight of about 12 Zeros.

The Battle of Guadalcanal, in spite of heavy losses we sustained, was a decisive victory for us, and our position in the Southern Solomons was not threatened again seriously by the Japanese. Except for the Tokio express which from time to time succeeded in landing small quantities of supplies and reinforcements, control of the sea and air in the southern Solomons passed to the United States.

\* \* \* \* \*

After the Battle of Guadalcanal, our forces on the island retained the offensive, hunting down the Japanese in the jungles and gradually driving them westward. The First Marine Division was gradually withdrawn and replaced by army troops, and in December General Vandegrift turned over command to Major General A. M. Patch, U. S. Army.

At the end of November, however, another powerful Japanese attempt to relieve Guadalcanal was suspected, and in order to counter such a move, Admiral Halsey placed a force consisting of the heavy cruisers Minneapolis, New Orleans, Northampton and Pensacola, the light cruiser Honolulu, and four destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral C. H. Wright.

**The Battle of Tassafaronga (Lunga Point).**

On November 30, Rear Admiral Wright reached the entrance to Savo Sound, where he was joined by two more destroyers. Late that night, while crossing the sound, his force made contact with seven enemy ships, and as the range closed, the destroyers in the van opened fire with torpedoes. Shortly afterward all ships were directed to open fire.

Immediate results of the fire appeared decidedly favorable but because of the visibility we were unable to get a clear picture of the enemy formation and there was a temporary lull in the action.

The Minneapolis and New Orleans soon engaged new targets, one of which blew up. At this time, however, both the Minneapolis and New Orleans were struck by torpedoes and a few minutes later the Pensacola and Northampton were also torpedoed, the latter being so badly damaged that she had to be abandoned. Undamaged ships undertook to close with the enemy but were unable to regain contact.

The effect of this engagement was to break up a Japanese reinforcing attempt, but only at severe cost. Our three damaged cruisers, however, reached port safely and were repaired and refitted.

**The Evacuation of Guadalcanal**

With the exception of encounters with the "Tokio express," surface naval action in the Guadalcanal area ended with the Battle of

**Tassafaronga (Lunga Point).**

On land, our forces gradually compressed and weakened the enemy, and by January the Japanese ground forces on the island, which had not been adequately supported, occupied a most favorable position. Under these circumstances, and bearing in mind the events of the past few weeks, it was reasonable to expect another effort on the part of the enemy to retake Guadalcanal. The Japanese had had time to repair and reorganize their surface forces and to replace their carrier air groups, and therefore when there were heavy increases in shipping at Buin and Rabaul late in January, and a stepping up of air activity, it appeared that they were ready to move. Ships available to Admiral Halsey to prevent such a move now consisted of three new battleships, four old battleships, two carriers, three auxiliary carriers, three heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, two anti-aircraft light cruisers and numerous destroyers—a force considerably stronger than any we had had in the area up to that time.

On January 27, a convoy left New Caledonia for Guadalcanal. On January 29, the heavy cruiser Chicago (a unit of the covering force for the convoy) was torpedoed and badly damaged by enemy planes in a night attack, and the next afternoon she was again attacked by planes, the damage inflicted being so severe that she sank immediately after being abandoned. In an effort to cover the Chicago, the destroyer Lavallote was also torpedoed.

The convoy reached Guadalcanal without damage, unloaded, and departed on the 31st. On the following day Army troops were landed behind enemy ground forces at Varsue. While engaged in covering the landing craft used in this operation two destroyers, the Nicholas and the DeHaven were attacked by enemy dive bombers, and the DeHaven was sunk.

In anticipation of another attack on the island, our forces were disposed south of Guadalcanal, and aircraft dispatched by Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur carried out daily attacks on enemy air fields in the Bismarck and Northern Solomons. The first week in February the "Tokio express" were increased in size, and it soon became apparent that the enemy was evacuating what little strength he had left on the island. On the night of February 7-8, 1943, exactly six months after our landing in the Solomons, the enemy completed his withdrawal. On February 8, our troops on Guadalcanal, which had been closing in on the enemy from both sides, joined forces, and the first Solomons campaign, except for incidental mopping up, ended.

**New Georgia and Bougainville Campaigns**

(Includes New Guinea Operations)

The evacuation of Guadalcanal on February 8, 1943, was by no means an indication that the Japanese were retiring from the Solomons Islands. On the contrary, there was ample evidence that they would make every effort to retain their positions in the Solomons and in New Guinea. Conversely, having pushed them out of the Southern Solomons area our next undertaking was to push them out of the Northern Solomons.

The most important enemy position in the Northern Solomons was an airfield they had constructed on Munda Point on the southwest coast of New Georgia Island, but construction of a secondary base near the mouth of the Villa River on the southern tip of Kolombangara Island had begun in the latter part of December. These two airfields constituted a threat to our position on Guadalcanal, about 200 miles away, and were therefore repeatedly attacked by aircraft from Guadalcanal during January, February, and March. In addition, our surface forces conducted a series of bombardments of those positions. Munda was bombarded on the night of January 4, by a task group of cruisers and destroyers. The Villa-Stenmore District of Kolombangara Island was shelled on the night of January 23-24. On the nights of March 5-6, and May 12-13, both airfields were bombarded simultaneously. Neither the air attacks nor the bombardments were successful in putting the airfields out of commission for more than a day or two at a time.

On February 21, our forces made landings on the Russell Islands, 60 miles northwest of Guadalcanal, and immediately began the construction of strong defenses.

On March 1, in an attempt to reinforce New Guinea, the Japanese sent two convoys totaling 21 vessels through the Bismarck Sea. Both convoys were discovered and were almost completely destroyed by U. S. Army and Allied aircraft in a three day running attack.

Extensive preparations were now being made for the invasion of New Georgia, and although there were no noteworthy naval engagements for some time, serial operations were intensified throughout the South Pacific area. Japanese raids were frequent and heavy even though carried out at severe cost to the enemy. During this period of stepped up air operations, our advance base in the Russell Islands was in constant use by our planes.

On June 18, one of the most furious air battles of the Pacific war was fought over Guadalcanal. A force of enemy aircraft estimated at 60 bombers and 60 fighters was met by slightly more than 100 U. S. fighters manned by army, marine corps, and navy pilots. As a result of this encounter 107 enemy planes were shot down at a cost of six United States fighters lost, one landing ship (tank) and one cargo vessel damaged.

On the night of June 20, as a preliminary to the invasion of New Georgia, a task group of cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral A. S. Merrill bombarded Villa-Stenmore and the Buin-Shorland area near the southeast end of Bougainville Island. After the operation was underway, both Munda and Villa airfields were repeatedly bombed.

On June 30, surprise landings were virtually unopposed in the Woodlark and Tro-  
[REDACTED]

(Please turn to Page 1046)

## Born

**ACKERMAN** — Born at Baptist Hospital, New Orleans, La., 10 April 1944, to Col. and Mrs. Stephen W. Ackerman, USA, a son, Scott Fulton Ackerman, grandson of Brig. Gen. and Mrs. W. S. Fulton, Ft. Benning, Ga.

**AUSTIN** — Born at the Flower and Fifth Avenue Hospital, New York City, 17 April 1944, to Lt. (jg) and Mrs. John Page Austin, USNR, a daughter, Judith Page, Lieutenant Austin is serving overseas.

**BETZEL** — Born in Georgetown Hospital, Washington, D. C., 24 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. Albert F. Betzel, USN, a son, Bruce. Mrs. Betzel is the former Peggy Lavender.

**BISSELL** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 22 April 1944, to Capt. and Mrs. Howard Bissell, ASF, a daughter.

**BREWER** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 21 April 1944, to Maj. and Mrs. John E. Brewer, CE, a daughter.

**BUBERT** — Born at Maryland General Hospital, Baltimore, Md., 11 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. Charles K. Bubert, a daughter, Susan Parker. Lieutenant Bubert is in England.

**COFFELT** — Born in Water Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 22 April 1944, to M. Sgt. and Mrs. Paul S. Coffelt, AAF, a daughter.

**DAVIS** — Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 20 April 1944, to Capt. and Mrs. Kenneth Davis, SC, a son.

**DEAN** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 18 April 1944, to Capt. and Mrs. Jordan A. Dean, Ord., a son.

**FOX** — Born at the Swedish Hospital, Seattle, Wash., 20 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. Littleton Fox, USNR, a daughter, Phyllis Brand.

**GRANT** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 20 April 1944, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Herbert E. Grant, SC, a daughter.

**GREEN** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 20 April 1944, to 2d Lt. and Mrs. Samuel Green, FA, a son.

**GUNN** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 18 April 1944, to Capt. and Mrs. Jan V. Gunn, CE, a son.

**HOLT** — Born at the Family Hospital, Naval Air Station, San Diego, Calif., 11 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. Frank Harrison Holt, a daughter, Leslie Templeton Holt.

**JACKSON** — Born at St. Mary's Hospital, Madison, Wisc., 14 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. Robert L. Jackson, Inf., a son, Jack Jay. Lieutenant Jackson, the son of Lt. Col. and Mrs. Leo M. Jackson, is on duty with the 13th Armored Division.

**JONES** — Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 12 April 1944, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. Clyde L. Jones, USA, a daughter, Lydia Neal, granddaughter of the late Col. and Mrs. William G. McKay, USA.

**LE BLANC** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 23 April 1944, to Maj. and Mrs. Francis J. LeBlanc, ASF, a son.

**MORGAN** — Born at Sloane Hospital, New York, N. Y., 18 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. J. William Morgan, USNR, their second son, Richard Wm. Morgan.

**MOULDER** — Born at Stanford Lane Hospital, San Francisco, Calif., 16 April 1944, to T. Sgt. and Mrs. Bernard E. Moulder, a daughter, Linda Suzanne.

**NEWMAN** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 20 April 1944, to Maj. and Mrs. Hartley S. Newman, AUS, a daughter.

**PARKER** — Born in Newport Hospital, Newport, R. I., 10 April 1944, to Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. Henry Seabury Parker, Jr., USN, a son, Henry Seabury Parker, 3d.

**PELTON** — Born at Overlook Hospital, Summit, N. J., 22 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. Thurlow H. Pelton, (MC), USNR, a daughter, Deborah Noble Pelton.

**POMEROY** — Born at Columbia Women's Hospital, Washington, D. C., 20 April 1944, to Lt. (jg) and Mrs. Lawrence A. Pomeroy, Jr., USNR, a daughter, Louise Aldrich.

**BILEY** — Born at Moore County Hospital, Pinehurst, N. C., 23 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. James Wilson Riley, Jr., a son, James Wilson Riley, Third, grandson of Col. and Mrs. James Wilson Riley of Belle Haven, Greenwich, Conn., and of Mrs. Russell Adams Clapp, Jr., of "Lazy Acres," Fairfield, Conn., and nephew of Lt. Col. Joseph C. Anderson, GSC, USA, and of Lt. Comdr. Van Ostrand Perkins, USN. Lieutenant Riley is on duty at Ft. Bragg, N. C., with the Field Artillery, and he and Mrs. Riley are living at Southern Pines.

**ROCKEY** — Born in Elmira, N. Y., 21 April 1944, to Capt. and Mrs. Edward Huntley Rockey, DC, USA, a son, Robert Schmidt Rockey.

**ROSEN** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 18 April 1944, to Maj. and Mrs. Leo Rosen, SC, a son.

**SCHELLING** — Born at the Naval Hospital, Key West, Fla., 13 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. Robert Ayres Schelling, USN, a daughter, Patricia Anne, granddaughter of Capt. and Mrs. John M. Schelling, Orange, Tex., and of Capt. and Mrs. Murray L. Royar, (SC), USN, South Arlington, Va.

**SCHERBERGER** — Born at Duke University Hospital, Durham, N. C., 13 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. Richard J. Scherberger, a daughter, Joyce Dee.

**SCHERR** — Born at Norfolk General Hospital, Norfolk, Va., 19 April 1944, to Lt. and Mrs. Harry Scherr, Jr., USNR, a son, Harry Scherr, 3d.

**SEITZ** — Born at Hunter Field Base Hospital, Savannah, Ga., 26 March 1944, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. George H. Seitz, Jr., CAC, a daughter, Katherine Mary.

## Births • Marriages • Deaths

(No charge for service announcements. Please notify promptly.)

**SIMMONS** — Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 19 April 1944, to 2d Lt. and Mrs. John F. Simmons, AAF, a daughter.

**SIRKEN** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 24 April 1944, to Maj. and Mrs. Joseph G. Sirken, MC, a daughter.

**SLAN** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 23 April 1944, to T. Sgt. and Mrs. Harry J. Van Liew, OCS, a son.

**VARDEN** — Born in Highland Park Hospital, Highland Park, Ill., 20 April 1944, to Capt. and Mrs. Harry James Varden, QMC, a daughter, Mary Victoria, weight ten pounds.

**WALKER** — Born in St. Vincent's Hospital, New York City, 22 April 1944, to Lt. (jg) and Mrs. Thomas J. Walker, USNR, a daughter, granddaughter of the Postmaster General and Mrs. Frank C. Walker.

**WILLINGHAM** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 21 April 1944, to T. Sgt. and Mrs. Stanley Yucikas, AAF, a son.

**YUCIKAS** — Born in Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 21 April 1944, to T. Sgt. and Mrs. Stanley Yucikas, AAF, a son.

### Married

**ABBINK-BRITTAIN** — Married in Alexandria, Va., 17 April 1944, Miss Barbara Ruth Brittaine, daughter of Maj. and Mrs. John B. Brittaine, USA, to Lt. John Basil Abbink, AUS.

**APPLE-GLENN** — Married in the U. S. Naval Academy Chapel, Annapolis, Md., 19 April 1944, Miss Patricia Anne Glenn to Ens. Robert E. Apple, USN.

**ARNOLD-MEYER** — Married in St. Joseph's Episcopal Church, Queens Village, Long Island, N. Y., 20 April 1944, Miss Hazel F. Meyer to T. Sgt. Albert E. Arnold, Jr., AUS.

**ARONSON-LEXANDER** — Married in New York City, 23 April 1944, Miss Muriel Ann Alexander to Capt. Harold James Aronson, AUS, stationed at Yale University.

**BELL-TAYLOR** — Married in the chapel at Camp Chaffee, Ark., 8 April 1944, Miss Wilma Elizabeth Taylor to Lt. Robert Gurley Bell, USA.

**BRICKLEY-HICKOX** — Married in New York City, 22 April 1944, Miss Lydia Hickox to Lt. Richard L. Brickley, AUS.

**CAPPELLI-YEOMANS** — Married in the Marble Collegiate Church, New York, 21 April 1944, Miss Maxine Yeomans to Lt. (jg) Raymond J. Capelli, USNR.

**COLEMAN-RIDICK** — Married in All Souls Episcopal Church, Miami Beach, Fla., 15 April 1944, Miss Mary Jane Ridick to Ens. Nathaniel Ragsdale Coleman, USNR.

**CROSS-PHILLIPS** — Married in Church of Good Shepherd, Meadowbrook, Va., 10 April 1944, Miss Eleanor Royce Phillips to Lt. Charles Branson Cross, Jr., USNR.

**DAVIDSON-WINDER** — Married in Mathews, Va., 16 April 1944, Miss Eloise Byrd Winder to 1st Lt. Charles Albert Davidson, USA.

**NIXON-ANNER** — Married in St. Boniface Church, Sea Cliff, Long Island, N. Y., 22 April 1944, Miss Virginia M. Anner to Lt. Arthur V. Nixon, Jr., MC, USA.

**OBENSHAIN-WILLIAMS** — Married in Riverside Church, New York, N. Y., 22 April 1944, Miss Barbara Jeanne Williams to Lt. (jg) Wiley Shackford Obenshain, Jr., USNR.

**OWINGS-RUSSELL** — Married in the chapel of St. Joseph of Arimathea of the Episcopal Cathedral of SS Peter and Paul, Washington, D. C., 22 April 1944, Lt. (jg) Margaret Elizabeth Russell, USNR, to Lt. (jg) Harry Evan Owings, Jr., (ChC), USNR.

**PETERSON-MILLER** — Married in Columbus, Ohio, 13 April 1944, Miss Marilyn Miller to Lt. Earle Carpenter Peterson, Jr., USNR, son of Comdr. and Mrs. Peterson, USN.

**PISANI-MELLIGOTT** — Married in Our Lady Chapel of St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York City, 22 April 1944, Miss Angela Marie McElligott to Capt. Anthony Joseph Pisani, MC, AUS.

**PRICE-TAYLOR** — Married in the Church of the Ascension, Norfolk, Va., 21 April 1944, Miss Violet Cruiser Taylor to Lt. Clarkson Monk Price, AAF.

**REED-GOLD** — Married in the First United Presbyterian Church, Jersey City, N. J., 22 April 1944, Miss Rachel Bell Gold, daughter of Chaplain and Mrs. William H. Rafferty, to Lt. E. William Ellis, Jr., AAF.

**EMERSON-DAVIS** — Married in the First Presbyterian Church, Hollywood, Fla., 11 April 1944, Ens. Harriet Elizabeth Davis, USNR, to Lt. (jg) Frederick Alvin Emerson, USNR, and the late Mrs. Reed, USA.

**SALVER-NORTHRUP** — Married in All Saints Episcopal Church, Washington, D. C., 26 April 1944, Miss Lois DeWolf Northrop to Lt. Lloyd Phlin Salver, AAF.

**SAMSON-WILLETT** — Married in the Treasure Island Chapel, San Francisco, Calif., 15 April 1944, Miss Edith Gardner Willert, daughter of Comdr. and Mrs. Merrill William Willert, USN, to Lt. (jg) Hugh Samson, USNR.

**SAWYER-VAN ALSTYNE** — Married in King's Chapel, Boston, Mass., 19 April 1944, Miss Edythe Alexandra Van Alstyne to Lt. Paul E. Sawyer, USA.

**SAYER-SELLARS** — Married in Andover, Mass., 25 April 1944, Ens. Barbara F. Sellars, USNR, to Lt. (jg) Baldwin Sawyer, (DC), USNR.

**SHIPP-TURNER** — Married in the Selden Chapel of Christ and St. Luke's Church, Norfolk, Va., 22 April 1944, Miss Sallie Fenner Turner to Lt. John Bonney Shipp, Jr., AAF.

**GILSTRAP-NELSON** — Married in St. Matthews Lutheran Church, Washington, D. C., 15 April 1944, Y2c Mabel Jean Nelson, USNR, to Lt. Jack Thomas Gilstrap, AUS.

**SMITH-LESHER** — Married in Albion, N. M., 8 April 1944, Miss Marion L. Lasher, daughter of Mrs. John H. Lasher of

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New York and the late Lieutenant Lester, USCG, to Lt. Robert R. Smith, AAF.

**SOLOFF-SCHREIBER** — Married in Mt. Vernon, N. Y., 23 April 1944, Miss Jocelyn Schreiber to Lt. Israel Soloff, AAF.

**STACKHOUSE-WOODWARD** — Married in the Congregational Church, Kingston, R. I., 22 April 1944, Miss Mildred R. Woodward, daughter of the President of Rhode Island State College, to Lt. (jg) James A. Stackhouse, (DC), USNR.

**STENBERG-CLANCY** — Married in the Reception Center Chapel, Ft. Harrison, Ind., 15 April 1944, Miss Eleanor May Clancy to Lt. Bruce W. Stenberg, asst. special officer at the Center.

**STRUBLE-CALLAHAN** — Married at Dallas, Tex., 1 April 1944, Lt. (jg) Arthur D. Struble, Jr., USN, son of Rear Admiral and Mrs. Struble, USN, to Miss Mary Ann Callahan, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Frank Edward Callahan, of Baltimore, Md. Lieutenant Struble was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in June, 1942.

**SUTTON-KARR** — Married in the Church of the Transfiguration, New York City, 20 April 1944, Miss Evan Karr to Lt. (jg) William I. Sutton, USNR.

**TORMOLLAN-KING** — Married in the chapel of Christ English Lutheran Church, Baltimore, Md., 16 April 1944, Miss Miriam Anna King to Ens. Francis C. Tormolan, Jr., USNR.

**TROUTMAN-NEELY** — Married at the Post Chapel, Ft. Myer, Va., 20 April 1944, Miss Rosebnd Harriet Neely to Lt. Leslie E. Troutman, USNR.

**TURNER-DUPRAT** — Married in Montclair, N. J., 18 April 1944, Miss Elizabeth Theodora Duprat, to Lt. Myron Hunter Turner, AUS.

**VAN HISE-MALONEY** — Married in Orange, N. J., 22 April 1944, Miss Catherine Rose Maloney to Lt. (jg) Warren Kara Van Hise, USNR.

**WALSH-QUICK** — Married in Our Lady Chapel of St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York, N. Y., 22 April 1944, Miss Mildred Florence Quick to Capt. Walter Joseph Walsh, AUS.

**WHITE-WAITT** — Married in All Souls Episcopal Church, Washington, D. C., 23 April 1944, Miss Betty Alden Waitt, daughter of Brig. Gen. and Mrs. Alden H. Waitt, USA, to John William White, MC, AUS, brother of Cadet James Todd White of the US Military Academy, West Point, N. Y.

**WILLIAMS-HARRIS** — Married in the Westminster Presbyterian Church, Albany, N. Y., 22 April 1944, Miss Georgia Downing Harris to Capt. David Sterling Williams, AUS.

**WILLIAMS-STEVENS** — Married in Newborn, N. C., 21 April 1944, Mrs. Charlotte Duffy Stevenson to Capt. Edwin Russell Williams, USMC, former vice president of the Chase National Bank of New York, N. Y.

**WINN-TONNESEN** — Married in St. Paul's Chapel, Columbia University, New York City, 22 April 1944, Miss Ruth Vivian Tonnesen to Lt. Cooper David Winn, 3d, USNR.

**WISE-ALCOCK** — Married in Norfolk, Va., 10 April 1944, Miss Mary Susan Alcock to Lt. Kippling Wycliffe Wise, USNR.

### Died

**ALBERT** — Died in Canton, Ohio, 20 April 1944, Mrs. Edith Spicer Albert, widow of Mr. Thomas Benton Albert, daughter of the late Capt. John W. Spicer, USN, and niece of the late Commodore William F. Spicer, USN.

**BALDWIN** — Killed in action over Italy, recently, Lt. Harry Wallace Baldwin, AAF, son of U. S. Representative Baldwin of Maryland, and Mrs. Baldwin.

**BALFE** — Died at his home in La. Jolla, Calif., 22 April 1944, Mr. Harry Balfe, father of Capt. Harry A. Balfe, USA.

**BIRD** — Died in Overlook Hospital, Summit, N. J., 24 April 1944, Mrs. Edith Dunkerton Bird, mother of Capt. Joseph M. Bird, AUS, and Pvt. Robert E. Bird, AUS.

**BOLGIANO** — Died in the U. S. Naval Hospital, Annapolis, Md., 25 April 1944, Comdr. Clarence P. Bolgiano, USNR, instructor of marine engineering at the U. S. Naval Academy. Survived by his widow and a son, Capt. Ralph E. Bolgiano, USA.

**BROWN** — Killed in airplane crash near Jacksonville, Fla., 22 April 1944, Ens. Sylvester O. Brown, Jr., USNR.

**CHAMBERS** — Died at home in Washington, D. C., 20 April 1944, Mrs. Martha Gregory Chambers, mother of Lt. Richmond D. Chambers, USN, and S. Sgt. John Wesley Chambers, with the Army in Ireland.

**CLARK** — Killed in airplane crash, near Macon, Ga., recently, 2nd Lt. James G. Clark.

**CONWAY** — Killed in action in southwest Pacific, 1 April 1944, Maj. William P. Conway, AAF, brother of Capt. Philip Conway, FA.

**COUPE** — Died in St. Francis Hospital, New York, N. Y., 20 April 1944, Mr. Thomas L. Coupe, father of Lt. Donald T. Coupe, USA, and Ens. Lorraine E. Coupe, USNR.

(Continued on Next Page)

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**Births, Marriages, Deaths**  
(Continued from Preceding Page)

**EASTHAM**—Died suddenly of heart attack, 20 April 1944, at Camp Shanks, N. Y., of which post he was Commanding Officer, Col. Kenna Granville Eastham, USA.

**FERGUSON**—Died of wounds received in attack on Manus Island in the Pacific, 23 March 1944, 2nd Lt. Joseph R. Ferguson, AUS.

**FERNALD**—Died in Mountainside Hospital, Montclair, N. J., 24 April 1944, Mr. Charles Barker Fernald. Survived by his widow and three sons, Ens. David G. Fernald, with the Navy in the Pacific; Cadet Olaf Fernald, AAF, at Yale University, and PFC William B. Fernald, AAF.

**FREDERICKSEN**—Killed in airplane crash in Los Padres National Forest, Calif., 29 Jan. 1944, Lt. Donald E. Fredericksen, AAF.

**GREENE**—Died at St. Vincent's Hospital, New York City, 3 April 1944, Mrs. Lillian Adams Greene, widow of Col. Lewis Douglass Greene, USA, mother of Maj. Gen. Douglass T. Greene, USA, 16th Armored Division, and Mr. Joseph N. Greene, President Alabama Gas Co., Birmingham, Ala., (formerly of the 7th Infantry), and grandmother of Maj. M. J. L. Greene, USA, Capt. Lawrence V. Greene, USA, 2nd Lt. Lewis A. Greene, Cpl. Douglass Greene, Ann Greene, Thomas Patrick Greene, Mr. J. N. Greene, Jr., Algiers, North Africa; Mr. Nicholas M. Greene, Columbia Medical School, and Miss Elizabeth Greene.

**HAGAN**—Died at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 18 April 1944, Mrs. Virginia C. Hagan, wife of Lt. Richard E. Hagan, AAF.

**HAMMATT**—Died at Los Angeles, Calif., 30 March 1944, Mr. William Cushing Hammatt, Civil Engineer and one time member of the class of 1896, U. S. Military Academy.

**HERRINGSHAW**—Died in San Francisco, Calif., 4 April 1944, Col. William F. Herringshaw, USA-Ret., survived by his widow, Mrs. Inez Herringshaw and a son, Lt. Col. George Herringshaw, USA-Ret.

**HILL**—Killed in action on Los Negros Islands, Admiralty group, 14 March 1944, 1st Lt. Ralph Edwin Hill, Jr., USA, son of Col. and Mrs. Ralph E. Hill, USA.

**HOSSICK**—Killed in airplane crash in Los Padres National Forest, Calif., 29 Jan. 1944, Lt. George C. Hossick, AAF.

**HUNOLD**—Died in airplane crash near Epsom, N. H., 24 April 1944, 2nd Lt. William Hunold, AAF.

**JOHNSTON**—Died in Norfolk, Va., 20 April 1944, Mrs. Robert Johnston, mother of Mrs. Joseph K. Taussig, wife of Vice Admiral Taussig, USN.

**KARNES**—Killed in airplane crash in Italy, 13 January 1944, Col. William E. Karnes, AC, USA, (USMA 1929). Survived by his widow, Mrs. Virginia Luckey Karnes, 2700 N. W. 25th St., Oklahoma City, Okla., and two children, William E. Karnes, Jr., and Suzanne.

**KEELER**—Killed in action in the Pacific Area, recently, Maj. Douglas Edgar Keeler, USMC. He is survived by his widow.

**MAYO**—Died in Washington, D. C., 17 April 1944, Mr. Winfield Scott Mayo, father of Capt. James A. Mayo, an Army Chaplain in England.

**MORRIS**—Died at Harwood, Md., 23 April 1944, Mr. George Morris, father of Lt. (jg) George Morris, Jr., USN.

**MUIR**—Died at the Washington Sanitarium, Takoma Park, Md., 23 April 1944, Mrs. Carlotta Brockett Muir, mother of Lt. Comdr. Brockett Muir, USNR and PO Bluford Muir, USN.

**MUNSON**—Killed in airplane crash in Los Padres National Forest, Calif., 29 Jan. 1944, Lt. Allen H. Munson, USAAF.

**MURRAY**—Died at St. Clare's Hospital, New York City, 19 April 1944, Mrs. Elizabeth Murray, wife of Lt. James A. Murray, AAF.

**PLATT**—Killed in airplane crash in Los Padres National Forest, Calif., 29 Jan. 1944, Lt. James W. Platt, AAF.

**QUARLES**—Died in the Norwalk Hospital, Norwalk, Conn., 24 April 1944, Mr. Sherrod H. Quarles of Hollow Tree Road, Darlen, Conn. Mr. Quarles was a graduate, class 1914, of the U. S. Naval Academy. Surviving are his widow, his mother, and two brothers, Col. George P. Quarles, USA, and Lt. Col. W. W. Quarles, USA.

**SHUSER**—Died at Camp Davis, N. C., 15 April 1944, Capt. Nathan Shuser, of Newport, R. I.

**SMITH**—Killed in airplane accident, recently, Capt. Charles C. Smith, AAF, son of Col. and Mrs. Compo Smith, USA and grandson of Gen. Abel L. Smith of Scarsdale, N. Y.

**STRONG**—Died at her residence, the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C., 21 April 1944, Mrs. Grace Nichols Strong, wife of Col. Richard Pearson Strong, MC, AUS.

**TAFFE**—Died in St. Francis Hospital, Poughkeepsie, N. Y., 21 April 1944, Mrs. Mary Desmond Taffe, mother of Lt. John Vincent Taffe, USA, recently reported missing in action in the Pacific area.

**WILSON**—Died at Garfield Hospital, Washington, D. C., 24 April 1944, Mr. Charles W. Wilson, brother of Lt. Frederick Wilson, USMC.

**OBITUARIES**

Word has been received of the death of Col. Wm. F. Herringshaw, USA-Ret., 4 April in San Francisco.

Colonel Herringshaw was one of the small group of Cavalry Officers of the regular Army who were assigned to Command the first Provisional Motor Truck Companies which accompanied General Pershing's expedition into

Mexico in 1916. This was the very beginning of motor transport in our Army and Col. Herringshaw was closely identified with this service from that time to his retirement. In France, Colonel Herringshaw served as Commanding Officer of the Second Division Trains until after the Marne Defense and subsequently became Chief Motor Transport Officer of the First Army serving in that capacity during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Arsonne Offensives. He received the DSM for his services with the First Army. Subsequent to World War I, Colonel Herringshaw had many varied Quartermaster assignments including command at Normoyle and his final service as Chief Quartermaster of the Philippine Department.

Since his retirement, Colonel and Mrs. Herringshaw had resided in San Francisco where he had been an officer of and extremely active in the Army and Navy Club of San Francisco and in the Bohemian Club.

He is survived by his wife, Mrs. Inez Herringshaw and his son, Lt. Col. Geo. Herringshaw, USA, retired.

Col. Kenna Granville Eastham, Commanding Officer of Camp Shanks at Orangeburg, N. Y., since the official opening of the post on 4 January 1943, died of a heart attack at his quarters in camp at 2:30 A.M. on 20 April 1944. He was 55 years of age.

Simple funeral services were conducted at the South Chapel in camp on 21 April, with the Rev. Dr. Ernest W. Churchill, pastor of the Grace Episcopal Church of Nyack, N. Y., officiating. A large number of Camp Shanks personnel paid their final respects to their Commanding Officer. A delegation from the New York Port of Embarkation, of which Camp Shanks is an installation, was headed by Maj. Gen. Homer M. Groninger, Commanding General of NYPE; Maj. Gen. William M. Goodman, Oversea Supply Officer of NYPE; and Brig. Gen. Calvin DeWitt, Jr., Deputy Port Commander.

Colonel Eastham's body was taken to Arlington National Cemetery on 22 April, and he was buried there with full military honors that afternoon.

Born in Harrisonburg, Va., 14 March 1889, Colonel Eastham was graduated in 1910 with a Bachelor of Science degree from Virginia Military Institute. Two years later, on 24 April 1912, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in Cavalry.

During World War I, Colonel Eastham served in France as the Commanding Officer of a Pioneer Infantry Battalion of the First Army in the Verdun area. He saw other foreign service in a tour in the Philippines and two tours in Panama on the General Staff.

An astute student of military tactics, Colonel Eastham attended numerous Army Officer Schools. He was graduated from the Troop Officer's Course in the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kan., in 1920; the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., in 1924; the Army War College in 1929 and the Naval War College in 1930. Colonel Eastham served as an instructor in the Command and General Staff School and the Cavalry School.

Colonel Eastham is survived by his widow, Mrs. Shirley Cooper Eastham; a brother, Col. C. Eastham of Colorado Springs, Col., and a sister, Mrs. George S. Harnsberger of Harrisonburg, Va.

At the funeral services in camp, the casket was taken to the South Chapel with the 37th Army Service Forces band and an escort of honor consisting of enlisted men of the Transportation Corps detachment.

Honorary pallbearers were Cols. Edward Hubbs, John F. Corby, Lee S. Dillon, Leon E. Savage and Albert J. Wick; Lt. Cols. Wallace E. Wilson, Allan G. Spitz, Harry L. Calvin, Lee M. Allen, Vincent P. Hewitt and David J. Granbard; and Captain John A. DeAngelo. Active pallbearers were Lt. Cols. Albert M. Musgrave and William Rich, and Majors Frank E. Gearhart, Simon P. Ambriz, Josepha B. Flach and Edward T. Devlin.

1st Lt. Ralph Edwin Hill, Jr., eldest son of Col. and Mrs. Ralph E. Hill of Jacksonville, Fla., has lost his life in defense of his country, his family has been advised by the War Department.

The official announcement received by his parents stated that Lieutenant Hill was killed in action 14 March on Los Negros Island in the Admiralty group.

Lieutenant Hill was born 3 July, 1920, in the Philippines Islands, where his father was stationed. He graduated from A. and M. Consolidated School and Texas A. and M. College, in the class of 1942.

Commissioned a second lieutenant in the U. S. Cavalry, he served at Fort Riley, Kan., and Fort Bliss, Tex., and in June, 1943, was sent to Australia. He was transferred in January of this year to New Guinea, where he served with the "Texas Cavalrymen."

Besides his parents, Lieutenant Hill is survived by his sister, Mrs. E. V. Helms of Jacksonville; his brother, Guy B. Hill, a private in the Air Corps, now stationed at Blythe, Calif., and his grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. Guy P. Bittle of Bryant, Tex.

Concerning the recent death of Lt. Col. Mark E. Guerin, JAGD, USA-Ret., Maj. Gen. Harry C. Hale, USA-Ret., writes as follows:

"Lt. Col. Mark E. Guerin came into the Service during World War I and was assigned to the Judge Advocate Department in Washington. Eventually he was sent as Judge Advocate on the staff of the undersigned in Chicago, Ill., who at that time was Commanding General of the Sixth Corps area."

"Colonel Guerin was my principal legal assistant and the ranking Judge Advocate in the Department at that station. My acquaintance with him became more than the usual official acquaintance. I became warmly attached to Colonel Guerin on account of his

sterling qualities and his efficiency. Of commanding presence, great dignity and poise, he was a great influence among his fellow officers. He soon became of great utility in his line of work."

"When his Commanding Officer (the undersigned) was retired in 1925, Colonel Guerin was changed to station in Washington. He remained on duty in the Judge Advocate General's Office until retired for disability as Lieutenant Colonel. His retired life has been spent in Washington and here again he made himself well known among the officers of his calling. Of late years he has been ill and while suffering severely he has conducted himself always with quiet dignity during an illness which came to an end last night at nine o'clock."

"Funeral services were held 10 April 1944, at St. Matthews Church, and the interment was in Arlington National Cemetery, where his deceased wife is already interred."

"A distinguished feature in the character of Lieutenant Colonel Guerin was his humanity. While a strict disciplinarian, he was well-known for the above-mentioned qualities and for his lovable character, and above all, he was always a soldier."

**Text of Admiral King's Report**

(Continued from Page 1044)

brind Island groups between the Solomons and New Guinea, and at Nassau Bay on New Guinea. On the same day landings were made simultaneously by the army at Rendova Harbor and by marines at Viru Harbor. Two groups of destroyers covered the landing at Rendova, and effectively silenced enemy land batteries on Munda Point. Enemy aircraft attacking our transports and destroyers were beaten off by our protecting fighters or shot down by ships' anti-aircraft batteries, but not until they had succeeded in torpedoing and sinking the transport Mc- Cawley.

On 2 and 3 July, landings were made on New Georgia and at Vangau Island to the southeast of New Georgia.

During the night of 4-5 July a task group of U. S. cruisers and destroyers bombarded enemy positions and gun installations on the islands of Kolombangara and New Georgia, in order to support landings at Rice Anchorage. During this bombardment the destroyer Strong was sunk by a combination of torpedo hits and gunfire from the shore batteries. Immediately after the bombardment more landings were effected for the purpose of seizing the islands of Enogai and Bairoko. First Battle of Kula Gulf

As the "Tokio express" was making night- ly runs through Blackett Strait and Kula Gulf to supply and reinforce the Japanese at Vila and elsewhere, an American task force of cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral W. L. Ainsworth, U. S. Navy, was dispatched to intercept the enemy. Early in the morning of 6 July, contact with two enemy groups was made in Kula Gulf. Our forces opened fire with devastating effect on the first enemy group and subsequently took enemy ships in the second group under an equally effective fire. Enemy fire consisted chiefly of torpedoes. While the amount of damage inflicted on the enemy could not be accurately determined, it is probable that two Japanese destroyers were sunk in this action.

During the action the cruiser Helena was torpedoed and sunk. Some of her personnel were rescued on the spot, and others made their way to Vella Lavella Island where they were later rescued.

**Second Battle of Kula Gulf**

During the second week of the New Georgia campaign our ground forces consolidated their positions at Rendova, Rice Anchorage, Viru, and began to close in on Munda. Meanwhile, the navy continued to protect American ground troops and to prevent the enemy from re-taking Munda garrison.

On 12 July, another task group under Rear Admiral Ainsworth again intercepted the "Tokio express." As a result of the engagement which followed (on the 13th) the enemy was again disposed in two groups: the first enemy group was badly shot up, and one cruiser was probably sunk. The second, however, inflicted considerable damage on our forces—the cruisers St. Louis and Honolulu were damaged by torpedoes, and the destroyer Gwin was set on fire and had to be sunk. The New Zealand cruiser Leander suffered a torpedo hit while engaged with the first enemy group.

The two engagements in Kula Gulf were costly, but they removed a threat of naval action by the enemy which might have jeopardized our landings on the north coast of New Georgia. Furthermore, they effectively prevented the Japanese from using the Kula Gulf route to supply and reinforce their garrisons at Vila and Munda.

Our ground troops on New Georgia slowly converged on Munda, which was also subjected to bombardments from the sea and air. Other air attacks were delivered by Allied airplanes at Bellale, at Vila, at Vovine Cove, at Buin, at Kahili airfield and at Shortland Harbor. The biggest single attack consisted of the dropping of 186 tons of bombs on Munda on 25 July. During the 37 days of the Munda campaign our planes destroyed an estimated 350 Japanese aircraft at a cost of 93.

Munda airfield was captured on 5 August, almost exactly one year after the first landing on Guadalcanal, and six weeks after New Georgia was invaded. The fall of Munda climaxed the Central Solomons campaign, and Bairoko Harbor, eight miles to the northward, was the last remaining Japanese strong point on New Georgia Island. Vila, on the southern tip of Kolombangara Island, was virtually neutralized as soon as the Seabees and army engineers rebuilt the Munda air strip.

**The Battle of Vella Gulf**

Our rapid consolidation of our control over the sea routes and the heavy ship losses sustained by the enemy during June and July

made it necessary for the Japanese to support their forces at Kolombangara by barge traffic moving at night close to the coast of Vella Lavella. As our PT boats inflicted considerable damage on enemy barges and landing craft in that area, the Japanese, on 6 August 1943, undertook to send equipment and troops, escorted by a cruiser and three destroyers, into Vella Gulf between Vella Lavella and Kolombangara Islands. This operation which was calculated to support enemy forces at Vila, led to the third surface action in the area within a month. A task group of American destroyers commanded by Commander Frederick Moesbrugger took the enemy force by surprise shortly before midnight. In an engagement lasting about 45 minutes, the three Japanese destroyers were believed sunk. Our forces suffered no damage.

**Invasion of Vella Lavella**

Vella Lavella Island, about 14 miles northwest of Kolombangara, was selected as the next objective in the central Solomons campaign. Although the island was not occupied by the Japanese, and no opposition in force was expected, preparations were made to resist air attacks from enemy airfields to the north.

On 15 August, three transport groups succeeded in making landings as planned. The anticipated enemy air attacks materialized, but did not seriously interfere with the landings, as our own air support broke up their attacks.

**Action of August 17-18**

On 17 August, four enemy destroyers and a number of barges were reported en route from Bougainville on a southeast course. Four of our destroyers under the command of Captain T. J. Ryan, Jr., intercepted and attacked the enemy force north of Vella Gulf, at night. Our forces scored heavily with gunfire on enemy destroyers and barges, whereupon the enemy force broke off the action. Our destroyers sustained no losses.

The campaign on New Georgia ended successfully with the occupation of Bairoko Harbor on 25 August. The Japanese lost heavily in attempting to evacuate personnel across Kula Gulf to Vila, when PT boats attacked and sank numerous barges filled with enemy troops. As a result of the occupation of Bairoko, Kolombangara Island, which was still occupied by a Japanese garrison, was now between our forces controlling New Georgia to the southeast and those occupying Vella Lavella to the northwest. Positions secured on Arundel, which was occupied on 27 August, made it possible to bring artillery to bear on the Japanese installations at Vila.

With his air power weakened, the enemy decided to evacuate Vila during the month of September. Again barges were used for the evacuation, with costly results to the enemy. Toward the end of the month of September our destroyers conducted a particularly damaging attack on barges, which up to that time had been attacked chiefly by aircraft and PT boats. Enemy personnel losses during the evacuation of Kolombangara were undoubtedly heavy, and it was assumed that these heavy losses were the cause of increased activity to the northward shortly thereafter, particularly in the vicinity of Bougainville.

**Action of October 6**

On the night of 6 October, a task group consisting of three destroyers, Chevalier, Selfridge, and O'Bannon, commanded by Captain F. R. Walker, U. S. Navy, sighted a superior force of enemy ships south of Choiseul. The enemy was disposed in two groups, one of which appeared to consist of a light cruiser and four destroyers, the other of four destroyers.

Our destroyers, in spite of being outnumbered, closed in and attacked with gunfire and torpedoes. The result was the repulse of a superior force and the infliction of considerable damage, at the cost, however, of the Chevalier, which was torpedoed and sunk.

By 6 October, the enemy completed evacuating his troops from Kolombangara and Vella Lavella Islands, and the central Solomons campaign ended.

**Bougainville Campaign**

Attacks on Bougainville and the small islands to the north and south of it began about three weeks after the evacuation of Kolombangara, our air forces meanwhile having softened up the airfields of Kahili, Balile, and Karu by daily attacks.

On 26-27 October Mono and Stirling Treasury Islands were invaded and occupied, on 28 October, a landing was made on Choiseul Island, and on 1 November, landings were made on Bougainville Island. The landings on Mono Island were preceded by bombardments by a task force commanded by Rear Admiral Wilkinson. Another task force under Rear Admiral Merrill bombarded enemy positions on Bougainville at Buks and Bonis immediately preceding our landing. Rear Admiral Merrill's force then proceeded to the Shortland Islands off the southern coast of Bougainville and delivered another bombardment on Morgusia Island.

In the meantime a landing force of marines under the command of Lt. General Vandegrift (who had returned to the area following the death of Major General Barrett) landed at Empress Augusta Bay, about midway up the west coast of the Island of Bougainville.

**Action of November 2**

Shortly before noon on 1 November, an enemy task force of four cruisers and eight destroyers was observed at the southern end of St. George's Channel but an attempt by Rear Admiral Merrill's force to intercept was not successful as the enemy retired before action could be joined. On the following morning, however, a Japanese force consisting of three groups of four ships each was

(Continued on Next Page)

## Text of Admiral King's Report (Continued from Previous Page)

picked up and attacked. After having suffered considerable damage, the enemy again retired. We lost no ships and sustained relatively light damage in this engagement.

The next day our ships, which had retired to Empress Augusta Bay, were attacked by enemy aircraft but suffered no appreciable damage.

Army troops reinforced the marines at Empress Augusta Bay on 8 November, and after consolidating our beach heads, took the offensive against enemy troops on the island. On 8 November, the enemy delivered an air attack on a force of our light cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral L. T. DuBose. The attack was not successful, in that we were able to protect our transports from enemy attacks while the transports were retiring from Bougainville.

On the night of 12-13 November, while engaged in covering transports en route to Torokina Point, Admiral Merrill's task force was attacked by enemy forces.

On 17 November, Japanese planes attacking another of our echelons bound to Torokina succeeded in sinking the destroyer transport McKean.

Action of November 25

On 25 November, four of our destroyers patrolling the area between Buka and Cape St. George on the southern tip of New Ireland, attacked a superior enemy force with torpedoes and gunfire, inflicting considerable damage on the enemy. None of our ships was damaged.

During the month of December, American land-based aircraft continued vigorous operations against Japanese positions throughout the northern Solomons, with the result that enemy airfields in the Buka-Bonis areas completely neutralized. Meanwhile, our troops and supplies continued to move unopposed into the base at Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay.

On 20 December, a force of American destroyers bombarded a Japanese concentration on northeastern Bougainville and on the 23rd, a task force of cruisers and destroyers bombarded the Buka Bonis area. On the 27th, another force shelled the Keta area.

Operations in New Guinea

Concurrently with the attacks on Japanese positions in the central Solomons, a powerful attack had been launched in the New Guinea Theater. On the night of 29-30 June Allied troops made a successful landing on Nassau Bay, about ten miles south of the Japanese base at Salamaua and moved up the coast to Mubo and Komistum. After the landing, the navy assisted in the new offensive by the use of planes and PT boats to harass enemy landing barges and prevent reinforcements from being put ashore. Task units of our destroyers also assisted by bombarding enemy defenses and installations.

On 3 September, our amphibious forces were ready to move against the enemy's naval and air bases in the Huon Gulf area, and a task force of destroyers and smaller craft successfully landed the Australian Ninth division and other troops near Nopoi. During the following days other task forces escorted more landing craft to the beaches, successfully fighting off air attacks and on 7-8 September, bombarded positions in the vicinity of Lae. On 11 September, Allied forces captured Salamaua and five days later Lae, thereby giving our Naval forces additional bases.

The next objective of the Allied amphibious forces was Finschafen on the eastern end of the Huon Peninsula. On the morning of 22 September, a task force of destroyers and landing craft proceeded to a beach about six miles north of Finschafen and after a brief bombardment landed a strong Australian force. Enemy air attack was ineffective. On 2 October, Finschafen was captured and our PT boats sank a number of barges loaded with enemy troops attempting to get clear of the island. On the following day our destroyer task forces suffered their first loss when the destroyer Henley was torpedoed and sunk.

On 1 January, an Allied landing in force was made on Salduor on the New Guinea Coast. There was no opposition to the landing, and there were no personnel casualties.

On 13 February, a final occupation of the Huon Peninsula was completed by the meeting of Australian units coming from the eastward with the 32nd U. S. Division.

Rabaul

As our forces moved toward control of the Solomons and New Guinea, it became possible to strike more directly at Rabaul. This Japanese held port is in a key position to control the general area to the south.

On 5 November, a task force under Rear Admiral F. C. Sherman, built around aircraft carriers, delivered an air attack on Rabaul. Bombs and torpedoes directed at shipping at anchor resulted in heavy damage to enemy heavy cruisers and destroyers present. Although our planes met Japanese air resistance, we shot down about 25 enemy planes at the cost of three of our own. This carrier-based strike was supplemented the same day by a large group of Liberators, which did severe damage to Rabaul's water front.

A week later there was a second series of air attacks on Rabaul. This time two American task forces were engaged. Rear Admiral Sherman's ships sent in a large flight of planes, and although unfavorable weather prevented inflicting as much damage as on the prior raid, hits were scored on Japanese destroyers outside the harbor. The same day a task force under Rear Admiral A. E. Montgomery sent in a large flight of planes to attack Rabaul shipping. Heavy damage to cruisers and destroyers in the harbor was reported. Our planes shot down 24 enemy aircraft at the cost of seven of our own.

Early in the afternoon of 11 November, a Japanese air attack was delivered against the carriers under Rear Admiral Montgomery.

No damage was done to our ships and something over 50 enemy planes were shot down by a combination of our own planes and anti-aircraft fire. We lost three planes in the encounter. Another flight of Liberators attacked Rabaul on 11 November.

During the last ten days of December the major Japanese base on Rabaul was struck by land-based planes operating from bases in the Solomons and elsewhere in the South Pacific area. On 25 December, planes from a carrier task force attacked Kavieng, another important enemy base on the northern tip of New Ireland. Reports indicated the damaging of a destroyer, the sinking of two cargo ships and three barges, and damage to other enemy units afloat. Upon its withdrawal, our task force was heavily attacked by enemy planes, but received no damage. On 28 December, Kavieng was again attacked, this time by our shore-based aircraft.

The attacks on Rabaul were significant in that they destroyed and damaged Japanese men-of-war, (always a main objective of our aircraft) which were thereby prevented from resisting our offensive in the northern Solomons, New Guinea or the Gilbert Islands.

On 1 January, another carrier strike on Kavieng was delivered by a task force under the command of Rear Admiral Sherman. This task force was supported by a group of battleships under the command of Rear Admiral Lee. Primary targets were two enemy cruisers and destroyers about to enter the port. Preliminary reports indicated that the attacks on the cruisers were successful, and that both were either sunk or beached. One of the destroyers was hit by a heavy bomb and both were strafed. Information is lacking as to the effect on the destroyers, but both were believed heavily damaged. Between 20 and 30 enemy aircraft intercepted the attack. Eleven were shot down. Our losses were two fighters and one bomber.

On 4 January, a task force successfully attacked two destroyers off the entrance to Kavieng.

On 8 January, cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Ainsworth bombarded the Shorlands without incident.

On 15 February, an Allied landing in strength on Green Island, 120 miles from Rabaul, was virtually unopposed. On the same date two destroyer task groups, one commanded by Captain R. W. Simpson and the other by Captain A. A. Burke, bombarded Rabaul and Kavieng without suffering damage from enemy air attack. The task force making the landing was under the command of Rear Admiral Wilkinson, assault forces being composed of American and New Zealand troops. A task force of cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Ainsworth covered the advance and retirement of the assault forces. The aircraft task force under Vice Admiral Fitch and a support force of cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Merrill, participated in the operation.

Occupation of the Admiralty Islands

On 29 February, amphibious forces from the South West Pacific Force under the command of Rear Admiral W. M. Fechteler (these forces included the First Cavalry Division, dismounted) conducted a reconnaissance in force on Los Negros in the Admiralty Islands. As the reconnaissance revealed insufficient enemy strength to warrant withdrawing our reconnaissance forces, the island was promptly occupied. Covering forces were cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral D. E. Barbey, U. S. Navy. This was a brilliant maneuver in the campaign in that part of the Pacific, conducted under the direction of General MacArthur.

The Central Pacific Campaign

Our only operations in the central Pacific following the Battle of Midway had consisted of a diversionary damaging raid on the island of Makin, in the Gilberts, by a small party under the command of Captain J. M. Haines, U. S. Navy. On 17-18 August, the submarines Nautilus and Argonaut transported officers and men of the Second Marine Raider Battalion to the island, where they annihilated the Japanese garrison and did severe damage to enemy installations.

Toward the end of August 1943, while Allied forces in the southwest Pacific were advancing toward the Japanese bases at Rabaul and Truk, and while other forces in the Aleutians were consolidating their positions, Admiral Nimitz organized important units of the Pacific Fleet for a series of assaults on the enemy's outposts in the central Pacific. These task forces succeeded in capturing certain islands on the western rim of the enemy's defenses and in diverting the Japanese from the northern Solomons and New Guinea. In addition, these operations represented valuable combat training for new air and surface units of the fleet.

Capture of the Gilbert Islands

The Gilbert Islands are a group of coral atolls lying athwart the equator. They had been held by the British up to the outbreak of war in December 1941, when they were seized by the Japanese. Their location is of great strategic significance because they are north and west of other islands in our possession and immediately south and east of important Japanese bases in the Carolines and Marshalls. The capture of the Gilberts was, therefore, a necessary part of any long range thrust at the Japanese Empire.

In August, September, and October, carrier-based air strikes on Marcus, Tarawa, Apamama, and Wake served to soften Japanese installations and keep the enemy guessing as to where our next full-scale attack would be delivered. The attack on Wake was particularly effective as it included considerable bombardment in addition to air attacks. Enemy air opposition was overcome, and a heavy toll of enemy planes was taken, both on the ground, and in the air. During October, and early November, planes from our bases attacked the Japanese in the Gilberts and also the Marshalls. The Japanese retaliated by raiding our establishments in the Ellice Islands.

During October and November, various

units of the Pacific Fleet were placed under the command of Vice Admiral (now Admiral) R. A. Spruance, USN, who was designated Commander, Central Pacific Force. Vice Admiral Spruance had commanded one of the task forces at the battle of Midway and had more recently been Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) R. K. Turner, USN, who had been in command at sea during the campaigns in the Solomon Islands, was placed in charge of our amphibious forces and Major General (now Lieutenant General) H. M. Smith, USMC, in charge of the landing forces. Other forces in the command were placed under Rear Admiral H. W. Hill, USN. The entire force consisted of battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts, transports and numerous auxiliaries and landing craft. Shore-based aircraft were commanded by Rear Admiral J. H. Hoover, USN.

During the second week in November, while operations in the Bougainville area and attacks on Rabaul were in progress, the force under Vice Admiral Spruance headed west. On 19 November, our cruisers bombarded Tarawa, and on the morning of 20 November, our attack groups were off both Tarawa and Makin Islands.

Heavy shore bombardments by battleships and cruisers preceded the landing at Makin. Army units which landed there met little opposition at first, and although the Japanese eventually put up a stiff resistance the issue there was never in serious doubt. The capture of Makin was announced on 22 November.

The assault on Tarawa was bitterly contested. Tarawa was heavily fortified, and garrisoned by about 3,500 Japanese troops on Betio, the principal island in the group. They had been attacked repeatedly from the air for weeks preceding the assault and on the day before they had been heavily bombarded. In spite of these attacks, which alienated the Japanese heavy guns, wrecked everything above ground and killed approximately half of the enemy troops, their dugouts, pillboxes, and bomb-proof shelters were still partially intact.

The enemy was able to concentrate his forces beside the only beach where a landing was possible. In spite of fire support from the air and from ships, our casualties were heavy. The fighting which ensued was considered by many to be the most intense of any in the war, and the personnel of the Second Marine Division under the command of Major General Julian C. Smith and of the Naval units which accompanied them in their landing, demonstrated magnificent courage and tenacity. The assault lasted nearly four days, at the end of which the island was

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Captured.

During the assault period on both Tarawa and Makin, our transports covered by their escorts, lay off the islands unloading. In some cases, ships were able to enter the lagoons and unload. During this period enemy submarine attacks which developed off Tarawa were successfully combatted, but the Liscome Bay, an escort carrier, was torpedoed and sunk off Makin. Rear Admiral H. M. Mullinix, USN, and the commanding officer, Captain L. D. Wiltsie, USN, and a large number of officers and men were lost. Enemy air attacks were successfully driven off by our own aircraft.

After the completion of the assault phase of the operation, our task forces withdrew to their bases to the north and south. Carrier task groups under Rear Admirals C. A. Pownall, USN, and A. E. Montgomery, USN, attacked enemy air bases in the Marshalls on 4 December, the main attack being directed against the atoll of Kwajalein, where enemy naval and merchant vessels, aircraft and shore installations were heavily struck with torpedoes and bombs. A lighter attack was made on the island of Wotje. Another task force under Rear Admiral W. A. Lee, USN, proceeding southward from the Gilberts attacked the island of Nauru. Carrier planes bombed the island, and battleships subjected it to heavy bombardments, starting large fires and destroying a number of planes.

During the remainder of the year, Army and Navy land-based planes carried out repeated attacks on enemy holdings in the Marshalls Islands and at Nauru, inflicting considerable damage on ships and shore installations. Enemy air attacks on our newly acquired bases in the Gilberts were delivered, but no serious damage was sustained.

### Operations in the Marshall Islands

On 30 January, offensive operations on the largest scale yet undertaken were directed against the Marshall Islands by task forces under the command of Vice Admiral (now Admiral) Spruance. On that date simultaneous attacks were delivered on Kwajalein by carriers commanded by Rear Admiral F. C. Sherman, on Roi by carriers commanded by Rear Admiral A. E. Montgomery, on Taroa by carriers commanded by Rear Admiral J. W. Reeves, USN, and on Wotje by carriers commanded by Rear Admiral S. G. Ginder, USN. In addition, cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral E. G. Small, USN, bombarded Taroa and Wotje, and shore.

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(Continued from Preceding Page)

based aircraft under Rear Admiral J. H. Hoover, USN, bombed all four islands, together with Mille and Jaluit.

On 31 January, carrier attacks were resumed on Kwajalein by forces under Rear Admiral Reeves and the island was also bombarded by battleships. Roi was again attacked by Rear Admiral Montgomery's carrier force, and in addition was heavily bombarded by battleships. Taroa and Wotje were again struck by a carrier force under Rear Admiral Ginder and in addition were bombarded by cruisers. Forces under the command of Rear Admiral Small assisted in the bombardment of Wotje and Maloelap Ebeye was struck by carrier forces under Rear Admiral Reeves, and Eniwetok was attacked by carriers under Rear Admiral F. C. Sherman, USN. Mille, Jaluit and Wake were bombed by shore-based aircraft.

Other forces under Admiral Spruance's command in this operation consisted of a joint expeditionary force (southern attack group) under Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) R. K. Turner, USN. Defense forces and land-based aircraft were under the command of Rear Admiral Hoover. Rear Admiral H. W. Hill, USN, commanded an attack group and Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly, USN, another, (the northern attack group). Expeditionary troops were under the command of Major General (now Lieutenant General) H. M. Smith, USMC. The carrier task forces were commanded by Rear Admiral M. A. Mitscher, USN.

On 31 January, the forces commanded by Rear Admiral Hill proceeded against the atoll of Majuro, but found no Japanese present there. On the following day troops were sent ashore and the atoll was occupied.

On 2 February, landings were made on Roi, Namur and Kwajalein. Roi was secured and enemy resistance on Namur was confined to the northern part of the island. By the middle of the afternoon all organized resistance on Roi and Namur was overcome and the Commanding General of the Fourth Marine Division (Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC) assumed command ashore. Our casualties on these two islands were less than 100 killed and 400 wounded. Simultaneously four smaller islands were occupied. At Kwajalein our troops (Seventh Division, U. S. Army) made considerable progress against increasing resistance.

By 5 February, our troops on Kwajalein had captured the island, and by the 8th, the entire atoll was in our possession.

Tarao, Wotje, Jaluit, Mille and Ponape were bombed and/or bombarded at frequent intervals during the remainder of the month.

On 17-18 February forces under the command of Vice Admiral (now Admiral) Spruance delivered an attack on the island of Truk. The first part of the attack by carrier-based planes, was followed up by battleships, cruisers and destroyers. Heavy damage was inflicted on the enemy, both in ships sunk and damaged, and in planes shot down and destroyed on the ground. This attack, which was delivered with devastating effect, was particularly satisfying as it was generally regarded as partial payment for the debt incurred when Pearl Harbor was attacked.

Forces participating in the attack on Truk included carriers under the command of Rear Admiral Mitscher (under whom were Rear Admirals Reeves, Montgomery, and Sherman), cruisers commanded by Rear Admirals L. T. DuRoe, USN, J. L. Wiltsie, USN, and R. C. Giffen, USN, and battleships under Rear Admirals C. M. Hustvedt, USN, G. B. Davis, USN, and R. W. Hansen, USN.

On 17 February, an expeditionary task group under the command of Rear Admiral Hill (assault troops were headed by Brigadier General T. E. Watson, USMC), landed on Eniwetok Atoll, which had previously been bombarded and bombed over a period of several days. Supporting forces included carriers under Rear Admirals V. H. Ragsdale, USN, and Ginder, cruisers commanded by Rear Admirals J. B. Oldendorf, USN, and L. H. Theebold, USN.

On 18 February, after extensive bombing and bombardment Engebi Island was captured. With the capture of Eniwetok on 20 February, announced by Rear Admiral Hill, control of the Marshall Islands which were Japanese possessions before the war, passed to the United States. The operation in the Marshall Islands carried out by the forces under Vice Admiral (now Admiral) Spruance were characterized by excellent planning and by almost perfect timing in the execution of those plans. The entire operation was a credit to all who participated, and is a noteworthy example of the results that may be expected from good staff work.

**Raid on the Marianas**

On 22 February (East Longitude Date), a task force under the command of Rear Admiral Mitscher en route to deliver attacks on Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas was detected by enemy search planes and subsequently attacked by enemy bombers and torpedo planes. The task force suffered no damage, shot down a number of planes and proceeded to deliver attacks on the objectives stated the next day. During the attack several enemy ships were sunk and damaged. About 30 enemy planes were shot down and 85 or more were destroyed on the ground. In addition, numerous small craft were destroyed. At the same time our aircraft raided Guam.

**Northern Pacific Campaign**

Since the Aleutian Islands constitute an aerial highway between the North American continent and the Far East, their strategic value is obvious. On the other hand, that chain of islands provides a rugged a theater for warfare as any in the world. Not only are the islands mountainous and rocky, but the weather in the eastern part of the islands is continually bad. The fogs are al-

most continuous, and thick. Violent winds (known locally as "williwaws"), with accompanying heavy seas make any kind of operation in that vicinity difficult and uncertain. The Bering Sea has been termed a "storm factory," because during the winter months the storms form up there and at the rate of one or two a week, travel east and southwest.

In May 1942, when we were calculating the various risks involved in the disposition of our forces, Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands was considered to be a definite possibility as an enemy objective. A task force to operate in that area was therefore organized and placed under the command of Rear Admiral R. A. Theobald, U. S. Navy. His command included all American and Canadian Army personnel in the North Pacific, including sea and air units.

On 3 June 1942, just as the battle of Midway was beginning, Dutch Harbor was attacked by Japanese high altitude bombers, presumably from enemy carriers. The attacking force was not located immediately, because the fog set in, and the intention of the enemy was therefore obscure. Within a few days, however, it was discovered that the enemy force had turned westward and effected landings on the islands of Kiska and Attu, where they were erecting buildings.

During June and July, in spite of the weather, our submarines and aircraft, by a series of attacks, succeeded in preventing the arrival of major Japanese reinforcements. Army Air Force bombardment squadrons and units of the Royal Canadian Air Force contributed notably to these operations, as they did to the operations of the succeeding months.

On 7 August, Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, USN, with a force of cruisers and destroyers bombarded the shore installations on Kiska, but because of poor visibility the damage inflicted could not be ascertained. The bombardment served, however, to indicate the need for air bases closer to the islands occupied by the Japanese and as a consequence we occupied the island of Adak, in the Andreanof Group, at the end of August. In January 1943, we occupied Amchitka, considerably closer to Kiska, and by February our fighter planes were able to operate from there. By that time, we also had made good progress in establishing and equipping the base on Adak. Meanwhile, Kiska was attacked almost daily by planes from the Andreanof.

Because of weather conditions and the employment of our forces in other theaters, no attacks, other than bombing raids, with the exception of the bombardment previously referred to, were delivered on the islands until the spring of 1943.

**Battle of the Komandorski Islands**

In that situation, the enemy, late in March 1943, undertook to support the two garrisons by sending through a small but heavily protected convoy. Early on the morning of 26 March, a unit of our North Pacific Force, commanded by Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris, encountered the advancing enemy force, which included heavy and light cruisers, some destroyers and cargo ships, about 65 miles south of the Komandorski Peninsula. Our force, although outnumbered, closed for attack.

The engagement which followed developed into a running gunnery duel between our cruisers Salt Lake City and Richmond and enemy cruisers. This was followed by a torpedo attack delivered by our destroyers, upon completion of which the enemy retired in the direction of Paramushiru, 500 miles to the westward. Our damage was small and our casualties were light. While the damage inflicted on the enemy is not definitely known, a superior enemy force, after being engaged for three and one-half hours, had been prevented from supporting Japanese garrisons at Kiska and Attu.

**The Capture of Attu**

During the month of April, severe weather interfered considerably with our operations, but later in the month a detachment of cruisers and destroyers was sent to bombard the island of Attu.

Meanwhile, plans had been completed for an assault on Attu, and a force consisting of battleships, an auxiliary aircraft carrier, destroyers, auxiliaries and transports was placed under the command of Rear Admiral F. W. Rockwell, who operated under the direction of Rear Admiral Kinkaid. In addition to Rear Admiral Rockwell's force there was a unit consisting of cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen and another under Rear Admiral McMorris. The entire operation was to be supported by the Army Air Forces under the command of Major General Albert F. Brown. These troops were embarked in the transports.

On the morning of 11 May, landings were made on the north coast of Attu, and our troops proceeded inland. In the afternoon other landings were made at Massacre Bay, and also at Holtz Bay. These landings were covered by our Naval forces, and in the bitter fighting which followed, various Naval units assisted Army troops by furnishing fire support and air cover. Enemy attacks on our Naval forces were ineffective. On 31 May, the "mopping up" stage ended, and the island was in our possession. Enemy forces there had been virtually annihilated.

**Occupation of Kiska**

Following the assault on Attu, preparations were made for a similar assault on Kiska. In anticipation of that assault, Kiska was heavily bombed during July and August, and on numerous occasions was also bombarded by our Naval forces.

When assault troops landed on the island on 15 August, it was found that it had been evacuated by the Japanese under cover of the fog. Thus, the Aleutian campaign ended, with our forces once more in possession of the entire chain of islands.

**NOTE:** Although it had no connection with the campaign herein described the bombardment of Paramushiru by a task force under the command of Rear Admiral W. D.

Baker, USN, was carried out on 4 February 1944. Large fires were started. No damage was sustained by our forces. The bombardment is included in this part of the report because it took place in the Northern Pacific.

**Submarine Operations**

Because of their ability to operate effectively in enemy controlled waters the weakness of our Asiatic Fleet was partially compensated by virtue of the 29 submarines assigned to it—our submarines took the offensive immediately upon the outbreak of war. When our surface forces retired to the south from the Philippines Islands, submarine under the command of Captain (now Rear Admiral) John Wilkes succeeded in delaying the enemy's advance and in giving intermittent support to our forces remaining in the islands. As the Japanese advanced through the Netherlands East Indies and into the Solomons, submarines continued to interrupt enemy lines of communications, and since that time have continued their attacks on enemy men-of-war and merchantmen with telling effect.

At the beginning of the war Rear Admiral T. Withers was in command of the submarines in our Pacific Fleet. Rear Admiral R. H. English, who relieved him in May 1942, was killed in an airplane accident in January 1943. Since that time the uniformly excellent operation and administration of Pacific Fleet submarines has been continued under the direction of Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, who previously commanded submarines of the South West Pacific Force. Rear Admiral R. W. Christie succeeded to command of the submarines in the South West Pacific Force.

Atlantic Fleet submarines have been commanded since the spring of 1942 by Rear Admiral F. A. Daubin. Submarine operations in the Atlantic, which have been chiefly fitting out and training, have done much to make effective combat submarine operations possible within a minimum time after each submarine joins the Pacific Fleet.

Without adequate ship's power, Japan can not hold out, much less support her forces in the islands of the Pacific. Furthermore, the Japanese shipyards have limited capacity. Per shipping, therefore, was a natural target for our submarines, and they have taken a tremendous toll.

For reasons of security, our submarine operations throughout the Pacific can be discussed only in very general terms. No branch of the Naval Service, however, has acquitted itself more creditably. Submarine commanding officers are skillful, daring and resourceful. Their crews are well trained and efficient. Their morale is high and in direct ratio to the success of submarine operations. Materially our submarines are in excellent shape, and we have kept up to the minute in all features of design and scientific development and research.

The versatility of our submarines has been so repeatedly demonstrated throughout the war that the Japanese know only too well that in no part of the Pacific Ocean are they safe from submarine attack. When the full story can be told, it will constitute one of the most stirring chapters in the annals of naval warfare.

**Atlantic Theater General**

At the outbreak of the war our operations in the Atlantic Ocean consisted chiefly of escorting convoys to Great Britain, and to Russia and Near East ports (also West Indian and South American ports) and of training. Concurrently, with these operations, it was necessary to dispense the heavy units of our Atlantic Fleet so that they would be available immediately in case ships of the German Fleet, basing at various ports in Germany, Norway, and France, attacked our shipping. From time to time, in order to maintain a satisfactory distribution of Allied strength, as insurance against such a breakout by units of the German Navy, certain of our ships operated with the British Fleet.

By agreement with the British, emphasized at the Casablanca conference and at each subsequent conference, the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Isles has been a continuing commitment of the United States. Obviously, such a commitment requires, as a prerequisite to the furnishing of the necessary support, the maintenance of overseas lines of communication, so that the safe passage of lend lease shipments, supplied to our own forces, and troop convoys can be accomplished.

The responsibility for those naval operations required to keep open not only those lines of communications, but, as well, all lines of communications in the Atlantic Ocean, has rested with Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. Faced with the threat of the U-boat fleet (the methods taken to combat and overcome that menace are covered elsewhere in this report) and with the possibility of attack by other enemy units, escort of convoy operations was of paramount importance.

Early in the war the attempts of the enemy

to interrupt our lines of communications, while not successful, nevertheless were a matter of considerable concern. By judicious use of escorts, however, and by other means, our convoys continued to go through. The magnitude of those escort operations which have been continuous, is not likely to be overestimated, as we have expended tremendous effort in providing the ships and training them, and in the execution of their duties. The record of safe overseas transportation of troops and material speaks for itself, in so far as the efficiency of these operations is concerned.

Direct support of units of the British Fleet in any operation requiring combined effort, has been another Atlantic Fleet activity calling for careful planning and execution.

In addition, Admiral Ingersoll has had the responsibility for the defense of the Western Hemisphere by our naval forces. That has involved the stationing of air and service forces at various points in North and South America and in certain islands in the Atlantic Ocean, and, of course, such changes in their disposition as might be warranted by the situation. The South Atlantic Force, under the command of Vice Admiral J. H. Ingram, whose headquarters are in Brazil, has operated in harmony and close combination with forces of the Brazilian Navy in contributing to our control of the South Pacific.

In order to facilitate the passage of convoys to Russia and Great Britain, and in order to provide a base for our heavy surface forces, considerable use has been made of Iceland, where we originally established a base for forces engaged in escorting lend-lease convoys. All of the bases acquired from Great Britain in exchange for the 50 destroyers have been in constant use, and of great value.

Except for anti-submarine actions and for occasional aircraft attacks, units of the Atlantic Fleet have not been in any extensive combat in the Atlantic Ocean. As covering and supporting forces, however, they have accompanied our expeditions which landed in North Africa, and later in Sicily and Italy, and in the case of the landings in North Africa, there were some engagements in the Atlantic Ocean. The details of those operations are covered separately in this report.

For the purpose of training the large number of newly commissioned ships on the East Coast, which report to the Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet as soon as they are completed, a training command, under Rear Admiral D. B. Peary, was established as a part of the Atlantic Fleet. That command took over all ships (except submarines) as soon as they were ready for sea, and conducted such operational training as was necessary to fit each ship for duty in the fleet to which assigned. In addition to that type of operational training, the Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet was charged with extensive amphibious training.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the

(Continued on Next Page)

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## Text of Admiral King's Report (Continued from Preceding Page)

Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet has had a wide variety of responsibilities which have been contributory to the success of the multiplicity of operations, some of which were carried out by the Atlantic Fleet and some by other fleets. Because of the situation, there has been a continuous shift in the strength and disposition of the Atlantic Fleet, in which connection its flexibility, and the manner in which adjustments and readjustments were made have been of tremendous assistance to the Navy as a whole.

### The Atlantic Submarine War

The submarine war—particularly the Atlantic phase of it—has been a matter of primary concern since the outbreak of hostilities. Maintenance of the flow of ocean traffic has been, and continues to be, a vital element of all war plans.

Operating on exterior lines of communication almost every front, the United Nations have been dependent largely upon maritime transportation. The success of overseas operations, landing attacks, the maintenance of troops abroad and the delivery of war materials to Russia and other Allies concerned primarily with land operations has depended to a large extent upon the availability of shipping and the ability to keep it moving. Shipping potentialities have been the major factor—often the controlling factor—in most of the problems with which the Allied High Command has had to deal.

The principal menace to shipping has been the large fleet of submarines maintained by Germany. Our enemies have employed the submarine on a world-wide scale, but the area of greatest intensity has always been the Atlantic Ocean where the bulk of German U-boats have operated.

The German U-boat campaign is a logical extension of the submarine strategy of World War I which almost succeeded in starving Great Britain into submission. Unable to build up a powerful surface fleet in preparation for World War II, Germany planned to repeat her submarine campaign on a greater scale and to this end produced a U-boat fleet of huge size. The primary mission of this underwater Navy was to cut the sea routes to the British Isles, and the enemy undersea forces went to work on this task promptly and vigorously.

The United States became involved in the matter before we were formally at war, because our vessels were being sunk in the trans-Atlantic traffic routes. Consequently, in 1941, we took measures to assist the Royal Navy to protect our shipping. As stated in more detail elsewhere in this report these measures included the transfer of 50 old destroyers to the British, and—in the latter part of 1941—the assignment of our own Naval vessels to escort our merchant shipping on threatened trans-Atlantic routes.

The submarine situation was improving as 1941 drew toward a close. Escort operations on threatened convoy routes were becoming more and more effective. British aviation had become a potent factor by direct action against the U-boats, and also by bringing under control the German over-water air effort that had augmented the submarine offensive. Our resources were stretched, however, and we could not, for a time, deal effectively with the change in the situation brought about by our entry into the war on 7 December 1941. Our whole merchant marine then became a legitimate target, and the U-boats, still maintaining full pressure on the trans-Atlantic routes, had sufficient numbers to spread their depredations into wide areas hitherto immune. Our difficulty was that such part of the Atlantic Fleet as was not already engaged in escort duty was called upon to protect the troop movements that began with our entry into the war, leaving no adequate force to cover the Navy maritime traffic areas newly exposed to possible U-boat activity.

The Germans were none too quick in taking advantage of their opportunity. It was not until more than a month after the declaration of war that U-boats began to expand their areas of operation. The first move took the form of an incursion into our coastal waters in January, 1942. We had prepared for this by gathering on our eastern seaboard our scant resources in coastal anti-submarine vessels and aircraft, consisting chiefly of a number of yachts and miscellaneous small craft taken over by the Navy in 1940 and 1941. To reinforce this group the Navy accelerated its program of acquiring such fishing boats and pleasure craft as could be used and supplied them with such armaments as they could carry. For patrol purposes we employed all available aircraft—Army as well as Navy. The help of the Civil Air Patrol was gratefully accepted. This heterogeneous force was useful in keeping lookout and in rescuing survivors of sunken ships. It may have interfered, too, to some extent with the freedom of U-boat movement, but the heavy losses we suffered in coastal waters during the early months of 1942 gave abundant proof of the already well known fact that stout hearts in little boats can not handle an opponent as tough as the submarine.

The Navy was deeply grateful for the assistance so eagerly volunteered by the men who courageously risked their lives in order to make the best of available means, but there had to be better means, and to provide them no effort was spared to build up an anti-submarine force of adequate types. Submarine chasers, construction of which had been initiated before the war, began to come into service early in 1942. The British and Canadian Navies were able to assign some anti-submarine vessels to work with our coastal forces. Ocean escorts were robed to reinforce coastal areas. These measures made it possible to establish a coastal convoy system in the middle of May, 1942. Anti-submarine aviation had concurrently improved in quality and material and training of personnel. The Army Air Force had volunteered the

services of the First Bomber Command which was especially trained and outfitted for anti-submarine warfare.

The effect of these measures was quickly felt in the Eastern Sea Frontier (the coastal waters from Canada to Jacksonville) where they were first applied. With the establishment of the initial coastal convoy (under the command of Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier) in the middle of May, 1942, sinking in the vital traffic lanes of the Eastern Sea Frontier dropped off nearly to zero and have so remained. While it has not been possible to clear those routes completely—there is evidence that nearly always one or more U-boats haunt our Atlantic Coast—submarines in that area long ago ceased to be a serious problem.

When the Eastern Sea Frontier became "too hot," the U-boats began to spread farther afield. The coastal convoy system was extended as rapidly as possible to meet them in the Gulf of Mexico (under the command of Rear Admiral J. L. Kauffman, Commander Gulf Sea Frontier), the Caribbean Sea (under the command of Vice Admiral J. H. Hoover, Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier), and along the Atlantic Coast of South America. The undersea craft made a last bitter stand in the Trinidad area in the fall of 1942. Since then coastal waters have been relatively safe.

The problem was more difficult to meet in the open sea. The submarine chasers that do well enough in coastal waters are too small for ocean escort duty. Destroyers and other ocean escort types could not be produced as rapidly as the smaller craft. Aircraft capable of long overseas patrol were not plentiful, nor were aircraft carriers. In consequence, protection of ocean shipping lagged to some extent. By the end of 1942, however, this matter began to come under control, as our forces slowly increased, and there has been a steady improvement ever since.

The Atlantic anti-submarine campaign has been a closely integrated international operation. In the early phases of our participation, there was a considerable mixture of forces, as the needs of the situation were met as best they could be. For a time some British and Canadian vessels operated in our coastal escorts, while our destroyers were brigaded with British groups in the Atlantic and even occasionally as far afield as north Russian waters. As Allied strength improved in power and balance, it became possible to establish certain areas of national responsibility wherein the forces are predominantly of one nation. This simplifies the problem of administration and operation, but there still are—and probably always will be—some areas where forces of two or more nations work together in a single command, and always there is close coordination in deploying the forces of the several Allies.

There is a constant interchange of information between the large organizations maintained in the Admiralty and in the United States Fleet Headquarters (in the form of the Tenth Fleet which coordinates United States anti-U-boat activities in the Atlantic) to deal with the problems of control and protection of shipping. These organizations, also, keep in intimate touch with the War Shipping Administration in the United States and with the corresponding agency in Great Britain.

Command of anti-submarine forces—air and surface—that protect shipping in the coast-wise sea lanes of the United States and within the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico is exercised by "Sea Frontier Commanders," each assigned to a prescribed area. The command in naval except in the Panama area where the Naval Sea Frontier Commander is under the Commanding General at Panama.

Since aircraft and surface combatant ships are most effective when working as a closely knit team, it is the policy—in anti-submarine as well as other naval operations—to weld together air and surface forces in a single command in each area.

In the Atlantic Ocean, beyond the coastal area, anti-submarine forces—air and surface—are part of the Atlantic Fleet under the command of Admiral R. E. Ingersoll. One of the units of Admiral Ingersoll's fleet is the South Atlantic Force (Vice Admiral J. H. Ingram commanding) which guards shipping in the coastal waters south of the Equator and throughout the United States area of the South Atlantic. Vice Admiral Ingram's command includes highly efficient surface and air units of Brazil, which country has wholeheartedly joined our team of submarine hunters. This team, incidentally, turns its guns on surface raiders and other bigger

game when the enemy provides the opportunity.

It is appropriate to express here appreciation of the services of Netherlands anti-submarine vessels which have operated with exemplary efficiency as part of the United States Naval Caribbean Force ever since we entered the war.

Anti-submarine warfare is primarily a naval function but, in accordance with the general policy of working together, Army and Navy forces that are available turn-to together on the enemy when need arises. Thus it happens that there are instances in which Army aircraft join in the submarine hunt. The assistance of the Army Air Force has been of great value, particularly in the early phases of the war, when Naval resources were inadequate. An example of this is the formation of the Army Air Force Anti-submarine Command in the spring of 1942, which was given the equipment and training necessary to make its members anti-submarine specialists. It operated, under the command of Brigadier General (now Major General) T. W. Larson, in the United States and abroad until last November, when the Navy obtained enough equipment to take over the tasks so well performed by this command.

It is regretted that it is not possible at this time to go into the details of our anti-submarine operations in this report. It would be a great pleasure to recount the many praiseworthy exploits of our anti-submarine forces, but to do so now would jeopardize the success of future operations. The U-boat war has been a war of wits. The submarine is a weapon of stealth, and naturally enough the German operations have been shrouded in secrecy. It has been of equal importance to keep our counter measures from becoming known to the enemy. There is a constant interplay of new devices and new tactics on the part of forces working against the submarines as well as on the part of the submarines themselves, and an important element of our success has been the ability to keep the enemy from knowing what we are doing and what we are likely to do in the future. It is, also, of the utmost importance to keep our enemies from learning our anti-submarine technique, lest they turn it to their own advantage in operations against our submarines.

Submarines have not been driven from the seas, but they have changed status from menace to problem.

**The Mediterranean Theater Landings in North Africa**

In July 1942, after several months of discussions and study by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it was decided to effect landings in force in North Africa and there establish our troops in opposition to the German forces. The strategic significance of that move since has become apparent, in that the troops which were transported and landed in North Africa subsequently moved through Sicily to Italy, and there engaged enemy land forces.

The invasion of North Africa was a complicated operation. In the first place, in view of the uncertainty of the relationships existing between the French forces in that area and the Vichy government, the political situation in North Africa required the most careful and diplomatic handling. Obviously it was to our advantage to effect unopposed landings, and the problem therefore was to persuade the French forces not to resist. We could not afford, however, to take any chances in revealing our own plans, and the dealings with the French authorities had to be undertaken with utmost discretion. As it turned out, the French forces resisted initially, but within a few days agreed to an armistice.

In addition to the foregoing difficulty, it was agreed that the forces participating in the operations would consist of British and American units. Furthermore, the nature of the operations was such that the American units had to be both Army and Navy. Command relationships were worked out accordingly, and Lieutenant General (now General) D. D. Eisenhower, USA, was appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied force. His principal naval subordinate was Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, Royal Navy.

The plan agreed upon called for three points of attack: Oran and Algiers, both Algerian seaports on the Mediterranean, and Casablanca on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco. The attack forces assigned to effect landings at Oran and Algiers consisted of United States Army troops supported by British Naval units (with a few exceptions). The Casablanca attack force was composed entirely of United States forces. This report deals chiefly with the part played by United

## Army and Navy Journal 1049 April 29, 1944

States Naval forces in the operation.

Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) H. K. Hewitt, who was placed in command of the United States Naval forces designated to support the Casablanca attack, (Major General (now Lieutenant General) George S. Patton, commanded the Army troops in this attack left the United States on 24 October, and the movement overseas proceeded without untoward incident. On 7 November, the forces separated and the three attack groups, the covering force (under the command of Rear Admiral R. C. Giffen, USN) and the air groups proceeded independently to their assigned positions for the landing attacks.

### Operations in French Morocco

Operations in French Morocco were conducted by United States forces under the unified command of Rear Admiral Hewitt until General Patton's headquarters were established on shore and he was ready to assume command. The plan called for a main landing at Fedala, 14 miles north of Casablanca, and secondary landings at Port Lyautey, 65 miles north of Casablanca, and Safi, 125 miles south of Casablanca. The object of the main landing was to capture Casablanca from the land side. The principal objective at Port Lyautey was the airfield nearby, and the objective of Safi was to capture the port by direct assault and then to assist in the reduction of Casablanca.

Early in the morning of 8 November, shortly after our troops had been landed, shore batteries opened fire on the Naval forces supporting the landings at Fedala. These shore batteries were engaged at intervals during that morning by the Augusta, the Brooklyn, and accompanying destroyers. Early in the afternoon the shore batteries on Point Fedala were captured.

Several naval actions took place between Fedala and Casablanca on 8 November. Shortly after daylight, eight submarines left Casablanca. Three others were sunk at their moorings. Early in the forenoon, two French destroyer-leaders and five destroyers sortied and stood toward Fedala. They were taken under and forced to retire. Shortly afterward the French light cruiser Primauguet sortied and joined the French destroyers outside the harbor. The group, which stood toward Fedala, was promptly engaged by the Augusta and Brooklyn, and vessels of the covering force. With the exception of one transport which managed to get back to the harbor, all French ships were either sunk or beached. Meanwhile, the covering force, consisting of the Massachusetts, Wichita, Tuscaloosa, and four destroyers, exchanged fire with the shore batteries at El Hank, and the French battleship Jean Bart, which was moored in the harbor, and with the French forces that had sortied from Casablanca.

Another action took place on 10 November.

(Please turn to Page 1051)

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Financial Digest

The two year old fight of Montgomery Ward & Co. with the War Labor Board and the administration over its conduct of its labor relations hit a high mark in government control of business this week when President Roosevelt issued an executive order directing seizure of the Chicago plant.

Insistence of Sewell Avery, chairman of the board of the mail order house, in attempting to retain control of his company, led to the government's use of Army troops to forcibly oust him from his office, which was subsequently occupied by Attorney General Biddle and a corps of government aides.

Mr. Avery previously had rejected instructions from the White House and the War Labor Board demanding that he ex-

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tend an expired contract with the CIO United Mail Order, Warehouse and Retail Employees Union pending an election to determine if the CIO still represents a majority of the 3,500 workers in the Chicago plant.

Government forcible seizure of the mail order house was undertaken on the pretext that one of its branches holds war contracts, that interferences with its operations interfered with the war economy, and that it is a vital factor in the distribution of agricultural implements.

Attorneys for the mail order house have asked the United States District Court to bring to trial immediately the company's suit for injunction restraining enforcement of the government's procedure against it.

Meanwhile, the concern of members of Congress in the matter of government control of purely private business is rising and there is likelihood of an official investigation into the proceedings.

The joint statement of the experts of the United Nations that "the most practical method of assuring international monetary cooperation is through the establishment of an international monetary fund" also is likely to bring about considerable differences of opinion among the members of Congress as well as citizens concerning its sound money policies. Without sound money policies within each country such an international fund, in the opinion of many, would merely mean that the sound countries would become creditor nations for those unable, or unwilling, to regulate their own economy.

Officers Reassigned

Col. Richard E. Anderson has been transferred from Camp Carson, Colo., to another assignment and has been succeeded by Col. Polk J. Atkinson, formerly commanding officer of Ft. Meade, S. D. Ft. Meade has been taken over by the Veterans' Administration.

Merchant Marine

War Shipping Administration officials have announced that the recruitment of experienced officers and seamen is falling behind quotas necessary for the manning of American merchant ships this year. The announcement, based on recruitment results for the first three months of 1944, was made at a quarterly conference between heads of operating companies, maritime labor union leaders, and officials of Recruitment and Manning Organization, WSA.

The critical shortage is among qualified mates and engineers, cooks-bakers, radio telegraphers, and able-bodied seamen.

Coast Guard statistics for waivers issued for skilled personnel for January and February 1944 were shown to have been exceptionally high. A waiver is a permit by U. S. Coast Guard making a seaman or officer eligible for a job of higher grade than the one for which he is qualified.

Officials said in January approximately 20 per cent of all deck and 25 per cent of all engineering officers sailing from United States ports aboard American ships had to be given waivers in order that ships could sail with a full complement of skilled men.

In February approximately 15 per cent of all deck and 20 per cent of all engineering officers had to be given waivers. Figures were not available for March and April but officials said indications point to an increasing necessity for such waivers in coming months unless there is a marked return of experienced men to sea duty from shore positions.

Army Promotions

(Continued from Page 1015)

1st Lt. to Captain

N. D. Smith, AC	R. B. Chun, AC
V. M. White, QMC	R. A. King, Jr., SC
W. H. Prunty, AC	J. R. Cochran, AC
L. D. Pudney, AC	C. F. Gross, SC
T. G. Hansell, TC	C. S. Sheffey, QMC
J. E. Belcher, ANC	D. R. Van Cleave, TC
M. G. Whitmore, AC	C. R. Dahl, AC
J. N. McGee, AC	M. V. Uhlmann, ANC
E. W. Roberts, QMC	L. R. Priest, Ch
P. J. Kelleher, TC	Harry Kemp, Inf.
T. B. DeRose, Sig C	W. E. Molett, AC
H. R. Baker, CAC	C. L. Waller, TC
T. M. Killeen, AC	F. J. Donahue, AC
H. J. Bingham, AUS	W. F. Halpenny, TC
O. H. Stroh, Sig C	R. C. Burness, OD
J. W. Counter, Jr., AC	F. W. Zellmer, AC
W. A. Buchanan, AC	E. H. Morrison, AC
H. C. Carruth, AC	E. L. Rathbun, AC
L. R. Kropke, TC	J. L. Chamberlain, AC
W. D. Sieck, Sig C	R. J. Avery, Jr., AGD
J. H. Bone, MAC	C. J. Forstrom, CAC
H. V. Burch, ANC	P. P. Liscio, DC
H. D. McGee, MC	D. P. N. W. Grant, Jr., AC
F. Koelting, AGD	S. L. Stern, AC
S. J. Sax, TC	B. J. Chapman, AC
F. W. Alber, ANC	E. W. Cubbedge, Jr., CMC
S. Cohen, Sig C	W. K. Davis, DC
R. R. Reinsberg, MC	E. J. Schmehl, MC
V. Vincent, TC	E. C. Ritter, TC
J. R. Chastain, CWS	F. A. Moore, SC
W. R. Hickman, FD	A. M. Adams, AC
C. L. Ingram, QMC	R. M. Rohn, AC
J. E. Burns, Sig C	E. R. Casey, AC
L. B. Balicer, DC	W. H. Webb, Jr., QMC
G. L. Haldak, MC	H. F. Hodges, AC
C. G. Kelakos, AC	O. A. Davis, QMC
J. C. Plezia, CMC	B. W. Sloan, CE
B. Bernstein, CWS	L. A. Scott, CAC
V. L. Corzine, Sig C	L. E. Crocker, CE
C. R. Tieman, AUS	W. W. Thomas, AC
J. H. Struchen, QMC	B. Alpert, AC
S. B. Huston, VC	M. R. Esposito, AC
J. L. Crawley, Jr., FD	J. A. Kelley, AGD
R. D. Honig, Inf.	C. E. Sharon, WAC
E. H. Dessau, ANC	H. Cook, DC
R. F. Minch, OD	R. J. Beuhler, SC
C. D. Smith, Jr., TC	A. V. Palma, AC
R. W. Woltz, Sig C	M. A. Marvin, Jr., AC
E. Neumeister, TC	L. Green, MC
H. Goldberg, MC	H. T. Myer, QMC
A. Beck, MC	R. L. Howell, AC
H. M. Klotz, TC	J. A. Wilson, AGD
Isidore Brown, Sig C	R. B. Barker, AC
L. Rothbard, QMC	D. E. Coy, AC
L. Friedman, AGD	N. W. Coats, QMC
A. Marcus, TC	J. R. Hall, TC
L. E. Waterman, TC	A. L. Esposito, MC
E. A. Loeb, TC	M. W. F. Dickerson, Jr., DC
G. B. Kyle, MC	S. F. Pokut, TC
P. M. Read, MC	R. S. Jackson, MC
M. Berg, DC	W. N. Chambers, MC
M. Levine, CE	F. P. Rivara, TC
R. H. Migel, AC	J. A. Volk, TC
D. Carson, AC	W. Bruno, TC
A. H. Jespersen, CE	G. B. Fechter, AC
R. D. Cavilli, MC	E. Shine, CE
E. S. Goepper, Jr., QMC	J. D. Janco, Ch
I. F. Beumer, FD	H. J. Siegel, DC
W. D. Proper, AC	S. Wechsler, MC
W. V. Banning, MC	L. W. Chase, QMC
G. B. Harrison, SC	M. Rutner, AC
W. B. Bertolet, Inf.	E. F. Mulfur, DC
J. M. Walsh, Ch	
H. J. McPartland, ANC	
R. J. Knight, FD	
E. K. Briles, WAC	
C. T. Ewell, DC	

H. M. Friedman, MC	J. M. Black, MC
J. F. Keiser, CAC	W. F. Shanks, AC
G. S. Hunter, AC	R. D. McLain, AC
J. C. Smith, AC	C. M. Smith, Jr., AC
R. L. Jordan, AC	R. W. Wells, AC
G. W. Hayes, DC	H. E. Kuhn, AC
H. T. Ausdenmoore, Ch	H. C. Mattingly, SC
	B. J. Entine, DC

2nd Lt. to 1st Lt.

M. E. Abrams, WAC	K. H. Butsch, SC
A. Ray, QMC	R. B. Alderson, SC
B. F. Douglas, AC	Al Kraft, OD
R. Sweetland, ANC	C. E. Barney, Inf.
C. L. Ashlock, TC	W. E. McNulty, Inf.
W. S. Melnick, AC	C. N. Williams, OD
L. J. Young, AC	G. P. Cottor, AG
K. B. Evans, Inf.	C. R. Thompson, SC
C. J. Todd, AC	J. H. Oatis, TC
M. M. Wilhelm, ANC	J. H. Cunningham, Inf.
W. N. Edwards, AC	J. D. Bowman, FD
P. G. Hedman, ANC	J. E. Engel, AC
L. Deutsch, AC	J. A. Parr, Inf.
A. C. Conrad, ANC	H. Vail, ANC
A. Villamari, ANC	R. P. Crawford, Inf.
Z. Mitchell, ANC	G. F. Miller, SC
L. L. Hendricks, ANC	J. M. Tuohy, QMC

N. H. Ohlwein, ANC	N. Kushel, SC
J. H. Allen, SC	J. P. Redmond, SC
E. R. Coiner, QMC	S. Kowalsky, TC
M. L. Sarin, ANC	V. K. Ferrick, TC
E. T. Carlin, QMC	V. K. Diamond, CAC
E. Pauw, WAC	R. W. Lau, AC
R. Baciol, ANC	M. Mandel, AC
M. J. Wade, ANC	J. F. O'Flynn, AC
L. R. Milbrandt, ANC	J. F. Clark, AC
	H. A. Rosenberg, AC
	I. Domowitz, SC
	R. G. Gottesman, SC
	E. A. Landau, AUS
	J. C. Carey, SC
	A. R. Solomon, SC
	G. G. Kahl, SC
	H. Wolf, OD
	E. M. Miller, TC
	M. J. Clark, Inf.
	D. J. Sheehan, AFD
	B. Kaufman, TC
	S. A. Barnett, SC
	J. R. Johnson, Inf.
	C. W. Browning, Inf.
	F. W. Hancock, SC
	L. Parker, QMC
	R. N. Ness, SC
	G. H. Oliver, Inf.
	L. A. Wagner, WAC
	C. C. Martin, Inf.
	F. B. Miller, Inf.
	H. A. Matelski, AC
	W. F. Young, TC
	G. L. Beardsley, ANC
	A. P. Bartholomew, Jr., FD
	J. H. Persson, SC
	O. E. Coville, SC
	S. B. Welch, AC
	J. R. Johnson, Inf.
	C. W. Browning, Inf.
	F. W. Hancock, SC
	L. H. Parker, QMC
	R. N. Ness, SC
	G. H. Oliver, Inf.
	L. A. Wagner, WAC
	C. C. Martin, Inf.
	F. B. Miller, Inf.
	H. A. Matelski, AC
	W. F. Young, TC
	G. L. Beardsley, ANC
	A. E. Hooper, QMC
	W. H. McBride, AC
	F. J. Weisberger, Jr., CE
	J. W. Rank, FA
	T. S. Shaw, Jr., Inf.
	R. G. Neds, AUS
	G. A. Williams, ANC
	M. T. Brennenman, QMC
	J. D. Pierson, AC
	L. H. Yaffe, AC
	P. E. Phetteplace, AC
	I. H. Keatley, AC
	P. E. Adams, Jr., SC
	L. D. Snyder, CE
	W. B. Montgomery, SC
	J. G. McDowell, Jr., AUS
	R. V. Isaacs, Inf.
	W. R. Hebbelin, CE
	E. B. Storey, TC
	T. F. Brunner, AUS
	W. G. Best, AC
	D. E. Friday, AC
	C. L. Cardwell, FD
	W. W. Dick, AC
	J. L. Meahl, AC
	R. P. Worcester, Inf.
	R. W. Armbruster, Jr., AC
	W. J. Elvin, Jr., Inf.
	R. A. Craig, AC
	F. E. Hassey, AUS
	W. H. Crescenti, OD
	H. J. White, AC
	M. P. Meagher, ANC
	A. B. Dooliver, AC
	M. L. Rose, ANC
	C. E. Smith, FD
	T. S. Blood, AC
	A. G. Muller, Inf.
	F. J. DiCiaccio, FA
	H. Mountford, Jr., MAC
	E. Gandy, WAC
	R. I. Hunter, CE
	R. E. Morey, CWS
	W. H. Morse, SC
	W. P. Carney, Inf.
	M. H. Whitney, AUS
	E. W. Fordney, Jr., QMC
	L. D. Bell, SC
	J. P. Nothout, Inf.
	J. T. Ely, SC
	E. T. Crook, AC
	T. N. Moore, Inf.
	J. M. Worrell, AUS
	L. D. Kirby, FD
	L. M. Hvass, ANC
	E. T. Rankin, Jr., SC
	J. L. Watkins, MC
	H. W. MacNamee, Inf.
	J. E. Boeggeman, TC
	A. E. Kotcher, ANC
	H. F. Leftwich, OD
	J. G. Wilmarth, QMC
	T. E. Robinson, Inf.
	L. D. Bell, SC
	J. P. Nothout, Inf.
	J. T. Ely, SC
	E. T. Crook, AC
	T. N. Moore, Inf.
	J. M. Worrell, AUS
	L. D. Kirby, FD
	L. M. Hvass, ANC
	E. T. Rankin, Jr., SC
	C. R. King, QMC
	M. E. Danbom, SC
	T. J. Wallace, AUS
	N. C. Holst, TC
	G. M. Liebig, ANC

## Text of Admiral King's Report

(Continued from Page 1049)

Late in the forenoon the enemy vessels took up a position outside of the harbor of Casablanca and opened fire on our troops ashore, whereupon the *Augusta* and four destroyers stood toward Casablanca and engaged the two enemy vessels. While in that position, the *Augusta* was fired upon by the *Jean Bart*. The *Augusta* and accompanying destroyers immediately retired.

Sometime between 8 November and 10 November, the *Jean Bart* was sunk at her moorings, but the water was shallow and she was able to continue to fire.

Thanks to the elimination of the French forces at Casablanca the landings at Fedala were successfully completed, but the aftermath was costly. On 11 November, the transports Joseph Hewes, the older Winooski and the destroyer Hambleton were torpedoed. The *Hewes* sank in an hour, and the other two ships were later taken to Casablanca for repairs. On 12 November, the transports Hugh Scott and Edward Rutledge were torpedoed and immediately caught fire and burned. All these attacks were assumed to be from Axis submarines.

### The Attack on Safi

The attack on Safi was made principally by two destroyers, the Bernadou and Cole, which were supported by gunfire from a covering group under the command of Rear Admiral L. A. Davidson, consisting of the battleship New York, the cruiser Philadelphia, and the destroyer Mervine. The Bernadou, carrying army troops, and the Mervine, with naval personnel, made a daring entry into the harbor early in the morning of the 8th, and there landed their troops without serious difficulty.

### Port Lyautay

The landings at Port Lyautay were made with comparatively little difficulty. Stiff resistance was later encountered south of the mouth of the Oued Sebou River, and shore batteries were not silenced until 9 November. Ships furnishing naval gunfire and naval aircraft support included the Texas, the Savannah, and a number of destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Monroe Kelly, USN.

### The Oran Operation

The naval support for the landings at Oran was furnished by the British naval forces. In order to facilitate the capture of Oran, however, it was decided to seize the harbor of Arzeu, about 25 miles east of Oran, and by a daring and well executed assault, a small raiding party, under Captain Walter Ansel, USN, captured the harbor early in the morning of 8 November.

Also assigned to assist British naval forces was a small United States naval unit commanded by Lieutenant Commander George D. Dickey, USN. This unit, together with army units, was embarked in two British ships, HMS *Walney* and *Hartleb*, both of which were formerly U. S. Coast Guard cutters. Upon entering the harbor early in the morning of 8 November, both ships were discovered and sunk.

### The Algiers Operation

Included in the naval task force assigned to assist in the Algiers landings was a division of four American transports. These vessels had proceeded from Great Britain in time to arrive on the Algerian coast simultaneously with the forces arriving on the Moroccan coast from the United States. Late in the afternoon of 7 November, the transport Thomas Stone was torpedoed. Her troops thereupon were put in landing boats about 100 miles from Algiers. After a hazardous trip, during which a number of the landing craft were lost, they succeeded in reaching the Algerian coast, but by that time, hostilities had ceased.

The transport Leedstown was attacked by German aircraft on the evening of 8 November, and again on the following afternoon, and was sunk by torpedoes. The loss of personnel was light.

With the successful negotiation of the armistice on 11 November, resistance from the French forces ceased, and in so far as the immediate participation of United States naval forces was concerned, the operation ended. Meanwhile, however, a naval unit on the east coast of French Morocco was established as a Sea Frontier, under the command of Rear Admiral John L. Hall, USN, and a Naval Operating Base at Oran, under the command of Rear Admiral A. C. Bennett, USN, was also established.

The United States naval forces participating in these operations were taken from the United States Atlantic Fleet.

### Landings in Sicily

By May 1943, German forces had been driven from Tunisia, and by that time our fighting strength was such that we were able to make definite plans for a major offensive move against the enemy in his own territory. Sicily was selected as the immediate objective, and an amphibious operation on the largest yet undertaken was planned. Generally speaking, one part of the operation was to be a ship-to-shore movement in which our troops were to be taken to the scene of the landing in transports and there embarked for the actual landing in small boats. The second part was a shore-to-shore movement, the troops being transported directly to the landing beaches from the point of embarkation.

In like the North African operation, the landings in Sicily were to be combined British and American. General Eisenhower was given command of the expeditionary force and Admiral Cunningham was given command of all naval forces participating. Under these officers were three task forces, one of which was (with the usual provisions for change-over in command) under the command of Vice Admiral Hewitt, and Lieutenant General George S. Patton. Army air forces were under the command of Brigadier

General (now Major General) Carl Spaatz. Under the plan agreed upon, landings were to be made at five places on the Island of Sicily. Three of those objectives, namely Scoglitti, Gela, and Licata, on the south coast of Sicily, were to be attacked by the American task force.

This report concerns itself primarily with the activities of the American Naval forces in the operation.

In anticipation of the operation, transports, cruisers and destroyers were assembled at Oran and Algiers. Various types of landing craft were assembled at Tunis and Bizerte. There were some exceptions to that arrangement. On 5 July, the largest ships of the Scoglitti force left Oran and on the following day they were joined by the ships of the Gela force from Algiers. As the force passed Tunis and Bizerte they were joined by the small craft.

### Scoglitti

The landing at Scoglitti, early in the morning of 10 July, which was preceded by bombardment of shore batteries and beach positions by our Naval units, was accomplished with comparatively little opposition, as the Italian troops abandoned their positions at the first attack. Landings at Scoglitti were both ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore operations, and by early forenoon all troops were on the beach.

### Gela

The landings at Gela were more of a shore-to-shore undertaking than those at Scoglitti. Troops landed on schedule, and the first wave encountered slight opposition, but the second wave met stiff resistance and suffered heavy casualties until the shore batteries were silenced by the Naval gunfire from the light cruisers Savannah and Boise.

### Licata

The landing at Licata was almost entirely a shore-to-shore operation, practically all troops being transported in small craft. After comparatively heavy opposition was encountered, all beaches were captured by early forenoon and the unloading of supplies began. We lost the destroyer Maddox and the minesweeper *Sentinel* in the operation, both being sunk by bombs.

After the Licata landing had been accomplished, the participating forces were subjected to intense enemy air attack which lasted three days. During that three-day period, also, the enemy launched a counterattack with tanks, which took up a position from which they could fire on the beaches and at the ships standing by. When this tank attack developed, our cruisers and destroyers moved inshore and opened fire on them, pending the establishment of anti-tank fire on the beach. So effective was naval gunfire on this occasion that the tanks were successfully repulsed at a most opportune time. Had there been no naval gunfire support, or had it been less effective, our landing force in all probability would have been driven into the sea.

By the 13th, most of our ships had completed unloading and left the area.

\* \* \* \* \*

As our troops advanced inland and along the coasts from their landing points, their advance was supported from time to time by naval gunfire. During the period 12-14 July, our cruisers and destroyers bombarded Porto Empedocle and Agrigento, this bombardment being one of the factors which contributed to the capture of those towns on 17 July. This bombardment was followed by a short lull, in so far as naval participation was concerned (a second contingent of transports had already arrived) and it was not until the end of the month that our forces were again employed directly in the attacks. On 31 July, fresh troops were transported to Palermo. These transports were attacked by German air forces when in Palermo harbor, but were effectively protected by our destroyers.

Throughout the month of August the navy supported the movements of land forces as they closed in on Messina. Naval gunfire destroyed shore batteries, roads, bridges, and other objectives, and on 17 August, a task force of cruisers and destroyers proceeded against southern Italy.

### Landings in Italy

Landings in Italy were in logical sequence to the occupation of Sicily. Shortly after the Sicilian operation was completed, British forces began crossing the Straits of Messina, and in order to assist these forces in their progress up the Italian Peninsula, a combined Anglo-American attack was undertaken some distance in the rear of Axis troops opposing the British. The general region chosen was that portion of the Italian coast extending from Cape Circeo to the southern headland to the Gulf of Policastro and containing the important harbors of Naples, Gaeta, and Salerno. The particular part of the coast selected for the initial assault was the Bay of Salerno, which offered a number of beaches suitable for troops landings.

Although the troops employed in the landings were exclusively British or American, the Naval forces supporting them were mixed. The latter were placed under the command of Vice Admiral Hewitt and divided into two parts, one of which was predominantly British and the other predominantly American. The American (southern) Attack force was assigned coverage for the landings at Salerno.

The principal American convoy assembled at Oran, and British forces formed up at Tripoli, Palermo, Terminal (in Sicily) and Bizerte, and from time to time, beginning 5 September, sailed from the points of assembly.

The landings were made on the morning of 9 September, and although successfully accomplished, met immediate resistance from the Germans, who delivered a series of air attacks for the next two days. Also, enemy fire on the ground was intense, exceeding anything previously experienced and proving considerably more troublesome than had been anticipated. In spite of the resistance, however, (which included counterattacks,

some of which were broken up most opportunely, as at Licata, by fire of naval vessels) the port of Salerno was captured by the 10th, and after heavy fighting on the 11th and 12th in the vicinity of Salerno, the town of Battipaglia was captured.

On the 13th and 14th, the enemy succeeded in retaking some of the ground previously gained by our troops. Our naval units, however, continued to lend reinforcements and supplies, and Allied warships, including battleships, cruisers and destroyers, bombarded enemy positions. During the remainder of the operation, our naval forces kept up a steady flow of supplies to the various beaches, bombarded shore objectives, helped to repel air raids, and finally on 1 October, took the city of Naples under bombardment.

For several months our naval forces continued to operate in the Mediterranean area chiefly in supplying our troops in that theater and in keeping open the lines of supply.

On 21 January, 1944, a joint force landed at Anzio, Italy and there established a beach head. The amphibious task force participating was under the command of Rear Admiral F. J. Lowry. Gunfire support for the operation was furnished by cruisers and destroyers.

### TEAMWORK

#### The Navy Team

Representing as it does intense scientific research and the development of various methods of fighting for hundreds of years, modern naval warfare is admittedly complex. Historically, any new method of fighting, whether with or without new weapons, has been productive of counter measures which are usually successful in reducing its effectiveness. This may be expected to continue. So far as new methods and weapons are concerned, we are in a position to set the pace.

The Navy, perhaps more than any other of the services, is dependent on a high quality of engineering skill and practice. All our ships and planes, the establishment which designs and builds them, and the equipment which operates and arms them could not exist without the engineer and the technical expert. We are fortunate in having in the United States in an unequalled degree the necessary engineering brains, educational facilities and technical knowledge.

Each technician on board ship must learn not only how to operate his own particular part of its machinery, he must also learn how to operate it so that it will contribute most to the efficiency of that ship as a unit. There is no better example of the necessity of team work than a modern man-of-war. In a submarine, for instance, every man in the crew and every officer, has a job which directly affects the handling and operating of the ship, her hitting power, and her survival, and each depends on the other to do the right thing at the right time.

Once a unit is trained to operate efficiently by itself, the next problem is to train it to operate with other ships and planes so that all may function as parts of a powerful but smooth running machine. Each unit must learn to play its position on the team, and the whole team must be equipped, coached, drilled and taught to fight and win, anywhere in the world.

Mobility is one of the prime military qualities. The surface, submarine and air forces of the Navy possess mobility in a high degree. With the increased tempo of our operations, therefore, the question of timing—strategically and tactically—is all important. It is the basis of the coordinated striking power—the overall "teamwork"—which has been successfully used in past operations, and which we count upon with confidence for even more successful operations, yet to come.

#### The Army and Navy Team

In February, 1942, the President established an agency known as the "U. S. Chiefs of Staff," (frequently called the "Joint Chiefs of Staff") whose function it is to exercise strategic control of our armed forces in the war. The members of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff are the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy; the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

By effective coordination of strategic plans and their execution the U. S. Chiefs of Staff have in effect operated the Army and Navy as one national military force. Furthermore, by continuous exchange of information of all kinds, including that relating to operating techniques, new weapons, and strategic and tactical problems, the two services have been able to derive the maximum benefit not only from each other, but from all other agencies whose activities have a direct bearing on the conduct of the war.

In keeping with the unity of action taken by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, that agency has worked out and established certain principles relating to unity of command in joint operations. Under those principles, and having due regard for the qualifications of the officer and the type of operations likely to predominate in a given theater, the supreme commander in the theater, and his principal subordinates, may be officers of any one of the services. For example, it was agreed that under certain conditions unity of command in our sea frontiers (which correspond generally to Army defense commands) would be exercised by Naval officers. Under other conditions, unity of command would be vested in Army officers. Another example was the unity of command vested in General Eisenhower in the North African operation. Still another is the unity of command exercised by Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific Ocean.

The principle of unity of command as it exists within our own forces, by agreement with the British Chiefs of Staff, is extended to situations where forces of more than one nation are engaged in the same operation. The operations in the Mediterranean theater illustrate that arrangement, which has worked well.

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### The Allied Team

The British Chiefs of Staff or their representatives in Washington and the U. S. Chiefs of Staff working together are known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The headquarters of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff are in Washington, and there the day to day problems of the war are under continuous consideration. Representatives of other Allied nations and dominions attend the Washington meetings from time to time.

At intervals the Combined Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff, together with the heads of their respective governments, have met to discuss and decide upon the over-all conduct of the war. In meetings at Casablanca, Washington, Quebec and Cairo-Teheran during the year 1943, agreements of far reaching importance were reached. Russian representatives attended at Teheran and Chinese representatives were present at Cairo.

These international conferences, which are of sufficient duration to allow thorough presentations of matters of mutual interest, make possible on-the-spot decisions not only with respect to strategy and command relationships for combined operations but also with respect to the commitments of each country.

In addition to the foregoing, the discussions relating to the war effort in the Pacific area were made possible by the formation of the Pacific War Council. That body, over which the President of the United States presides, is composed of representatives of the United States, Australia, Canada, China, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines Commonwealth, and the United Kingdom. The Council does not meet regularly, but was established as a means to promote informal exchanges of views and information.

### CONCLUSION

As this report is concluded we can look back with satisfaction on the progress of the war to date, and with just pride in the part played therein by the United States.

In the European theater, our forces have taken part in driving the enemy out of Africa, and have shared in the occupation of Sicily and in the invasion of Italy, which resulted in its capitulation. The Russian army, turning against the Germans in an irresistible offensive has driven them back to the borders of Poland and Roumania. France has been given new hope. Instead of being a daily target for the German air forces, Great Britain has become a base for an air offensive against the heart of the Axis on a scale which dwarfs the greatest German attacks of the war. The German submarine fleet has been reduced from a menace to a problem. The encirclement of Germany is in sight.

As of 1 March 1944, the situation in the European theater is increasingly desperate for the Axis and correspondingly encouraging for us.

The German structure of satellite states is crumbling. Italy has fallen and is a battlefield in which 20 German divisions are taking heavy punishment. Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland are weakening. The Balkans are afire with Guerrilla war, and other occupied countries await only the signal.

The Russian armies continue to advance, a massive invasion threatens in the West, and with all this, Germany is scientifically and remorselessly being bombed on a scale whose magnitude and increasing tempo have flattened her cities, wrecked her factories, and can not but be a major factor in her eventual collapse.

In the Pacific theater, the Japanese, after their attack on Pearl Harbor, advanced with impressive speed and power through the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies into the Solomon Islands, in the general direction of Australia and New Zealand. Following these successful advances, they effected landings in the Aleutian Islands and attacked Midway. The Japanese advance was checked, however, almost as abruptly as it had begun. Our successes in the Solomons, in the central Pacific, and in the northern Pacific, are now matters of record, and we have had time to build up our strength, and to test our power. Our outposts, which two years ago were on a line running from Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians to Midway, thence to Fiji, Samoa, and Australia, now begin at Attu, on the tip of the Aleutians, and extend south through the Marshall Islands to the Bismarcks and New Guinea.

Through experience, we have mastered and improved the technique of amphibious operations, in which the Japanese were so proficient in the early days of the war. Our Army and Navy forces have learned how to fight as one team. We have learned how to make the most of what we have, but it is no longer necessary to ask our commanders to get along as best they can on inadequate means. The numerical inferiorities which were so pronounced in the Java Sea campaign, and in subsequent actions in the Solomons have been reversed. Our submarines and planes are cutting deeper and deeper into the vital Japanese shipping, and our fleets move in the central Pacific unchallenged.

The war against Japan has gone increasingly well of late. From their posts of maximum advance in the Pacific, the Japanese have been driven back progressively by a series of offensive operations. Important as our own advances toward Japan are, they do not fully represent the improvement in our position. Japanese capacity to maintain the war at sea and in her advanced areas has suffered increasingly, due to the loss of vital shipping, while the growth of our power in the Pacific enables us to threaten attack on the Marianas and Carolines and Kuriles, which may be called the intermediate zone of defense of the Empire.

Japan will not be directly under attack (Continued on Next Page)

**Urge Defense Dept.**  
(Continued from First Page)

Juncture would be unthinkable."

Mr. Forrestal declared that the question of a military organization should be answered after detailed examination "rather than acting upon the assumption that the case is already established."

"I don't believe it is," he added.

Referring to the assumption that air power must form a separate and distinct branch of the services "to the extent that the Army and Navy are separate and distinct," Mr. Forrestal said the assumption has been supported by every Army witness but is "one entirely foreign to the naval concept of its mission and functions."

"This is a matter which this committee can profitably explore so that the various considerations can be made plain," Mr. Forrestal added.

Concluded his statement, the Under Secretary said, "Of course, you will hear the testimony of many naval officers during this hearing. I want you to know that they have been instructed to state their personal views freely and frankly. They are not to attempt to conform to any pattern."

Navy witnesses scheduled to appear include Vice Adm. Richard S. Edwards, chief of staff and aide to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet; Vice Adm. Frederick J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Vice Adm. Randall Jacobs, Chief of Naval Personnel, and Vice Adm. Arthur B. Cook, Commandant of the Tenth Naval District.

The unanimity of the Army witnesses was reflected in the reaction of the 23-man committee which appeared wholeheartedly to endorse the idea of a single department.

However, among the Congressmen, as among the War Department leaders, were some differences as to details. Particularly in question was when the consolidation should be carried out. General Somervell and Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansh, Jr., Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, urged an immediate beginning. The Secretary of War stated the combination could not be undertaken during the war, not until the European phase of the conflict was ended, at least.

The Secretary of War, General Somervell and Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, urged that Congress lay down the principle of consolidation now, leaving the details to be worked out after the war. However, General McNarney urged that Congress set a date—"not later than six months after the close of hostilities"—for the consolidation to become effective. In this, General McNarney reflected the fears of Representative Short, Mo., and other members of the committee that if nothing is done until after the war, the pressure of those opposed to disturbing the status quo will be much more difficult to combat than during the war.

Outlining the purpose of the committee at its opening session, Monday, Chairman Woodrum, Va., declared:

"The committee has no purpose or intention whatsoever to suggest any organizational change in the military establishment that would affect its operations during the present war. Our concern is purely for the post war period."

The committee, Mr. Woodrum made clear, is not a legislative group and will not bring in any bills. However, he later indicated to reporters that he or other members of the committee, as individuals, might later introduce bills which would reflect the sentiments of the group.

In their differences of opinions on details the witnesses obeyed the abjuration of Representative Wadsworth, N. Y., sponsor of the committee, to give their own opinions and counsels.

Mr. Wadsworth is an avowed proponent of a single department of defense. Mr. Woodrum has not made his position clear, declaring that he has an open mind on the question. However, he opened the hearings Monday by stating:

"If this war up to now has given us one great lesson it is that to win in mod-

ern warfare there must be teamwork. Today we have that teamwork—on the land, on the sea, in the air, and on the home front our fighting forces move forward to victory, and it is possible only because it moves forward as one great fighting force."

First Army witness was Brig. Gen. John McA. Palmer, adviser to the Special Planning Division of the War Department, aide to General John J. Pershing, who was assigned by General Pershing towards the close of World War I to take part in plans for a post-war organization.

"In my opinion," General Palmer told the committee, "the post war military establishment should be headed by a single executive department having control over all the armed forces. Without such a control necessary coordination must be left to the President, without any established machinery to aid him in that coordination."

Mr. Maas interjected that the single department with one head does not go far enough. The Army, Navy and Air Force as such should be abolished, he declared, and "unification should go down to the combat teams."

"All necessary coordination can be worked out in a single department of war," General Palmer replied. "I haven't studied the matter (Mr. Maas' proposal) but it seems to me the matter could be worked out without going that far."

General Palmer was followed by Brig. Gen. William F. Tompkins, director of the Special Planning Division, who declared that the duplications of two departments must be ended if the United States, with its post-war debt, is to support an adequate defense organization.

"You will be interested to know," he told the committee, "that our investigation of this fundamental question showed a remarkable unanimity of opinion within the War Department. I can say that of all the officers of the War Department with whom I have discussed the matter, and I have talked with many, I have yet to find one who did not believe that a single department of the armed forces was the best solution to the problem."

The Secretary of War reiterated General Tompkins' statement, declaring that a single department "is essential if our nation is adequately and most effectively to carry on its wars under modern conditions, which have revealed that even our great nation has limitations in manpower and resources. I believe that this view is held among the civilian and military leaders of my department with substantial unanimity."

The Secretary continued:

"At present our armed services are divided into two entirely separate branches. There has been no failure in earnest effort on the part of the military leaders of both these branches by cooperation to make the systems work together. I have had long and abundant opportunities to observe the cooperation of the armed services in both peace and war. I believe there has never been a time in the history of our country when better cooperation, or even as good cooperation, between those branches has existed as there has been during this war."

"I attribute this not to the form of the present organization but to the personalities of the military leaders, their good will, and their intelligent and devoted efforts, assisted by the pressure of circumstances which furthered their action."

"But our experiences in the war have abundantly brought out that voluntary cooperation, no matter how successful, cannot under any conditions of warfare, and particularly under 'tri-tribal' warfare, be as effective results produced by a single authority as some form of combination and concentrated authority at the level of Staff planning, supervision and control. In warfare it is a long standing and thoroughly tested principle that no voluntary cooperation of independent forces can achieve the effective results produced by a single authority in such planning, supervision, and control. Consequently there have been in this war, in spite of the earnest efforts of the military leaders of the two services at cooperation, many duplications of time, material, and manpower, with the loss of effectiveness, resources, and power which such duplications inevitably produce."

"Under our present organization of separate departments, disagreements have to be resolved at very high levels, or even by the President of the United States himself—a necessarily slow and inadequate process."

"Our armed services have accepted the principle of unity of command in theaters of operation and it is working extremely well. This tends, I believe with great success, to eliminate duplications originating in the fields of actual operation. Manifestly, however, it cannot avoid the results of our failure to accept the same principle of unity in the higher commands of the services at home and in the procurement of men and material."

"I do not believe that any such fundamental reorganization could take place at a critical period in this war without difficulties, dangers, and complications which would more than offset its advantages. We are now in the midst of great battles and, while we should continually plan for the best organization of military forces, we should continually plan for the best organization of military forces, we should so time any actual changes in organization at the higher levels as to ensure that no slowing down of operations in the field will take place. Otherwise such changes made hastily might result in temporary disorganization and would be far too much of a strain on the men and machinery involved, particularly as they are now operating in high gear. You cannot radically change a great military organization at a critical moment of war any more than you could change the engine of an airplane while it was in flight."

"But, on the other hand, it seems to me of the greatest importance that the general principle of consolidation be determined upon as soon as possible."

"Once that is decided, even though not carried out until after the termination of hostilities, (at least in the European theater), it is made far easier to settle questions of duplications. Many such questions could be readily resolved even now if that general principle were determined, and progress could be made to a point where the final consolidation could be effected without great difficulty."

Gen. McNarney

"Difficult enough to achieve in time of war," Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, told the committee, "it is too much to hope that in the peacetime rivalry for limited funds, this principle of unified command can endure without statutory authority."

He continued:

"To retain this principle of unified command requires a single Department for the Armed Forces. In my opinion, the following essentials must be provided:

"A U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff organization headed by a Chief of Staff to the Constitutional Commander in Chief and including the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Forces. I would include in this group the Director of Common Supply Services, but in a status subordinate to that of the various Chiefs of Staff. The main functions of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff would be in the field of military strategy and in making budgetary recommendations and allocations of appropriated funds. As the President's principal military advisers, they would have the legal authority to report to him direct."

"There must be one overall organization headed by a Secretary for the Armed Forces under whose direction there can be overall control of the three armed forces. I suggest that there be provided an Under Secretary for the Army, an Under Secretary for the Navy, and an Under Secretary for Air. I would add to the three armed services which are united in this single department, a fourth element, directly under the Secretary for the Armed Forces, which would consist of the common supply services that can be combined, and which could render supply services which are not peculiar to any one service."

"It is all-important that the organic law establishing a single Department for the Armed Forces permit its accomplishment by evolutionary processes. I can not be too emphatic in stressing this point. In working out a single Department for the Armed Forces we must avoid the error of trying to prescribe exact specifications to cover the multitudinous details that can only be worked out in an evolutionary manner. If at this time the Committee or the Congress tries to work out and prescribe how all the complicated pieces will fit together, I am sure that there will be such confusion over details as to becloud the entire issue. It should be admitted that there are many possible variations of the various details of the reorganization which are equally acceptable."

He concluded:

"I wish to reiterate the importance of securing early Congressional action which will prescribe in broad terms the organization and status of the United States Chiefs of Staff, and which will establish the principle of three services within one single Department for the Armed Forces. An essential part of the proposed legislation is that broad authority be granted to make the change in an evolutionary manner over a considerable period of time. It is likewise essential that this broad question of overall organization be determined as a matter of principle, and that unnecessary involvement in unimportant details be avoided so that they will not confuse or delay a settlement on the overriding issue. In my opinion, the establishment of an organization for national defense such as I have outlined presents an opportunity which must not go unchallenged. It is the greatest single forward step that can be made."

Taking direct issue with General McNarney, and with a similar proposal by Lt. Gen. Breton Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Chairman Vinson of the House Naval Affairs Committee declared that he was opposed to granting any blanket reorganization authority. "Congress must pass on the details," he said. "Moreover, the men on the firing lines and at sea should contribute their opinions. We should hear from Eisenhower, Nimitz and the others."

Mr. Vinson cross-examined each witness at length on their proposals to make

Air, co-equal with Ground and Sea Forces, until finally Chairman May of the House Military Affairs Committee declared: "I don't propose to let the House Naval Affairs Committee run these hearings." Mr. Vinson declared that he was not speaking for the Navy or the Naval Committee, but wanted to know how creation of three, instead of two branches, would help consolidation. He indicated that he favored the continuance of Air in its pre-war position as a bureau in each department, co-equal with the Infantry or the submarine force.

General McNarney defended higher status for Air, declaring bluntly:

"Advance of air will be more rapid under a Chief of Staff for Air, than if Air is just a part of the armed forces."

Representative Maas urged again that consolidation go further—to one armed force with a single uniform, with personnel specializing in the various branches.

"Possibly at some future date the single department might work into such a force," General McNarney said. "We in the Army have been endeavoring to weld our Infantry, Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery and the like into one team known as the Ground Forces. That in itself is an evolutionary process."

Under Secretary of War Patterson's testimony was directed to the advisability of eliminating duplication in procurement and production. He urged a single supply service for the armed forces, citing many instances of needless cost, delay and inefficiency due to duplicating supply and procurement services. He also stated that he thought the Army and Navy hospital services could well be combined.

Referring to Air, he said:

"In my personal opinion, I think the Air should be a third arm, with this reservation: that planes operating from carrier must be under the Navy."

Assistant Secretary of War for Air Lovett also advocated a co-equal status for Air.

He declared:

"I assume that the military organization in this country will find it necessary and desirable to maintain a highly specialized and efficient Fleet Air Force as part of the Navy. I likewise assume that this Fleet Air Force will consist of carrier and ship based aircraft; and that permanent land based aircraft will become the responsibility of the United States Air Force. I assume that aircraft for Sea Forces and Ground Forces will be allocated and disposed in the interest of national defense by a combined and unified staff consisting of the top Ground, Sea and Air Officers in this country, and not on the tortured interpretation of antiquated documents dealing with vague theories and doctrines which have to be thrown away the moment war breaks out."

Mr. Lovett further urged a single procurement agency for aircraft, consolidation of research, elimination of duplications in staff, intelligence, weather, communications, and the like; joint recruitment and basic training; joint storage and supply, and consolidation of air bases.

In his statement, Mr. Lovett revealed that the question of a single department of defense was brought up by the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending that a decision be made to plan the establishment of a single Department of the Armed Forces."

Asked by Mr. Vinson whether he would support a proposal to put the Army and all its units and the Navy and all its units under one head, Mr. Lovett answered: "No. That would not in itself eliminate duplications and overlapping functions."

"It is not just theaters that need unity of command but the country as a whole," he added. "A single department of defense will make unity of command infinitely easier."

**Text of Admiral King's Report**  
(Continued from Preceding Page)

as Germany is now, until the citadel area of that empire, island and continental, is under our threat or control, but the current and prospective circumstances in the Pacific Theater present a situation which must be as dark and threatening to Japan as it is full of promise to us.

Both in Europe and in the Pacific, long roads still lie ahead. But we are now fully entered on those roads, fortified with unity, power, and experience, imbued with confidence and determined to travel far and fast to victory.

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